Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe said that the country would be a ‘logistics hub’ in the Indian Ocean region
Has Sri Lanka’s China policy really changed?
N Sathiya Moorthy
One year down the line, it is anybody’s guess if the change of Government in Sri Lanka has effected any major shift or change in the nation’s foreign and security policy, particularly neighbourhood policy impacting on the larger northern Indian neighbour in particular. The answer is ‘yes-and-no’ at the same time. It’s not without reasons, either.
Recently, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe declared that the China-funded Colombo Port City project and other developmental schemes of the kind would continue on stream. His Government had stalled the prestigious Port City project for review after Wickremesinghe had announced that the scheme would be shut down if the joint Opposition candidate, Maithripala Sirisena, became President.
Sirisena was elected in the 8 January 2015 polls – but nothing seems to have changed on the China front, barring a stoppage of work on the Port City project, for an internal review. It’s more so for those in India who had unilaterally concluded that a change of government/President in Sri Lanka would work out to India’s advantage vis a vis China. To ‘em all, the Port City Project was a ‘gone case’ for China, and a ‘test case’ for India – by extension (of their fertile imagination). It was/is not to be, and rightly so from a Sri Lankan perspective, per se.
Logistics hub
PM Wickremesinghe has also since declared that Sri Lanka would (continue to) be a ‘logistics hub’ (in the Indian Ocean). It was one of the five ‘hubs’ that erstwhile President Mahinda Rajapaksa had pronounced as a part of his ‘Mahinda Chintanaya’ poll manifesto in the first electoral outing of 2005. Before Rajapaksa, the late President J R Jayewardene too had hoped to make Sri Lanka a ‘second Singapore’ in the region, based on such medium and long-term economic goals for his country.
Sri Lankan reservations on the India-abandoned(?) Sethusamudram Project and any new/expanded port in Vizhignam or Kochi in southern Kerala State were based on the assumption that it could impact on the India trade of Colombo port. As is known, 70 percent of Colombo port’s businesses originate/terminate in India, particularly the southern States. South India does not have an international port like the one in Colombo, and that has made a positive difference to bilateral trade, politics and economy, over the past decades.
To say that Ranil’s ‘logistics hub’ scheme had its origins in Rajapaksa’s ‘Mahinda Chintanaya’, or ‘Mahinda’s Thoughts’, is not to suggest that the former had taken it from the latter, or Rajapaksa had lifted the idea from Jayewardene, or Wickremesinghe is only following in the footsteps of Rajapaksa. This could sound particularly discomforting for sections of the Indian strategic community in particularly. They had refused to understand and/or acknowledge concepts such as ‘national priorities’ and national consensus in the case of neighbourhood nations while rightly claiming and attesting to the existence of the same in the Indian context.
‘Vikramaditya’ visit
What should endear the new Sri Lankan dispensation to these sections of the Indian strategic community might be INS Vikramaditya’s port-call at Colombo while traversing from the west coast to the east coast of India, recently. It was the first Sri Lanka touch-down by the aircraft-carrier of the Indian Navy. It happened around the time three Chinese naval vessels and also three smaller Indian naval vessels were on port-call duty at Colombo.
More recently, President Sirisena made a particular reference to these naval visits from China and India, and also an upcoming one from the Japanese Navy. Sirisena said it was all a ‘blessing’ for Sri Lanka. It may again be an unacknowledged reference to the ‘naval’ hub that Rajapaksa’s ‘Mahinda Chintanaya’ had talked about – and thus, an extension of the ‘national consensus’ in action.
India in general and sections of the Indian strategic community in particular were upset – and justifiably so – when the Rajapaksa Government granted permission for two Chinese submarines to traverse the shared waters with India, in 2014. It is unclear if they would now consider the Colombo berthing of ‘INS Vikramaditya’ as the new Sri Lankan dispensation’s tit-for-tat viz the predecessor, of an Indian tit-for-tat for China. What they should instead be concerned, if at all, should be the continuity and frequency of Chinese naval vessels to Sri Lankan ports.
If Vikramaditya visit were an Indian tit-for-tat viz China, then the question arises if India would have been satisfied if the Rajapaksa dispensation too had invited an Indian carrier or submarine, to berth in Sri Lankan ports. If not, the question arises if the Vikramaditya visit now will be cited in future by Sri Lankan Governments – this and others – to ‘balance off’ India against other strategic adversaries, by inviting/permitting berthing facilities for their naval vessels, together or separately or alternatively.
India’s concerns in this regard flow from the existence of geo-strategic and/or neighbourhood adversaries of the US kind in the ‘Cold War’ era, to be replaced by China, post-Cold War. Pakistan has been a continuing and at times active player in India-Sri Lanka neighbourhood waters and specifically in the latter’s from time to time.
