Afghanistan: Electoral reforms not a done-deal, yet
Kriti Shah
On March 5, 2016, President Ashraf Ghani issued the much-awaited constitutional decree which will see the country’s electoral system reformed. Although the nation’s CEO Abdullah Abdullah and the Electoral Reform Commission have welcomed the decree as the first step toward electoral reforms, Ghani’s decree is simply symbolic.
The present decree comes as the fate of the electoral reform process remains uncertain, given that the earlier two presidential decrees over reforms were rejected by the Wolesi Jirga (Afghan lower house of parliament). Therefore, the hype on the new decree should be eased, until it is cleared by the Wolesi Jirga and further visible concrete steps are taken by the National Unity Government to work on reforming the electoral system.
Electoral reforms in Afghanistan are not only imperative, they are crucial for the country’s stability and longevity of democratic governance. When the NUG came into power in 2014, both Ghani and Abdullah agreed on the need for “fundamental changes” to electoral laws and institutions. Although they both agreed that no elections should be held until the present electoral system in overhauled, they disagreed on how to proceed and who would be in charge of the overhaul process.
Sluggish, lacklustre
This stalemate caused a great deal of uncertainty, dissent and polarisation in the politics of the country. The electoral reform process has been slow, sluggish and lacklustre without commitment and strong political will in the high level of government. Such events coinciding with the resurgence of the Taliban in parts of the country have not contributed favourably to changing the situation of political uncertainty.
The reason why electoral reforms are so important is twofold. One, the general election in 2014 that eventually led to the NUG and the power sharing agreement between Ghani and Abdullah, was racked with controversy amidst allegations of fraudulent voting practices. These allegations of fraud and cheating by both Ghani and Abdullah camps pushed the country into great political instability.
Lost legitimacy
There was fear that the country would slide into violence and greater instability if no government got formed. When the power-sharing agreement was finally signed, both leaders promised electoral reform to ensure such a situation does not occur again. More specifically, both Ghani and Abdullah agreed that serious reform was required in the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that was largely blamed for being biased and corrupt in its practices.
Since electoral bodies such as the IEC lost their legitimacy post the election, it was expected that they would be the first to be reformed and renewed. Needless to say, over a year and half since the formation of the NUG, there has been no significant reform in this regard. Electoral reform, especially change in composition of the electoral commission, is therefore a must as without reform, future elections risk the instability which pushed the country into the brink of an abyss in 2014.
The other reason why reform of the electoral system is so crucial is because it is the first step in the NUG’s ambitious electoral timeline, set out in the 2014 agreement: comprehensive electoral reform, followed by parliament and district council elections (which will create a quorum for the Loya Jirga), followed by a convening of the Loya Jirga within two years of the establishment of the government.
The Loya Jirga will in turn debate possible changes and amendments to the nation’s Constitution and will be responsible for formalising the post of executive Prime Minister for the current CEO, Abdullah Abdullah. Since proper electoral reform will take much longer, given the current pace, the NUG timeline has been pushed into redundancy.
Adding to this, parliament’s term expired in June 2015 without fresh elections and consensus on how to hold them. Although Ghani issued a decree to extend parliament’s term until elections are held, many called the move unconstitutional. All of this has resulted in international donors, such as Britain suspending aid and financing to the Afghan government until progress is made on electoral reforms.
Law-makers consulted
Although Ghani’s constitutional decree on electoral reform brings with it a sense of hope, it is still not a ‘done-deal’ that the government will be able to make progress in the reform process. Notwithstanding, it is promising that the government has consulted MPs and law-makers over the reforms in order to secure their support before the decree goes to the Wolesi Jirga.
However, much more remains to be done in order to end the political bickering. The government must ensure that it develops a broad consensus and take the inputs of civil society and government while drafting the reforms. Great differences in opinion amongst the reforms will only add to future political strife in the country, something Afghanistan can no longer afford to risk. It must bring all political actors on board to work together, so that future governments are not undermined by internal factions and external groups.
