Source: Maithripala Sirisena/Flickr
ANALYSIS
Sri Lanka: No accountability yet on ‘accountability’?
By N. Sathiya Moorthy
Repeating himself with consistent periodicity for the n+1 time after his UNGA assertion to the contrary, President Maithripala Sirisena has ruled out ‘foreign judges’ for UNHRC-mandates ‘accountability probe’, co-sponsored by Sri Lanka. While possibly targeting predecessor Mahinda Rajapaksa camp within the SLFP, of which he is the chairperson, he still asked local judges to be independent and impartial, yet his overall approach could seemingly upset his PM Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP apple-cart and/or their Government for National Unity (GNU).
Sirisena found a prompt echo in centre-right ‘Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist’ JHU alliance Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka, as always, while another unabashed backer in Cabinet spokesperson and Health Minister Rajitha Senaratne was/is away in Singapore for medical treatment. Ranwaka again said, ‘hands off war-heroes’, but has not clarified if his former presidential boss Mahinda Rajapaksa counted as one – and to what extent and end.
Another former and SLFP veteran, President Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga, CBK, as chairperson of the government’s Office of Unity and National Reconciliation (ONUR), has lauded the ‘eradication of terrorism’ (by the Rajapaksa regime), but has criticised the ‘politically-motivated’ derailment of post-war reconciliation – for which she has indicated ‘truth finding’ is a prerequisite of sorts.
On the UNP side, PM Wickremesinghe, not long ago, questioned the ‘independence’ and ‘credibility’ of the nation’s Judiciary, attributing it to ‘politicisation’, purportedly and near-exclusively under the Rajapaksa regime. In the US earlier this year, his UNP Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera sought to reassure the international community on ‘international probe’. But their new-found UNP MP and Minister, war-time army commander, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, seems to be singing different tunes at different times, but within a short span.
In a Parliament intervention as Regional Development Minister, Fonseka sort of blamed the controversial ‘white flag episode’, possibly among other alleged ‘war crimes’, on the Rajapaksas, and implied that he was ‘kept away’ from key decisions. At a news conference within days, Fonseka said the Rajapaksas were not involved in ‘battle-field decisions’. He was away in China and then President Mahinda Rajapaksa in Jordan during the crucial last days of the war, but Fonseka did not name acting defence minister Sirisena and/or then defence secretary, Gota R, as among those who possibly took decisions.
Yet, Fonseka also gave dates and timings to argue that he was still in the air back home, but Mahinda R was already back, when LTTE Prabhakaran was killed. He still disagreed with the Darusman Report for UN chief Ban Ki-moon, which fixed the number of Tamil war-victims at 40,000. He also discounted the theory that Pottu Amman did not die in the Nandikadal battle-field and was living in India, pointing out that the LTTE intelligence chief was wanted in the country for the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.
Credibility at stake
The confusing and contradicting signals and details, if they are any, emanating from different sections of the government, could put Sri Lanka’s credibility at stake, all over again. The Rajapaksa regime spoke in one voice, yet the international community felt that the government was shifting the self-fixed goal-posts often and without justifiable reason(s). The Maithri-Ranil government seems to be speaking in different voice(s), and the addition of Fonseka, that too, to the UNP fold, compounds the internal contradictions even more.
Two, the UNHRC resolutions since 2012 have derived from the Darusman Report and who knows, Pottu Amman’s fate too could be probed, whether by local or international judges. Fonseka, among others, could become a witness and more before a quasi-judicial or wholly judicial forum, domestic or international, if formed.
The Maithri-Ranil duo cannot be ignorant of the possibilities, and hence they could be seen as being non-serious about the UNHRC commitments and resolutions. Like the Rajapaksa leadership earlier, they cannot be seen as taking refuge in purported ‘Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist’ revivalism – and blame it this time on him. After his news conference, the Maithiri-Ranil duo seems to have rewarded Fonseka with additional departments under his ministerial care.
Whither India
The Tamil-exclusive TNA, the officially-recognised Opposition in the present Parliament, had backed Fonseka (2010) and Sirisena (2015) presidential polls, against incumbent Mahinda R. Their demands and claims on ‘accountability probes’ could become politically burdensome after a point. Having opposed Rajapaksa’s PSC (parliamentary select committee) route to political solution, the TNA has now tamely accepted a much larger and more complex CA (constituent assembly) path.