Accord’s Appendix
It’s anybody’s guess if India still considers the sanctity of the Appendix to the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, in which reference was/is made to Sri Lanka not allowing nations inimical to India to use Sri Lankan ports, starting with eastern Trincommalee. If Sri Lanka is to serve as a ‘logistics hub’, both in the maritime and naval arenas, then the question would arise if India would be justified in staking its claims, based on a Cold War era pact. Most, if not all other provisions proper of the Accord remain still, mostly on paper – or, in divergence and dilution.
The Rajapaksa regime, soon after the Chinese submarines’ visits, repeatedly claimed that Indian naval vessels were welcome in Sri Lanka. As he pointed out, however, most maritime and naval vessels using Sri Lankan ports were from other end of the globe, and needed facilities for refuelling, servicing and transhipment of goods (meant mostly for India), apart from rest and recuperation for their crew members.
India did not need these services, the Rajapaksa leadership had surmised, and for reasons of proximity to Indian bases and ports. Hence, an Indian naval visit to Sri Lanka had to be a formal port-of-call, as has been the case with ‘INS Vikramaditya’ and other vessels. It could only be that way, unlike the Chinese PLA-N submarines or other naval assets of other nations.
Neighbourhood duty
In the past, India demonstrated its will and willingness to rush the Navy and Air Force to help/assist Sri Lanka at the height of the ‘Asian tsunami’ of 2014. The tsunami had hit south India in general, Tamil Nadu in particular, from across Sri Lanka – along with Indian military assets in the Andamans. Before the tsunami, Indian Navy and Air Force, along with the Army was in Sri Lanka during the IPKF era (1987-89).
Together, the IPKF and tsunami proved a few things. One, India could and would rush military assistance to Sri Lanka whenever required, and at short notice, independent of the calamitous situation nearer home. Two, on both occasions, most especially in the case of the IPKF, Indian armed forces would pack up and go when the Colombo Government wanted it so.
In all this, India also showed that it would not hold past grudges of the ‘IPKF withdrawal’ kind, when Sri Lanka was in urgent need of external help and assistance. Rather, India considered it a neighbourhood duty to rush help to whichever neighbour that was in distress and India was in a position to help. India had thus offered assistance to adversarial Pakistan when the nation was hit by earth-quakes.
Living in the past
Critics of the other remain in both countries to date. They are mostly from the strategic community, whose personal experiences and memories may cloud their present-day perceptions. They still live in the past, and do not want to forget the past – lest possibly the present could render them irrelevant, too. They have also often overlooked the ground reality that Governments in the two countries have their own perceptions and understanding of each other, independent of whoever is in power – or, not.
Critics of Sri Lanka in India often recall the Sri Lankan decision to offer re-fuelling facility to Pakistan Air Force at the height of the ‘Bangladesh War’ in 1971. It was just six months after the ‘first JVP insurgency’, which India helped militarily neutralise. In the post-Cold War era, they now relate to China in particular, but with reference to the post-war Rajapaksa dispensation. They are unsure about their own views and perceptions of the new regime in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lankan critics of India have not stopped recalling ‘Operation Garland’ (1987), of Indian Air Force aircraft dropping food and medicines to the Tamils cornered by the Sri Lankan forces in the Northern Province. Nor would they acknowledge that ‘Tamil militancy’ in their country preceded the Indian training and arming of them at least by a decade. Indian aims at training the Tamil youth at ‘self-defence’ followed ‘Pogrom-‘83’.
Over 250,000 Tamil-speaking from Sri Lanka had risked their lives in mid-sea, to reach the safety of India. These had set off a ‘demographic imbalance’ in a sensitive sea-bordering southern State like Tamil Nadu. Yet, even the Sri Lankan preference for Pakistan during the ‘Bangladesh War’, India readily the conceded the Sri Lankan position on IMBL-Katchchativu issues (1974, 76).
It was so in the case of the Upcountry Tamils of recent Indian origin (IOT). India was still busy setting its post-Partition, Independent house in order, when the Sri Lankan State and polity almost stealthily disenfranchised the IOT, without reference to the Indian neighbour. Yet, when the ‘Stateless’ IOT population also became the target of the militant JVP left in its first avtar, India readily signed Shastri-Sirimavo repatriation agreement (1964), almost on the dotted line. History could not repeat itself. Nor could it be allowed, then or now.
In its ‘peace war’ with the West, the Rajapaksa regime had counted on India as the immediate, large and influential neighbour for sympathy and support – and on China, for the all important ‘veto’ at the UN Security Council. China does not have a veto in the UNHRC, and the West took Sri Lanka there. Rajapaksas’ successors are also burdened. It’s neither surprisingly, nor shockingly so.
Though speaking of Chinese funding, the current regime seems to be keen mostly on projects already on stream, or on which preparations had been made by the Rajapaksa leadership. They have started negotiating with the IMF (an extended fiscal arm of the West), for a stand-by arrangement (SBA), blaming the emerging forex crisis on the unpredictable nature of the Arab-Gulf economy and internal remittances by Sri Lankan workers, there.