It is high time that Ghani and Abdullah set aside their political differences and draft a coherent and unified roadmap to reforms. This will not only be beneficial to Afghanistan, but to them as well as the country goes into parliamentary and district council elections. By leading the reform process and sticking to a new efficient timeline, Ghani and Abdullah can hope to regain public support and trust in a government that is being loathed for its ineffectiveness.
They must realise that it is not only their political future and career that are at stake, but those of the nation’s as well. Electoral reform was the key foundation of the agreement that led to the National ‘Unity’ Government, preventing domestic strife and it would be a sad day in Afghanistan and the world, if electoral reform were the reason for the country’s downfall.
(Kriti Shah is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Foundation in Delhi).
Maldives: Supreme Court concludes hearing in Nasheed appeal
N Sathiya Moorthy
Even as the revived, Government-sponsored all-party talks for political reconciliation floundered in the absence of Opposition representation, and the nation’s Supreme Court concluded hearing in the ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’ appeals, Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) leader Mohammed Nasheed, has cautioned New Delhi, seems to be in an effort to counter President Abdulla Yameen. Nasheed was sentenced to a 13-year prison term by the trial court.
President Yameen had said at a public function in the northern Utheemu island in early March: “I spoke with both Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at length” on the day the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) met in London to finalise their report on their Maldives visit earlier. Yameen told a public function in the northern Utheemu island in early March. “They were very obliging … It was their representatives who spoke in our defence. There were some who attacked us. But we were saved because of the work done by both of our neighbourly powers,” the Maldives Independent quoted him as saying further.
Though CMAG set a month’s deadline for the Government to address democracy issues that it did specify, Yameen said that the CMAG’s decision not to place the Maldives on its formal agenda as an indication that “there are no major issues here.” Any Commonwealth action will obstruct foreign aid, the President said, and reportedly insisted that he had no influence over the judiciary to secure freedom for jailed opponents – a reference this particularly to Nasheed, now on ‘medical leave’ in the UK, while serving the jail-term.
Citing Nasheed’s constant meetings and media appearances in the UK, Yameen reportedly said that the former did not need any spinal surgery, but “only an injection” (which was available in Maldives). As may be recalled, since landing in the UK on ‘medical leave’, Nasheed has reportedly said that he would decide on returning home, based mainly on political reforms and freedom for ‘political prisoners’.
Modi’s visit
As if to responding to Yameen, yet addressing India almost directly, Nasheed in an interview to The Hindu, said that “Maldives is sitting on a time-bomb” and that “India can play an important role in the restoration of democracy … but the appeasement of dictators is not the way to do it”. He referred to President Yameen’s call for him to return to the county and work on the political reforms. “President Yameen should at least release the high profile political prisoners, six or seven of us….Only today he gave a speech on one of the islands, saying that India and Pakistan are willing to get him off the hook. If you have friends willing to do that, it is not likely that President Yameen would relent.”
Nasheed was also asked about Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi cancelling the Maldives leg of his four-nation Indian Ocean visit in March last, and the Indian aircraft-carrier, ‘INS Vikramaditya’ visiting the country a year later. “It is difficult to see how India projects power or creates leverage,” Nasheed said. “It is full of mixed signals and messages. And therefore, we have taken a very different view. Our actions and beliefs are not based on what the Indian government does. It is based on our principles. We are with India whatever they do. We might be in government or opposition, we might all be arrested, but we still have to hold on to our view.”
He said, he was “not disappointed” about India not taking a stronger position on democracy issues in his country,” because we take the long view. I feel that India will in time understand what is best for India, the Maldives and the Indian Ocean. At present I am not convinced that it has understood this. But to assume that appeasement towards dictators would help bring stability — it’s a tested hypothesis (that it does not). How far do you appease? What do you achieve out of that?”
Changed tactic?
