South China Sea: March 2017

Thursday, 30 March 2017

India’s role as US-China positions harden

Is the world dangerously moving closer towards war?

The South China Morning Post quotes an official from China’s Central Military Commission writing, “A war ‘within the president’s term ‘ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practicality reality” (The Statesman 29 January 2017). Quite obviously, it is in reaction to the recent statements coming out of the new administration in the United States.

This view is shared by Dan De Luce who in a recent post in the Foreign Policy Magazine (26 January 2017) has accused Trump of leading the world to the brink. He quotes Evan Medeiros who served as the top advisor on Asia in Barack Obama’s White House, labeling the US under Trump as both ‘confrontational and disoriented’ on the South China Sea. He argues that the new administration’s statements about US policy towards China and South China Sea are not only antagonizing and provoking China but also confusing allies and aggravating tensions.

Rex Tillerson, Trump’s choice for secretary of state, stunned lawmakers and foreign governments at his January 11 Senate confirmation hearing when he said that the United States would be ready to block China’s access to artificial islands it is building in the South China Sea. If it is a serious statement of policy that the US would be ready to act upon, it would require a blockade ‘which is an act of war’.

Like on many other issues, Trump believes, and he has very much given everyone to so understand from his campaign days, that it is time for the US to replace its weak dealing with China by a strong hand, assuming that getting tougher with China will lead Beijing to back down. So he is ready to break with the US stance on China of the past several decades.

The statements emanating from the new US administration seem to suggest it is “willing to court conflict with China without being terribly well-informed on this issue,” De Luce quotes Mira Rapp-Hooper of the Center for a New American Security as saying.

The idea behind Trump’s approach seems to be that the United States has been weak in its dealings with Beijing, and that a strong hand is needed. Experts say the Trump administration is testing the hypothesis that if Washington simply gets tougher with China, Beijing will back down. But US encounters with China during Clinton or Bush administrations were by no means easy to handle. China has only grown more powerful today with a massive economy and an increasingly capable military ‘equipped with ship-killing missiles that threaten the U.S. Navy’s dominance’. And its leaders confidently believe that their country’s moment has arrived.

Whether on Taiwan or South China Sea, China has made clear that it is not going to back down under pressure. Foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said: “We urge the United States to respect the facts, [and] speak and act cautiously to avoid harming the peace and stability of the South China Sea.”

The Trump administration’s policies, as they are taking shape through statements and actions so far, appear to be directionless but provocative on all fronts (think of the newly declared immigration policy). Talking about the Indo-Pacific alone, it is baffling, to say the least, why the US should abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed 12-nation trade pact with strong support among Asian allies and partners which was a signature step of the Obama administration.

Ash Carter, Defence Secretary in the preceding Obama administration, recently in a piece titled, “The Rebalance and the Asia-Pacific Security” (Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2016) has shown the important role the US has played in this region since World War II: “During Democratic and Republican administrations, in times of surplus and deficit, and in war and peace, the United States has played a part in the region’s economic, diplomatic, and security affairs… The results have been extraordinary: the Asia-Pacific has long been a region where every nation has the opportunity to thrive.” According to him, the Trans-Pacific Partnership aimed to bind together the United States more closely with 11 other economies in the region “is an opportunity that the United States…should not miss.”

Now the Trump administration’s pull out of the TPP has given a severe blow to its credibility in the region, from Vietnam to Japan, and China will likely fill in the void. While threatening the use of force to restrict China in the South China Sea, Trump has given it a free hand in the Indo-Pacific.

What should India do if the war talk between the US and China becomes more intense with the possibility of the impossible looming large?

On a number of issues like terrorism and India’s attempt to become a NSG member, India and China are not on the same page. The Modi-Xi bonhomie of 2014-15 has paled of late. India has neither warmed up to the ‘One-Belt-one-Road’ idea floated by China nor hesitated to express serious reservations on the China-Pakistan Economic Co-operation (CPEC) which runs through Pak-occupied Kashmir. On the other hand, India has positioned herself closer to the United States.

Under Modi government India has signed, significantly departing from its policy of not entering into a military agreement with any major power, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States which will allow their militaries to work closely and use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies. Although under the agreement, as reported, comprehensive logistics support will be decided on a case-by-case basis by the parties, the agreement does include “reciprocal logistics support…during authorised port visits, joint exercises, joint training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts” (Indian Express 31 August 2016). Thus, there is enough room for India under LEMOA getting entrapped in a US-China conflict.