Yet, the new regime also despatched Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake to China for the inaugural of the China-floated AIIB, a States-sponsored international bank. Western analysts see as a competition to Bretton Woods institutions, namely, the IMF and the World Bank. Rajapakse had signed in Sri Lanka as a founder-member of the AIIB, and the Maithri-Ranil duo may have had little flexibility in the matter. But for the nation’s Finance Minister to be present at the inaugural does say a lot, after all.
(The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai)
Pakistan: Anti-terror initiatives lack seriousness
Kriti M. Shah
The attack at Bacha Khan University has once again questioned Pakistan’s earnestness on fighting terror. The attack in Chardrassa, orchestrated a year after the attack on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar that killed 133, has exposed many gaping holes in Pakistan’s internal security apparatus.
Following the APS massacre, the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) has seen numerous arrests, raids on militant organisation offices and military offensives in North Waziristan and Karachi. The Nawaz Sharif government harps on the ‘success’ of the NAP by solely focussing on the figures of the arrests made, raids conducted and weapons seized.
Although there is now a greater sense of security among the masses with increased military and government crackdown on extremism, the university attack on 20 January is a grim reminder of the failure of the government and military to successfully create a national counter-terrorism agenda in the year after the APS massacre.
The attack in Chardrassa, claiming 22 lives, has once again brought the focus back on the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). The NACTA was formed in 2008 with the task of drafting a national security strategy after consultation with different stakeholders. In 2012, the cabinet approved the draft bill, making NACTA a legally- mandated body of the government.
The NACTA was envisioned to be a centralised organisation for coordination and intelligence-sharing among intelligence and law- enforcement agencies to curb acts of terrorism and counter extremist ideology. However, since the passing of the 2013 NACTA Act, the organisation has been regrettably non-functional. Without full activation of this centralised command, Pakistan will lose its war on terror.
The NACTA was formed in December 2014, after the APS massacre. Except for its first meeting, the Board of Governors of the organisation, who are required to ‘meet as and when required but it shall meet at least once in each quarter of the year’, has not had a single meeting.
The office ‘national coordinator’, the effective head of NACTA, who is tasked with the responsibility to execute the policies implemented by the body, has been occupied by five people within the last two years. This has meant that the organisation remained redundant body with no action or progress on any of its initial objectives.
In the budget for the fiscal year 2015-16, no funds were allocated for NACTA. The Minister of Finance remarked that NACTA’s budget had been included in the budget for the Interior Ministry. The latter denied that claim. This reflected the lack of seriousness on part of the government to harness the potential power of NACTA.
Ironically, only a few days before the Chardassa attack, the Finance Ministry released P-Rs 800 million for NACTA. In addition to the already sorry state of affairs, out of the 206 posts within the body, only 60 posts are filled, leaving 71 percent vacant.
Immediate agenda
The activation of NACTA to its full potential must be an immediate agenda of the Nawaz Sharif government in order to win the war on terror. The body has a vital role to play, being a point of coordination amongst intelligence and security forces fighting militants in the country.
The Chardassa attack is a jolting reminder of just that. Military crackdowns and set up of military courts to try terrorists have only short term consequences and cannot ensure the long term survival of the state. A comprehensive long-term plan to counter-extremist ideology, improved intelligence-sharing among law enforcement agencies and beefing up of internal security to prevent attacks on Pakistani soil. While making NACTA effective and efficient is a crucial part, there are other actions the government and the military must take in order to purge terrorism from Pakistani soil.
The government must control terrorist and extremist propaganda. The inability to do this has resulted in terrorist organisations radicalising impressionable youth to join their forces and launch more attacks on Pakistani and international soil. It must also take stricter action against members of banned militant organizations such as Jaish-e-Mohammad.
The fact that terrorist organisation leaders such as Maulana Masood Azhar are allowed to address rallies of thousands freely in Pakistan reflect the double-standards of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism policy. In addition to this, the government has largely ignored taking action on the vast network of terror financing in the country.
The Terror Financial Investigation Unit (TFIU) is the only organisation in the country that deals solely with terror financing. However, without a professional head and inadequate staffing for many years, the TFIU’s abilities are considerably restrained.
The setting up of military courts and the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty has led to the execution of many convicts. However the government must begin to address problems in the civilian judicial system through which many terrorists have walked away scot free by threats, extortion, kidnappings and murders of judges, lawyers and witnesses.
How to repair the system and secure the stability of a civilian-run judicial system are questions that the Sharif government has turned away from, readily allowing the military to dictate the rule of law as it sees fit. It must therefore enhance the capacity of courts, supporting them with legislation making it difficult for terrorists to get away. The set up of specialised units with enhanced military and intelligence capabilities is also warranted. Better provincial counter-terrorism networks with increased coordination with a central command, namely NACTA will help Islamabad rein in extremist it its entirety and effective safeguard Pakistan society.
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