Either, they too are keeping fingers crossed, or want to run with the hare and hunt with the hound – or, both, as on most occasions in the past. This way, a political resolution could become as much complex as a domestically-implemented process on ‘accountability probe’. As always, the Sinhala-led government and the moderate Tamil leadership can once again blame each other, the wind weather and everything else other than the self, which alone might have to be blamed for most parts – and also convince the world, even if partly, partially and momentarily so.
Neighbouring India seems to be breathing relatively easy just now on this score, as Sri Lankans are engaged, dis-engaged or re-engaged among them, in various permutations and cancellation. The TNA could suddenly begin ‘discovering/re-discovering’ the selectively ignored guardianship of ‘mother India’. The international community too could begin to pressure India, possibly for the first time after the 2012 UNHRC resolution period. It could become more and immediate, should the TNA come under pressure from within.
Secondly, Sirisena even seemingly losing further hold on the SLFP in particular, whether on this count or others, could pressure India into arguing the Sri Lankan government’s case with the TNA and the international community – as it did for the Rajapaksa regime, up to a point. Jointly and severally, partners in the GNU would see the virtues of the Indian ‘relative’, but for differing domestic reasons and compulsions.
A third possibility is about a wilful Sri Lankan decision, where the probe and power-devolution are left hanging, as under Rajapaksa and/or others before him. That again could leave a huge question-mark before India, (from) among Sri Lanka’s neighbourhood friends.
It may be a coincidence, and even wide off the mark. Like other Sri Lankan critics of India on this count, the TNA seems ready for testing the waters after a gap (when they did not really want India, but only the ‘US and the international community’), by taking up the ‘environmental hazards’ of India-funded/executed Sampur coal-based power-plant in the Eastern Province with a substantial Tamil population.
The TNA’s reservations to the bilateral development project during the war years under the Rajapaksa regime was confined, first to the site-choice and later to the rehabilitation of evacuees. In political terms, the TNA opposition comes when the Ranil-led government seems keen on taking forward the project after the unexplained but well anticipated sluggishness through the Rajapaksa regime, which however had signed the agreement for the purpose.
On the ‘ethnic issue’ and attendant accountability concerns, India ended up voting for a ‘diluted’ UNHRC resolution in 2012, when the US-led West yielded as much for its support, if only to convince other fence-sitter voting-nations at the UNHRC. When they had the numbers otherwise, as in 2014, the US almost came to ignoring the Indian friend, partner, ally or whoever. In 2015 at UNHRC, none wanted anyone as the new Sri Lankan government went on board with the West and the rest. That may not be the case again – again, and again.
Rajapaksa bogey
It’s time that the Maithri-Ranil put their collective and independent houses in order. They cannot (continue to) sing different tunes, and to different constituencies, and conclude that other constituencies are neither hearing, nor listening. The government’s honeymoon with the voter having ended, and the TNA too remains clueless about the next step(s) of self and others, the Rajapaksa bogey can work only up to a point – for all of them, jointly and severally.
If the government leadership continues to think that fixing the Rajapaksas in non-war charges of corruption and nepotism would keep the voter-mood happy, from now on it might be confined to the traditional UNP constituency, which alone could not win last year’s twin polls against the Rajapaksa camp and/or charisma. They would have to stand together, yes, to fight off Rajapaksas.
It is still not enough that they stick together only viz the Rajapaksas, as if that’s the only issue before the Sri Lankan people, and their friends in the international community. After the Rajapaksa experience(s), loss of credibility by and for this government, particularly without a broad and purposeful Tamil endorsement, could mean loss of global credibility and standing of the Sri Lankan State. Parties and personalities would not count in context, either way, and after a point. Politics (alone) would count – and it comes in every denominator – internal, external and what not!
The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai.
Pakistan: The Musharraf deal
By Kriti Shah
On March 18, former Pakistan President Parvez Musharraf slipped out of the country to Dubai reportedly for “medical reasons”. This was a day after Musharraf’s name was removed from the country’s ‘exit control list’ (ECL) that had banned him from international travel since April 2013, after being accused of a number of a crimes, including treason. While the news brought about a sense of alarm in the country as to how the most powerful can escape the law, it has brought about a familiar sense of discomfort with the realisation about the power and influence the military continues to exert on the civilian government and all aspects of decision-making in the country.
The former president and one-time army chief is facing charges of treason for ousting then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (now back in power) in a 1999 coup and for alleged involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Considering the severity of the cases against him, it is surprising that that the Supreme Court cleared him for international travel, instead of issuing fresh orders to continue the restriction.