Going by local media reports, at the ‘Abdulla case appeals’ in the Supreme Court, Nasheed’s defence seemed to have changed tack and tactics, to concede an ‘unlawful arrest’ against an ‘act of terror’, which attracted a lower penalty under the new penal code, which came into force (only) in November last. Earlier, the Supreme Court had decided to hear the State appeal, moved purportedly under international pressure against the trial court verdict.
As reported in the local media, Nasheed’s lawyers also pointed to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions (WGAD), concluding that his trial, conviction and sentencing were arbitrary and politically-motivated. His lawyers submitted that the Government was bound by the findings as it had signed the UN Charter, and also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The government had however rejected the UN body’s finding in September last, claiming it was non-binding, but however conceded that the Supreme Court would consider the WGAD’s opinion during the appeal.
As may be recalled, Nasheed had refused to move the High Court against the trial court verdict. He had also stopped participating in the trial after his lawyers refused to involve themselves, citing court’s refusal for them to meet with their client in prison, as frequently as they had wanted. The government seemed to have been peeved at the lawyers’ purported behaviour of making political statements unconnected with the case, to the media and the rest after the prison meetings.
Nasheed’s decision at those stages however seemed to be as much a political tactic as it might have been a legal strategy, too. However, the High Court’s decision against accepting the State’s appeal, citing ‘procedural issues’ involving the trial court, for reasons of locus standi, seemed to have weighed on Nasheed’s defence, for him to join the Supreme Court’s appeal. The State was the first one to move the Supreme Court. Technically, the appeal is against the HC rejection.
It would look as if Nasheed’s international legal advisors may have had a role in his U-turn. Arguing the HC’s rejection of the State appeal before the SC, Nasheed’s lawyers submitted that the five-member Male Bench of the High Court was cannot hear the appeal at present, as all three trial court judges in the ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’ have since been elevated – and the other two also had causes to recuse themselves, should the SC direct fresh hearings by the HC.
It is another matter that to help decentralise judicial administration across the archipelago-nation, the Yameen Government had created two Branches/Benches of the High Court in the South and North of the country, through amendments to the Judicature Act. However, transfer of Judges to the Benches too has run in to rough weather, with some of the transferees taking it up with higher authorities, including parliamentary committees.
The Prosecutor-General’s appeal against the trial court verdict had centred on the larger question, if Nasheed’s rights had been assured – or, violated/denied – during the 19-day trial. If Nasheed gets a favourable verdict on the ‘terrorism’ charge, it would also benefit other convicts in the ‘Judge Abdulla case’, and also former Defence Minister, Col Mohammed Nazim, who is facing ‘terrorism charges’, for offences, not as specific as those against jailed Vice-President Ahamed Adheeb, who was later impeached, for plotting a bomb-blast on President Yameen’s boat. Conversely, the appeal hearing in the Nazim case has also been concluded, and the verdict could have a bearing on the Nasheed case as well.
The procedural issue now thus involves a question on the legality of Nasheed joining the Supreme Court appeal after skipping the one in the High Court. The substantive issue however concerns the application of anti-terror law with retrospective effect that too after the original trial had commenced months ago. Another legal question could also relate to the Nasheed defence’s submission for retrospective application of the new penal code in his case.
Yet the political question would remain if any Supreme Court’s lowering of Nasheed’s sentence, based on his defence’s reported submission of a ‘lesser crime’ and ‘lesser penalty’ would entail him to contest the presidential polls, due by November 2018. If Nasheed had been convicted and sentenced under the original penal provisions, he would have to cool his heels for three years after the completion of a jail-term not over one year, before being allowed to contest elections. The alternative would be presidential pardon, for which he would have to apply – which could be politically unwise with an unsure future course, as well.
False start?
In a separate development, the MDP refused to participate in the all-party talks, revived by the Government, reiterating demands for the release of all ‘political prisoners’. Apart from Nasheed, the party had also included religion-centric Adaalath Party (AP) leader, Sheikh Imran, who too has been jailed for months now – also under ‘terrorism’ law – after the common Opposition rally that he had organised had turned violent, and policemen were beaten up.