There is, indeed, no reason for India to welcome a war at its doorstep now or in the foreseeable future, not to speak of getting engaged in such a war. If that be so, the best policy for India would be to help reduce such a possibility. Despite some amount of coolness in India-China relations of late, it is a fact that both China and India have maintained a decent relationship during the last few decades. Trump also is communicating with Modi. Therefore, India still has some leverage with both. It should take this opportunity and urge upon them the need for approaching and settling the issues not in terms of a zero-sum game but pragmatically within the framework of benevolent self-interest and consensus among regional countries. In today’s world no country has the privilege of dragging the whole world into a nuclear holocaust. In such an effort for world peace Modi will certainly find collaborators among leaders from May to Merkel and beyond.

This commentary originally appeared in Indian Defence Research Wing.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Europe warms up to China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, raising the stakes for India

ARUN MOHAN SUKUMAR

Europe’s gradual embrace of China’s OBOR presents most significant milestone in its history after President Xi Jinping pulled drapes off three years ago

File Photo of Xi Jinping during BRICS summit 2015

Source: Wikimedia

Beijing: Europe’s gradual embrace of China’s Belt and Road initiative (OBOR) presents the most significant milestone in its history after President Xi Jinping pulled the drapes off the project three years ago. To the mercantilist, OBOR is not a connectivity project but an arrangement intended to maximise China’s exports, and help Beijing move up the global value chain. Given that Europe is China’s overseas biggest market — they currently trade over a billion dollars a day — and the one with the deepest pockets, the EU’s warming up to OBOR ensures the project is here to stay. After all, creating “transit economies” without a firm guarantee from the final trading destination makes little sense for China.

But the EU’s eventual endorsement of OBOR also comes with geopolitical consequences, all of which materially affect India’s interests.

The Internationalisation of OBOR
The institutionalisation of a connectivity “regime” around OBOR
Reconfiguration of political relationships based on economic ties

OBOR goes global

What explains the EU’s interest in OBOR, if the project only seeks to satisfy China’s bulging export capacity? To start with, Brussels realises the primary source of capital for infrastructure projects in Eurasia over the next decade will be China. If European diplomats were reluctant to embrace the Belt and Road initiative for want of clarity, they now sense an opportunity to partner some of these projects. Among the EU’s top strategic priorities is a free trade agreement with China, with a focus on services. The Belt and Road project, many European interlocutors feel, is “mutually compatible” with the FTA proposal — in rooting for OBOR, the EU may be trying to attract Chinese investment in specific sectors.

Europe will also nudge Beijing into creating “sustainable” infrastructure along the Belt, and promote the use of green technologies in these economies. Most OBOR destinations, if not all, are parties to the Paris agreement, and the EU could see OBOR as a vehicle to project its climate leadership and ensure compliance with the agreement’s principles. And finally, participation in OBOR may be tied to the future of European influence: several Western European powers are founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a likely conduit for OBOR financing, and would be interested in shaping these projects as well as the economies that are receptacles for them.

What does it mean for India?

Europe’s endorsement of OBOR will mark the “internationalisation” of what was previously perceived as a Chinese initiative. Unlike the AIIB, which has significant buy-in from the region, including from India, OBOR has been seen in Asia as Beijing’s project aimed at strengthening its lagging exports. Conversations on OBOR have been almost exclusively bilateral, with the Chinese political leadership reaching out to their counterparts in state capitals. This has been true of Europe as well – China-Europe negotiations on OBOR have taken place under the umbrella of the “16+1” framework, with the project itself eyeing limited European destinations. But the EU’s formal involvement will encourage countries that were wary of China’s grand plans for the region to join the initiative. Second, Europe’s interest in linking the project to the Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Agreement targets could result in the institutionalisation of an OBOR regime, specifying the terms for economic development along the Eurasian landmass. For instance, China-EU negotiations may determine ICT security and data protection standards in the region, which countries in Central and South East Asia find easier to adopt for the ease of doing business.