Although the Nawaz Sharif administration had the constitutional power to re-impose the restriction, it did not do so, leading one to question the role army chief, Gen Raheel Sharif, may have had been in saving his former mentor. His brother Shabbir Sharif (who died in the 1971 Bangladesh war) was said to be close to Musharraf, leading the latter to guide and mentor Raheel at every stage of his career, promoting him to the rank of major-general before resigning as president in 2008. While it is difficult to establish with any certainty, Gen Sharif’s sense of gratitude may have been behind his purportyedly getting the Nawaz Sharif government to shelve Musharraf’s treason trial of 2013, and facilitating his overseas travel now.
Not accountable
Whether Raheel Sharif was behind the push to let Musharraf go, one cannot determine with surety. However, given the closeness between the two, and the military’s dominance in all aspects of the nation’s political life, one can deduce a possible connection. By allowing Musharraf to leave the country, Raheel Sharif has without a doubt added to his stature and popularity amongst the troops by demonstrating the power of a military chief above all, including the law. While bringing Musharraf to trial would definitely set a precedent that no one can escape the hands of the law, Raheel Sharif may have shattered that narrative by ensuring that the military, its officers and especially its chief, is not held accountable by civilian institutions.
The precarious balance of civil-military relations in Pakistan has once again found itself titling towards the later, with the military increasingly stepping into areas of governance, that are democratically set out for the elected civilian government. In an interview to DW, Kamran Murtaza, the former president of the Supreme Court Bar Association, said that “the court had ruled that the decision to impose or lift the ban would ultimately be decided by the central government. Therefore, it was (Nawaz) Sharif’s decision and responsibility”. Some reports state, that Nawaz Sharif, was unable to resist the military’s pressure in this matter. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the fear of the government of irking the military and its generals by detaining their former chief.
A help for the PM
The departure of Musharraf could also help Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N. By allowing the former army chief to leave the country, Sharif has demonstrated two important things. One, that he does not consider Musharraf to be a threat to him or his party in anyway. Two, that he is a leader who follows the military’s bidding. While this may lead him to be considered weak in the eyes of the international community, PM Sharif knows from experience, that within the country, it is vital to have good relations with the military.
Therefore by allowing Musharraf to leave under the pretence of Supreme Court orders, he has brought himself close to Raheel Sharif, with the public perceiving him to be a man who can deliver. It therefore not weaken Sharif amidst his political opponents, only strengthens his perception as a leader who works well with the military.
The civil-military matrix in Pakistan is a complex one, with each rising above each other on occasion. However, time and time again, the men in khaki demonstrate who holds the reins of the government. With the Prime Minster outsourcing matters of national security policy to the armed forces and Pakistan’s National Defence University, playing an increasing role in drafting security policy, Pakistan’s civilian institutions are continuously weakened.
In addition, the continued existence of the national reconciliation ordinance (NRO), the deal through which Musharraf left the country and political leaders from the Pakistan People’s Party and the Muttahida Quami Movement exit the country escaping accountability, needs to be changed so that political deals between accused civilians and the government cease.
While Musharraf will nonetheless, be thanking the Pakistan the military for its support and confidence in him, it remains to be seen what the future holds for him and its trial. While Nawaz Sharif had risked considerable political capital at the start of his term, declaring that he would bring Musharraf to justice, it cost him an expensive dharna that was backed by the military. Although he scraped through the crisis, it is unlikely that he will push for a trial anymore.
The military lurks like a hawk in both Islamabad and Rawalpindi, ready to defend its institution and poke holes in the tapestry of civilian ones. Nawaz Sharif, will find himself boxed into a tight corner once again, if he wakes the sleeping bear that is Raheel Sharif. In the meantime, Musharraf can rest easy, knowing his protégé is the army chief, and therefore has his back, come what may.
Kriti Shah is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
COUNTRY REPORTS
Afghanistan
US fights IS
The United States has intensified its air campaign in Afghanistan as the Islamic State widened its reach in the country, according to a report by the New York Times on 18 March. According to Air Force data, the United States conducted three times as many strikes in January and February this year as it did in the same period last year. The increase in strikes follows a decision by U.S. President Barack Obama to grant more leeway for strikes on the Islamic State in Afghanistan. The rate of strikes is the highest since 2013.
For more information, see: U.S. Steps Up Airstrikes Against ISIS After It Gains Territory in Afghanistan, The New York Times, March 18, 2016
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