The MDP has also rejected Government suggestions for one-on-one discussions on ‘clemency’ for Nasheed. The Government’s negotiations team, headed by Fisheries Minister, Dr Mohamed Shainee, has since repeated the invitation to the MDP. Indications are that the party may be apprehensive that any such move – particularly, yet another ‘false start’ by the Government, could hamper Opposition unity on the one hand, and could still deny Nasheed, the ‘right’ to contest the 2018 presidential polls.
The Government continues to hold that it was all for political negotiations, democratic, constitutional and judicial reforms but it should be an all-Maldivian affair. At the bi-annual UNHRC meet in Geneva, Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon reiterated the Government’s resolve in this regard, saying that they won’t ‘apologise’ for upholding the law of the land. She also said that the Yameen leadership “will change Maldives into a democracy that protects the rights of everyone” (but not under pressure from elsewhere).
With the result, the nation’s Parliament, where President Yameen’s PPM-led coalition holds a majority, rejected Opposition demands for a discussion/debate on CMAG report. It’s another matter that twice in the past two years, first under President Waheed Hassan Manik, and later under Yameen, the Government had said that Maldives was ready to quit the Commonwealth, if it came to that – yet, on both occasions, did cooperate with the CMAG, even if up to a point this time round.
(The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter)
Country Reports
Afghanistan
Taliban announces it will not join peace talks
On 5 March, the Taliban confirmed they would not join the next round of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) peace talks held by the United States, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in Islamabad, Pakistan this month. According to a statement from the Taliban’s website, “We reject all such rumors and unequivocally state that the leader of Islamic Emirate (the Taliban) has not authorized anyone to participate in this meeting.” The statement then listed the preconditions needed for Taliban participation in the peace talks, saying, “(Islamic Emirate) once again reiterates that unless the occupation of Afghanistan is ended, black lists eliminated and innocent prisoners freed, such futile misleading negotiations will not bear any results.”
For more information, see: “Taliban reject invite to Afghanistan peace talks”, CNN, 5 March 2016
China offers to help fight Taliban
The Afghan Defence Ministry announced an increase of military financial assistance from China to aid in Afghanistan’s fight against extremist groups, including the Taliban. The deal was put together in February when a delegation of Chinese military officials, led by General Fang Fenghui, chief of the Joint Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army, visited Kabul and met with President Ashraf Ghani, among others. China’s military financial support totals $70 million. While far less than the investment made by the United States, it is significant due to China’s previously neutral posture in Afghanistan as they sought to manage relations with the Taliban to further broad peace in the country.
For more information, see: “China Offers Afghanistan Army Expanded Military Aid”, Wall Street Journal, 9 March 2016
Taliban attack government office in Helmand
On the morning of 8 March, Taliban operators attacked the police head office and intelligence offices in Gereshk, located in south-central Helmand, according to Omar Zwak, spokesman for the provincial governor. Suicide bombers struck inside the police compound, but security officials were able to deter the attackers at the intelligence offices. A legal, investigative representative appointed by President Ashraf Ghani in Helmand, Jabbar Karaman, reported that seven Taliban militants had been killed, while three police officers and an unknown number of civilians had died as the gunfight continued. Helmand remains in a precarious position, as all but three of the 14 districts are controlled by Taliban forces.
For more information, see: “Taliban attack police headquarters in Afghanistan’s Helmand”, AP, 9 March 2016
Afghan-Tajik border clash kills two
On 7 March, a clash at the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border began as a group of nine, armed militants attempted to cross the border from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. According to the State Security Committee, the attempted cross occurred at the Panj border post before a gunfight broke out and one of the militants was killed. The Afghan-Tajik border is home to roughly 5,000 Taliban and other extremist-group fighters who have gathered near the border, according to a Tajik security official. The other victim of the clash is a Tajik security guard. The affiliation of the nine militants is unknown.
For more information, see: “Two killed in clash on Afghan-Taliban border”, Reuters, 7 March 2016
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