Such developments would have two potential consequences for India. Even if Beijing has not consulted India on the project, New Delhi has taken comfort from the fact that both countries are placed differently in regional and global supply chains. OBOR has not prevented India from continuing its neighbourhood infrastructure projects, and in any case, the country’s manufacturers have some way to go before satiating domestic demand. By linking to OBOR land and maritime routes, India could even benefit from the supply chains that will be created across the region, and offer products where it enjoys a comparative advantage. However, were OBOR to create an ecosystem of norms and standards, Indian businesses might find it difficult to compete in Asia with their Chinese/European counterparts especially in the services sector. It may also foreclose the future entry of Indian conglomerates into infrastructure projects. Most importantly, the reconfiguration of political relationships based on such economic linkages affects the balance of power in Asia.

The normative firepower that Europe brings to OBOR could undermine India’s strategic interests in the region.

China is not expected to pursue a radically different economic agenda for the region, but India should not discount the possibility that Beijing uses the political heft so accrued from OBOR to pursue exclusionary or preferential governance arrangements.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

India, China and NSG: Partnership vs strategic autonomy

RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN

Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s essay in the Indian Express on Thursday outlined a critique of India’s bid for membership of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group at its meeting last week in Seoul meeting. I was not surprised to find that I disagreed with almost every point he made there. Mehta’s is an important voice in the Indian public policy discourse on a variety of subjects, a Liberal, erudite, complex and moderate one. I find myself agreeing with almost all of his writings, save for that on Indian foreign policy and international politics, where his Liberal instincts and my Realist thinking part ways, as I have written on this blog before (here and here). But his is an important critique, not just from a policy perspective but also a theoretical perspective and so it is even more important to engage with it.

Before I get to my disagreements, a couple of points of agreement, even if they are relatively minor ones: I also thought the reference to climate change and Paris was unnecessary, and I agree with Mehta on the need to have the capacity to hurt the great powers if you want to take them on, a point also made by Praveen Swami. And now to the disagreements.

Mehta argues that there were three delusions in the discourse on India’s NSG membership bid. The first was about whether an NSG membership was really worth “the political capital invested in this venture”. He argues that the NSG waiver India got in 2008 takes care of most of our needs and any negative changes within NSG could have been prevented by having just one friend within the group (since the group works by consensus).

I had already dealt with the “political capital” argument in an earlier essay: the point is that India did not have a choice of making a pro forma application: it was either all or nothing. What Mehta is suggesting is that considering the cost, it was better not to have applied at all. This ignores the fact that the NSG is the essential rule-making body for the global nuclear order. We cannot stay out of it for long, not so much because it is a matter of prestige — the “high table” argument that is so tiresome — but because it makes real rules that have real impact. It was an NSG rule change in 1992, when they adopted what is called ‘full-scope safeguards’, that eliminated India’s options for nuclear commerce even with countries such as Russia that were willing to overlook India’s non-NPT status. More recently, the NSG made another change that restricts transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology. These rules cannot be overlooked because this is a cartel with teeth. Not being part of the NSG has had real costs to India; not joining could be equally expensive in the coming years.

Mehta’s suggestion that even one friend within the group can stop the NSG from framing rules unfavorable to India’s interests is problematic. I would have thought that the whole point of ‘strategic autonomy’ is that we do not have to depend on others. Moreover, there are only two countries in the NSG that are strong enough to potentially do our bidding: the US and Russia. Though everyone technically has a veto, expecting smaller countries in the NSG to risk standing against China for us is not very wise. And considering Russia’s increasing closeness to China, depending on Moscow to go against China to support India would also be risky. Russia is (still) a friend, but there is only so much you can ask of friends. This is one reason why India had to get the US to manage the NSG waiver in 2008. It was not that Russia (or France, for that matter) did not want to change the rules for India (especially since they were keen to sell India nuclear power plants) but they simply did not have the capacity to do it.

It may be possible to convince the US to stand by India again in the future to prevent such rules from being adopted but this would get more difficult with time unless we are willing to enter into a closer strategic relationship with the US, something that Mehta clearly opposes. Moreover, though our interests are currently aligned with that of the US, they may not always be. It was better to have made the effort now than wait and lose the opportunity. We have wasted several years already.

The second delusion, Mehta argues, is about the international order and thinking that China opposed India because it was India. Mehta argues China is not really concerned about India: we are “incidental”. China is more aggressive today and will not let the US write rules for its ally that excludes China’s ally, Pakistan. We are unnecessarily making this about us because of our “sheer narcissism”.

