Friday, 21 April 2017

Where does India stand on intellectual property rights in the digital economy

TPP, RCEP and TISA will entail some amount of IP norm-setting that shifts the balance established in the TRIPS towards rights-holders.
Courtesy: Sebastiaan ter Burg/CC BY 2.0
Several recent bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) appear to be exporting standards of IP protection that extend well beyond those prescribed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These FTAs include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
In this piece, I have scrutinised the TPP, TISA and RCEP that deal with IP and the digital economy vis-a-vis the current Indian legal standard for compliance with their provisions. For most of the IP section, I have assumed that the current Indian standard is TRIPS-compliant (e.g. with respect to data exclusivity), and therefore used the TRIPS standard interchangeably with the current Indian position. Below, I have discussed those provisions in these agreements that generate new international obligations for India. These include obligations that Indian legislators have already foreseen and complied with (such as the legal backing for TPMs), as well as obligations that would require a modification of the prevailing Indian standard.

Summary of findings

TPPTISARCEPTRIPS/Current Indian Standard

E-commerce

Zero customs duty on digital productsSimilar to TPP —TPP-compliant
Non-discrimination for foreign digital productsGovernment procurements exempt —None, as far as government procurement of software is concerned
Personal information protectionSimilar to TPP —TPP-compliant
Cross-border information flowSimilar to TPP, unless HK proposal is accepted by negotiators —Possibly non-compliant with TPP, depending on an interpretation of “legitimate public policy objective” in TPP Article 14.11.3 and TISA E-commerce Annex Draft Art. 2.4. Indian law requires the data recipient to comply with Indian data protection standards as a bare minimum.
Prohibition on server localisationSimilar to TPP, may be more expansive if “or investing in its territory” is accepted by negotiators —None

Intellectual property

 — —Commitment to accede to the WCT/WPPT/Beijing Treaty/UPOVN/A
Non-visual trade marks —Similar to TPP, with opposition for scent marksTPP-compliant in respect of sound marks, possibly non-compliant in respect of smell marks. RCEP-compliant if IN opposition is accepted by negotiators.
No rights for prior users of registered marks —Prior users protectedTPP non-compliant; RCEP-compliant.
Expansive definition of patentable subject matter —Similar to TPP,  but may have changed in a more recent draftTPP non-compliant — specifically with respect to evergreening and software patents.
Patent term adjustment for processing delays, and specific term adjustment for pharmaceutical marketing approval —Similar to TPPTPP/RCEP non-compliant
10 year data exclusivity for agrochemicals — —TPP non-compliant
Five year data exclusivity for drugs —Identical to TPPTPP non-compliant
Eight year data exclusivity for biologics — —TPP non-compliant
Patent linkage — —TPP non-compliant
Life plus 70 copyright term — —TPP non-compliant
Anti-circumvention measures—Similar to TPPPossibly TPP non-compliant — mens rea requirement
Presumption in favour of patent/trademark/copyright validity — —Possibly TPP non-compliant, especially with respect to patents
Criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation — —TPP non-compliant

“Who cares?”

This piece flags the most concerning elements of these treaties as they stand today, in terms of the IP obligations that India would import as a consequence of signing up.
But first — why must we concern ourselves with the implications of FTAs that we are (barring the RCEP) not even a party to?
There exists a three-fold answer: first, there is a growing perception that international standard-setting, at least in the IP space, is increasingly moving away from traditional multilateral regimes such as the TRIPS, and entering the turf of treaties styled as investment or free trade agreements. A passive approach to FTAs (especially those that bind significant portions of the world’s economic muscle) is today equivalent to a passive approach to international IP norm-setting. Line-drawing exercises in international law inherently entail distributive effects, and therefore are bound to benefit the interests of participants in these processes.
Second, accession to these FTAs is never out of the question. Nor is the possibility that parties to existing FTAs may require equivalent commitments in bilateral negotiations with non-parties such as India. It would be extremely convenient, for instance, for the US to ask India to accept a data exclusivity commitment in a hypothetical future India-US FTA, simply by pointing out that a similar provision exists in the TPP, which regulates trade between the US and many other Asian countries.
Third, the risk of being required to absorb TPP-equivalent standards as a pre-condition in bilateral negotiations is much higher for still poorer countries, who need the TRIPS flexibilities more than India.

