General Aung San signs the Panglong agreement in 1947
ANALYSES
Myanmar: Call for a second Panglong
By Mihir Bhonsale
Myanmar’s supremo Aung San Suu Kyi, in her new capacity as State Counsellor, has called for a second ‘Panglong-style’ conference next month in an effort to resolve ethnic issues. The call comes at a time when the Union Army is still busy fighting ethnic groups in Northern Shan states.
The first such ethnic conference was held in February 1947 in Panglong in the Shan State. The meeting was between the Shan, Kachin and Chin ethnic minority leaders and Aung San, head of the interim Burmese government. Then on the meeting was known as Panglong Conference. During the meeting, the leaders of the three ethnic groups unanimously decided to join the Union of Burma. It was agreed that after joining the Union, these states will be given full autonomy in the internal administration of the frontier areas. A separate Kachin state was agreed to be desirable, subject to discussion in the Constituent Assembly. Under the Panglong agreement, citizens of the Frontier Areas were to enjoy the rights and privileges regarded as fundamental in democratic countries. The financial autonomy of the Federated Shan States was not to be affected. Also, it was decided that financial assistance to the Kachin and Chin Hills likewise was not to be affected and the feasibility of the same arrangement for them as existed with the Shan states to be considered. On the agenda was the united struggle for independence from Britain and the future of Burma after independence as a unified republic.
Suu Kyi made the announcement for the second conference at the Joint Monitoring Group’s meeting on April 27. Suu Kyi also showed readiness to include non-signatory groups to the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord (NCA), even as she faces a tough task ahead in creating an atmosphere of trust and also negotiating with the military.
Reality today
More than 60 years after the signing of Panglong agreement, the deals reached between General Aung San and ethnic leaders stand unrealised. Crying betrayal, ethnic nationalities have taken up arms and engaged in an ugly war with the Union Army. Suu Kyi has inherited a government that had deployed a ‘divide and rule’ policy and not let any solidarity develop on ethnic grounds.
The former quasi-civilian government had concluded a NCA with eight armed ethnic groups in October last year, just about a month before the general elections in the country. However, ethnic groups with large armies, like the Kachin Independence Army and the Wa State Army, had declined to sign the NCA.
The Thein Sein government had set the ceasefire-first strategy. This meant that the groups were asked to sign the ceasefire agreement before holding any political dialogue. But, armed ethnic groups have for long held that political dialogue must precede any signing of the ceasefire agreement.
Also, of significance is as to how would the Union Government deal with armed militias after an agreement has been reached. Some armed groups have maintained that they would retain their armies even after the agreement.
Suu Kyi’s call for a Panglong style conference hints that her government’s approach is not exclusionary. Including the non-signatory groups for the dialogue also refutes the ceasefire first strategy of the previous government.
Military’s role
Any efforts at reconciliation and peace will be impossible without the military showing intent and purpose to governmental initiatives. Fresh clashes have broken out between the military and the Kachin, Shan and Arakanese ethnic groups this year.
Suu Kyi will find challenging bringing the military on board of her plan to negotiate with the armed ethnic groups. So far, there has been stiff resistance to any restructuring plan.
Constitutional reforms that could not be finalised last year remains the key to confidence building efforts of the government. The Parliamentary Committee formed for reviewing the constitution had recommended greater autonomy to areas dominated by ethnic nationalities. But, the review could not be completed due to the elections last year. The Parliament will soon restart the review, and more autonomy under the constitution could well be the olive leaf for peace in Myanmar.
The writer is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata.
Maldives: Yameen snaps ties with Iran, cites ‘Singapore model’

By N. Sathiya Moorthy
In a first of its kind for the four (Sunni) ‘Islamic nations’ in the eight-member SAARC, Maldives has severed its 40-year-long diplomatic ties with ‘Shia’ Iran. Simultaneously, President Abdulla Yameen has also commended the Singaporean ‘development (over) democracy’ model for his country, possibly for the first time in such clear terms.
In severing four-decade-long diplomatic ties with Iran, Maldives (under Yameen) has seemingly identified more with religion and sect than the region and neighbourhood. Whether or not it stirs up problems for and in the neighbourhood, as the political opposition in the country has claimed, there is no denying Sunni-Shia sectarian issues which have subsided to an extent in India but not in neighbouring Pakistan.