I do not doubt that China has become more aggressive but to suggest that India is incidental to China’s concern or that it opposes India only because the US is championing India’s case is completely mistaken. It exhibits a willingness to overlook the long history of China’s efforts to balance and contain India. China’s alliance with Pakistan has no basis other than the containment of India. The lengths to which China has gone in this pursuit is unparalleled, especially its willingness to supply nuclear and missile technology to Islamabad, something that no other nuclear weapon state has done. This has been a consistent pattern, with little correlation to the state of US-India relationship. This is not narcissism but the recognition of a mountainous reality that I find incredible Mehta cannot see. India can ignore this reality only at its peril.

The third delusion that Mehta outlines is that the one I find most difficult to understand: that the “American security lobby” is using the episode to demonstrate that the US is a friend and China will block our rise. In other words, the problem is not with China opposing and balancing India but with those who point this out. Mehta seems to be suggesting that if we only ignore the facts of China’s behavior, it will somehow not be so. Call me crazy but I am not convinced that burying our heads in the sand is a workable strategic solution.

The second part of this delusion, Mehta says, is that the NSG membership episode is being used to discredit the proponents of ‘strategic autonomy’. It is not an equidistance argument, Mehta insists, but a plea to not see issues as framed by the great powers, see each issue on its merits, to think hard about our interests. The US alone cannot get us everything, which is why we should be an “arena of great power agreement”. If we are that, presumably, we can get some things from the US but others from China. This is an important argument — and a deeply flawed one.

The idea that we can be an arena of great power agreement is completely unrealistic. We cannot simply declare ourselves as such and expect others will agree to leave us alone. China seeks to balance us because we are a strong military power, even if not as strong as China, and they will not stop balancing India simply because New Delhi declares itself neutral between the US and China. As I argued above, China has balanced us consistently and this will only get even more vigorous as India gets stronger, irrespective of the state of our ties with the US. All such an unrealistic pursuit of becoming an ‘arena of great power agreement’ will do is weaken India by isolating us from strong friends whose strength can aid us, even if not on every issue.

The idea that we can make a la carte choices on strategic issues is equally difficult to understand. Issues are linked, even if they are not zero-sum. Siding with the US and opposing China on some issues and vice versa makes no sense because no one will buy our claim that we are only looking at issues “on its merits”. This is not a recipe for strategic autonomy but for strategic loneliness. If we follow this prescription, we are basically on our own and we cannot expect any one to help us on anything at any time.

Maldives: ‘Currency-swap’ with India ahead of big Saudi, China deals

N. SATHIYA MOORTHY

MoS External Affairs M.J. Akbar paying courtesy call on President Yameen

Source: Presidency Maldives

MALDIVES

Going on all cylinders on economic diplomacy, President Abdulla Yameen has combined an astronomically high $ 10-b agreement with Saudi Arabia even while laying the foundation work for constructing a second runway in the Male International Airport with Chinese help. Nearer home in the Indian Ocean Region, IOR, the Maldivian Government had earlier made a $ 100-m currency-swap arrangement with India in December, to cushion any possible forex crisis in the immediate future.

The Saudi agreement is for the multiple development of Faafu atoll “on the lines of French Riveria”, and is expected to be signed during the March visit of King Salman. Ruling out any sale of Maldivian territory as alleged by the Opposition MDP, Yameen said, “What is about to happen to Faafu atoll – if its result is positive – is something that would feature the Maldives on the world chart more boldly than anything else.”

The Faafu project would be undertaken under the SEZ law, and would be similar to “mixed development projects in French Riviera” – the Mediterranean coastline of France that includes the microstate of Monaco – and would involve “international sea sports, mixed development, residential high-class development, many tourist resorts, many multiple airports” and other industries”, the Maldives Independent quoted Yameen as saying.

The web journal quoted Yameen as suggesting that the “project would be awarded through the special economic zones policy, which offers regulatory and tax incentives for large-scale investments”. Moving away from the existing long-lease pattern, Parliament passed a special law in 2015, two years after Yameen came to power, facilitating freeholds for foreign investments upwards of $ 1 b. In this context, Yameen declared at “no one has to be concerned over not getting details of these projects, especially senior statesmen”.

Sop or strategy?

This is Salman’s first visit as the Saudi king and the second after the earlier one undertaken as Crown Prince not very long ago. During the current trip, aimed at investment-promotion, according to Saudi media reports, he would also be travelling to Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan – and yes, China. As is known, Maldives under Yameen has been moving closer to the two unlikely regional powers – Saudi Arabia, the seat of Islamic power, and the non-believer in communist China.

This is not also the first time that Maldives has considered freehold or long-lease for whole atolls. When MDP’s President Mohammed Nasheed was in power (2008-2012), China was known to have come up with such a proposal. In principle, the Nasheed Government was known not to be in agreement, but the early exit of him from the presidency in February 2012 ended it all.

The anticipated neighbourhood security concerns of India was said to be among the main causes for the Nasheed leadership not taking the Chinese proposal forward. Does it mean that bringing in Saudi Arabia, instead, if not ahead of China, may be Yameen’s way of silencing any pronounced criticism from India, and possibly the other, Sri Lankan, neighbour too? Criticising the Saudi entry, the MDP has cautioned, especially India, that it could facilitate the spread of Wahabbism in the region as a whole.

Second runway

Just ahead of the King Salman visit, Yameen also inaugurated work on a $ 400-m second runway in the Male International Airport, after his Government had paid off Indian infrastructure major, GMR Group, $ 140-m in compensation for the cancellation of a 2010 construction-cum-concession contract. GMR was also reluctant to build a second runway. Yameen now said that unlike the GMR contract, where Maldivians’ money was given away to a foreign investor, his Government was “forming new capital for the benefit of the Maldivian people”.

As is known, China is already funding and building Maldives’ first major sea-bridge, connecting capital Male and the international airport island of Hulhule. The local media quoted Chinese Ambassador Wang Fukang that his nation looked at the sea-bridge project as a social service, and not a commercial venture. He also said that the two nations would take up other projects which were also agreed upon during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2014 Maldives visit.

Ironically, even while paying off GMR $ 140-m, the Yameen administration had obtained a $ 100-m from India as currency-swap facility. Technical details apart, in practical terms, it could be interpreted to mean that Maldives obtained credit or a credit-line from India, to pay an Indian creditor. Alternatively, it can be argued that Maldives needed to borrow money, Indian or others, pay creditors, and FDI of the Saudi/China kind made better economic sense, whatever be the impact on issues of sovereignty and regional security.

The last time the two nations were involved in currency-dealings of the kind, Maldives paid up public sector State Bank of India $ 50-m in credit dues at the height of the GMR row. Around the time, problems and harassment of Indian migrant workers in Maldives too blew up on the face of bilateral diplomacy – so did the domestic political problems of the atolls-nation, commencing as it had with Nasheed’s exit.

Ticking off Israel

Alongside the current developments on the economic diplomacy front, Yameen’s Maldives has also despatched Civil Service officials to Pakistan for training and skills-upgradation. Earlier, it had accepted anti-terror training for security personnel from the UK. In February 2017, the Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF) underwent life-saving emergency medical training from the personnel of the US Pacific Command, in Male.

At the same time at the UNHRC session in Geneva, Maldivian Foreign Minister Mohammed Asim called upon Israel to withdraw from Palestine territory. It was in consistent with the Government policy under Yameen, tough earlier under Nasheed Maldives had tried taking the middle-ground, though not always successful.

Overseas, Yameen’s economic diplomacy, which was at the centre of his foreign policy that he had unveiled as President in January 2014, only two months after taking over office, has been one of reaching out in parts and holding out in parts. A lot will depend on how India reacts to his current strategy and tactic, be it in public or in private conversations with all stake-holders.

What the Marshall plan can teach India about China-Pakistan economic corridor

ARUN MOHAN SUKUMAR

The CPEC may be a bilateral endeavour, but New Delhi cannot ignore its spillover effects on regional governance and regime creation in South Asia

Khunjerab Pass point at Pakistan, China border

Wikipedia

Beyond sketching out the broad considerations, India’s foreign policy planners are yet to study the impact of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on South Asia’s politics. New Delhi’s reaction to the CPEC could be divided into two groups: one believes the CPEC serves China’s singular agenda of extending its strategic footprint to Gwadar and beyond, and undermining the chokehold of the Malacca Strait that currently serves as the lifeline for Beijing’s global commerce. Another section believes, with good reason, that many CPEC projects are simply not viable enough to sustain the interest of Chinese investors in the long run. Either outcome may materialise, but the CPEC is an important enough project whose economic and strategic consequences require methodical assessment. Three aspects of the CPEC in particular stand out as relevant questions for India to consider:

Will economic cooperation through the CPEC lead to regional military architectures in South Asia?
How will the US respond to the CPEC – will the Trump administration offer counter-benefits to Pakistan or other regional actors to blunt China’s overtures?
Will Beijing see the CPEC as a case study for regime creation in Asia? That is, use it as a template to create and influence investment and trade standards in the region?