Iran pursues policies that are “detrimental to peace and security in the region, which in many ways, is also linked to stability, peace and security of Maldives,” the Foreign Ministry statement said, announcing in an obvious reference to the Gulf-Arab region and not South Asia. “The Maldives calls on Iran to show more commitment and tangible results in implementing the recommendations of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),” the statement added.
In this context, the Foreign Ministry recalled last month’s Islamic Summit, which called upon Iran to pursue a policy based on the principle of ‘good neighbourliness, non-interference in their domestic affairs, respect for their independence and territorial sovereignty, resolving differences by peaceful means in accordance with OIC and the UN Charters”.
Clearly, the Maldivian decision has been influenced by Saudi Arabia, which at the head of the global Sunni sect summit had severed ties with Iran in January after an ‘embassy protest’ in Tehran. The protest followed the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia.
Maldives is a member of the Saudi-initiated 33-nation Islamic group launched last year to fight global terrorism. Before Maldives now, Bahrain, Sudan and Djibouti followed the Saudi precedent/initiative while Kuwait and Qatar recalled their envoys to Iran. The UAE too has downgraded diplomatic relations with Iran.
It’s another matter that the Colombo-based co-accredited Iranian envoy, Mohammed Zaeri Amirani, presented his credentials to President Yameen only last month. The two had discussed Iranian oil imports to Maldives on the occasion. According to his office, Yameen had “expressed his hope and confidence that relations between the Maldives and Iran would continue to strengthen in the future”.
‘Irrational adventurism’
The opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) was prompt in criticising the Yameen decision, calling it “irrational adventurism” and that it “brings contentious issues to our region, risking Indian Ocean stability”. It was “an additional disservice to Maldivians” by the Yameen administration, jailed former President Mohammed ‘Anni’ Nasheed, now in the UK on medical leave, tweeted.
Another MDP leader, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, former foreign minister and UN special rapporteur on human rights in Iran, said: “This decision did not take into consideration Maldives’ interests or the security of the SAARC and South Asia. It was done to please or appease one particular country, Saudi Arabia.” At the same time, Maldives had also abstained in a UN Human Rights Council vote to extend his rights monitoring mandate in Iran, Shaheed said.
Other MDP leaders claimed that the drastic shift in foreign policy was not “adequately deliberated by relevant state institutions”. They also pointed out the Yameen leadership had rejected UN and Commonwealth calls for freeing ‘political prisoners’, including Nasheed, but had called for Iran to respect OIC recommendations.
Fine dividing line
In snapping ties with Iran, Yameen’s Maldives seems to draw fine dividing lines among three external powers, including the Indian neighbour. The evolving tripod thus involves India on security, including shared Indian Ocean, China on development front and Saudi Arabia from within the global Islamic nations.
Now, however, these lines seem to overlap, possibly adding to the concerns in India, though not necessarily of India. For starters, all three nations have been extending development aid of different kinds and extent to the Indian Ocean archipelago. India in particular has remained a constant supplier of all daily needs of the nation, in the two countries — education and health-care included.
China has replaced India in a short time, especially under Yameen, as the big-ticket investor after the ‘GMR fiasco’. Though the Yameen leadership has been successively reassuring India against extra-regional security engagements (read: with China), a vocal section of the Indian strategic community remains unconvinced. However, their specific concerns, if any, have remained unsubstantiated.
There has also been a simultaneous overlapping of development funding between China and Saudi Arabia. Though the latter, as the acknowledged leader of the Islamic world, has expanded political and economic ties with Maldives, it has not (sought to) replace China on big-ticket investments. Whether it has anything to do with bilateral Saudi-Maldivian concerns over the latter getting painted as a ‘Wahhabi outpost’ in India’s immediate Indian Ocean neighbourhood is unclear, however.
There is no denying the increasing number of Maldivians fighting for the international terror-group, IS, in Syria — and some going with their wife and children and losing their lives. In proportion to population numbers, the Maldivian involvement in IS has to be acknowledged as high in the region. Yet, the increasing number of IS recruits from across the world, including the SAARC neighbourhood, makes a difference, nonetheless.
No comments:
Post a Comment