The CPEC may be a bilateral endeavour, but New Delhi cannot ignore its spillover effects on regional governance. The inequities in the China-Pakistan relationship and the nature of proposed Chinese investment in the CPEC merit a comparison with the Marshall Plan, the most successful foreign assistance project of the 20th century. Analysts in India and Pakistan have expressed bewilderment at Pakistan borrowing from Chinese banks to pay for Chinese projects in the corridor, but Beijing is simply taking a leaf out of the US playbook. The Marshall Plan – known formally as the European Recovery Plan — involved the US extending lines of credit and assistance for Western European economies ravaged by the Second World War. Credited with restoring stability in Europe, one needs to look no further than the then US undersecretary of state Dean Acheson’s words to gauge the real goals of the Marshall Plan. In May 1947, Acheson laid out the objectives of the recovery project in a speech at Cleveland so:

“Our [US] exports of goods and services to the world during the current year, 1947, are estimated to total 16 billion dollars […] In return for the commodities and services which we expect to furnish the world this year, we estimate we will receive commodities and services from abroad to the value of 8 billion dollars. […] The differences between the value of the goods and services which foreign countries must buy from the United States this year and the value of goods and services they are able to supply to us this year will therefore amount to the huge sum of about 8 billion dollars.
How are foreigners going to get the US dollars necessary to cover this huge difference? [This is one] of the most important questions in international relations today.”

Read Also | What CPEC means for South Asia

In 1947, the US needed to finance and create captive markets that would continue buying American goods while offering their own services (cheap labour, highly skilled professionals) to the US in return. China today is looking to move its assembly lines outside the country, create cheaper supply chains and limit its economic externalities (such as environmental pollution) at home. Then, as is the case today with the 2008 recession, the global economy had slowed down after two devastating wars. The US, like China, was facing an export glut.

In many Marshall Plan projects, moreover, the strategic interests of the US government were at odds with that of its private sector. The case of oil is illustrative. Soon after the Second World War, oil prices shot through the roof. With Russian influence over Eastern Europe limiting their access to energy resources, Western European countries turned to the US for help. The US government, which saw the Marshall Plan as critical to staving off communism in the continent, sought to ensure Europe’s access to oil at low prices. US oil companies, which controlled the lion’s share of global oil supply, strongly resisted this move but eventually gave in to many of their government’s demands. In that case, the situation worked itself out since recipients of Marshall Plan aid used US dollars to buy US oil-refining equipment, with an eye on cheaper crude oil. But the episode highlights the important lesson that financial viability – often used to dismiss the China Pakistan Economic Corridor – is not necessarily the sole determinant of the CPEC’s future. Beijing’s strategic relationship with Islamabad, and its continuing quest to underwrite strategic parity between India and Pakistan in South Asia, will certainly contribute to the CPEC’s longevity.

Spillover effects of CPEC

But what of the unintended or spillover consequences of the CPEC on security in South Asia? Here too, the Marshall Plan is instructive. Two years after the Economic Recovery Plan was formally announced by secretary of state George Marshall during his 1947 commencement address at Harvard, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) came into effect. The trans-Atlantic military alliance had been in the making for a while and the Marshall Plan by itself did not contribute to NATO’s creation. But the plan freed up European coffers for rearmament and militarisation, acting as an “indirect economic subsidy”. In fact, US President Harry Truman then expressly linked military support to Europe and the Marshall Plan, adopting a no-questions-asked policy to recipient NATO countries, who could then channel national budgets for defence spending.

Will Russia-China-Pakistan axis leave India out of Afghanistan

HARSH V. PANT

Baba Tangi peak on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border

Source: steynard

AFGHANISTAN

There has been another dramatic twist in the seemingly never-ending Afghanistan saga. Last month, Russia hosted representatives of China and Pakistan to discuss developments in Afghanistan and the three agreed upon “a flexible approach to remove certain [Taliban] figures from [United Nations] sanctions lists as part of efforts to foster a peaceful dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban movement.” The three states underscored their concern “about the rising activity in the country [Afghanistan] of extremist groups, including the Afghan branch of IS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]” and underlined that the Taliban was a necessary bulwark in the global fight against the ISIS. The Taliban obviously welcomed the move. “It is joyous to see that the regional countries have also understood that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a political and military force,” a statement, issued on their behalf, said.

The proposal forwarded in the Moscow tripartite of delisting members of the Islamic Emirate is a positive step forward in bringing peace and security to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan seems to be becoming another front in Russia’s attempt to undermine the West and in particular American geopolitical interests. Buoyed by its seeming “success” in Syria, Russia now views itself as the vanguard of the global challenge to the West. Not surprisingly, the US military views this sudden endorsement of the Taliban by Russia as an attempt to undermine NATO military efforts in Afghanistan. The Afghan government too has reacted strongly against Russian attempts to bolster Taliban’s credibility.

As Afghanistan Struggles, Russia’s Got a Plan

The Afghan forces are fighting a tough battle against the Taliban with western help. After declaring that the US’ ‘combat mission’ in Afghanistan had ended, Barack Obama is having to revisit his decision based on ground realities. He has decided to send around 300 soldiers of the US Marine Corps back to Afghanistan as advisors, two years after leaving the country as combatants. There are still around 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan, a significantly higher number compared to the 5,000 Obama had envisioned on the campaign trail in an effort to scale back Washington’s ground forces. The security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. Earlier this week, more than 50 people were killed and 80 wounded in twin bombings near the Afghan parliament in Kabul, for which the Taliban claimed responsibility. Repeated bids to launch peace negotiations with the Taliban have failed and a fierce new fighting season is expected to kick off in the spring. With President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, at loggerheads, the Afghan government too is facing a serious political crisis.

Enter Russia with a plan. Amidst its deteriorating ties with the West, it has started warming up to the Taliban. It is now arguing that Afghanistan could become a safe haven for the ISIS, from where it would be able to pose a serious threat to Russian hinterland. China too remains worried about the impact of growing ISIS threat in its Xinjiang province. And both of them have found in Pakistan an important interlocutor who could perhaps manage the Taliban in a way that it would be a force against the ISIS.

Russia’s change of heart comes after helping the Afghan military by supplying helicopters and also agreeing to a supply route for coalition materials through Russia. But that cooperation is a thing of the past as contacts between Moscow and the Taliban have surged in recent years to an extent where the two have also shared intelligence about the ISIS. For Russia, the Taliban is a local nuisance and has given up the idea of global jihad, whereas the ISIS are the global jihadists. Zamir Kabulov, Vladimir Putin’s special representative for Afghanistan, has suggested that in so far as fighting the ISIS is concerned, “the Taliban interest objectively coincides with ours.”

Russia Trying to Derail Afghan Stability

Russia’s warming up to Pakistan is part of this broader shift in Moscow’s foreign policy. The two held their first ever joint military exercise in September 2016 and their first-ever bilateral consultation on regional issues in December. After officially lifting an arms embargo against Pakistan in 2014, Pakistan’s military will be receiving four Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters in 2017. It is also likely that China-backed CPEC might be merged with Russia-backed Eurasian Economic Union. China has found a new ally in Russia which is keen to work with China, even as a junior partner, to scuttle western interests.

Russia has an interest in hyping the threat from the ISIS in Afghanistan and it is doing so rather effectively. The Taliban remain the most potent threat to the future of Afghanistan as everyday bombings in the country attest to. But given the uncertainty over President-elect Donald Trump’s Afghanistan policy, Russia feels this is the right moment to insert itself in the region and derail whatever little progress that has been made towards stabilising Afghanistan.

India May Find Itself Isolated

As Russia works with China and Pakistan to engage the Taliban, jettisoning its historic animosity to the group, India might find itself regionally isolated. The Afghan government is too weak to assert its primacy in the process. And given Trump’s soft corner for Russia, if he decides to buy into the Russian argument, then India’s Afghan policy will once again be at a crossroads.

There was once a time when the US wanted to reach out to the Taliban. Despite the threat of isolation, India stuck to its stand on the group. Eventually, New Delhi’s views prevailed as the Pakistani shenanigans made sure that the so-called peace process with the Taliban did not go anywhere. Today, India once again looks isolated. It would be hoping that Washington and Kabul will heed its advice on Afghanistan and stand up strongly against the China-Pakistan-Russia axis to manipulate regional strategic realities to serve their short-term ends. But hope is not a policy, and it is possible that New Delhi may have to revisit some of the fundamental assumptions of its Afghan policy soon.

The commentary was published in thequint.com

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).