Methodology

Of the treaties surveyed, the only one whose final text (pertaining to IP and e-commerce, the focus of this piece) is available in the public domain is the TPP. A draft leaked in October 2015 is the latest text available for the RCEP, while the latest TISA documents were leaked in May 2016. In addition, the RCEP does not propose to legislate on e-commerce, meaning that only its effects on IP norms can be measured, while the TISA’s IP chapter is yet to be leaked, meaning that only its effects on e-commerce can be examined. I will be examining the impact of the TPP, and (where feasible) the RCEP and the TISA on IP and the digital economy. I have only highlighted those instances where these agreements create significant new international obligations for India, if we were to accede to them.

E-commerce

While an important element of the TPP’s Digital Two Dozen (D2D) core principles is the removal of customs duties on all digital products (Article 14.3), this does not create any new international obligation for India. This is because India is a party to the 1996 WTO Information Technology Agreement, which appears to already mandate this. The TISA contains a provision (Draft Art. 10 of the E-commerce Annex) that mirrors the TPP standard.
The TPP also requires, in Article 14.4, that parties practice non-discriminatory treatment of digital products originating from any other party. Draft Article 1.6 of the TISA’s E-commerce Annex contains a non-discrimination provision, but the crucial difference between the two obligations is that the TISA appears to provide a flexibility for government procurement, while the TPP limits exceptions to Article 14.4 to subsidies, grants and other government-sponsored benefits. To the best of my knowledge, India has no explicit non-discrimination legislation, but such a law would be redundant, since India would be compliant with Article 14.4 merely by virtue of refraining from treating foreign digital products discriminatorily. In addition, government policies such as preferential adoption of the Bharat Operating System Solutions (BOSS) Linux distro may fall foul of the TPP standard, given that mere adoption would not amount to a grant or subsidy.
Article 14.8 of the TPP and Art. 4 of the TISA draft both mandate the protection of personal information online. While it can be argued that these legal standards can be independently imposed on India through instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these will represent the first time India accepts a concrete international obligation to actualise the right to privacy over the internet.
Article 14.11 of the TPP mandates the free flow of information across national borders. This provision may have huge implications for businesses that base their revenue generation on big data and targeted advertising, and the thrust of Article 14.11.2 is that parties must allow businesses to transfer information (including personal information) across borders through electronic means. However, Article 14.11 is subject to two significant carve-outs. First, Art. 14.11.2 is only applicable to covered persons, a term that has been defined to exclude financial service providers. Second, Article 14.11.3 permits derogation from the free flow obligation to achieve “legitimate public policy objectives”, provided that measures derogating from the obligation are non-discriminatory and least-restrictive in nature. The TISA draft, in Article 2.1, contains a similar provision to Article 14.11 of the TPP. However, it is unclear whether the TISA definition of “service supplier” mirrors the TPP definition of “covered person.” If it is, then financial service providers will be similarly excluded from the TISA obligation. Otherwise, the TISA obligation would be wider than the one in Article 14.11 of the TPP. In the latest TISA draft, Hong Kong has proposed a lengthy prefix to Article 2.1 of the E-commerce Annex which exempts all measures taken by parties to protect the privacy of individuals from the cross-border data flow obligation. Indian compliance with the TPP obligation is doubtful, and would turn on an interpretation of the words “legitimate public policy objective” in Article 14.11.3. This is because under Rule 7 of the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and sensitive personal data or information) Rules 2011, cross-border flow of personal information is permitted only in situations where the recipient of the information complies with Indian data protection standards as a bare minimum. Similarly, India would almost certainly be non-compliant with the TISA draft unless the Hong Kong proposal is incorporated into the final text of the agreement.
Article 14.13 of the TPP contains a prohibition on parties against conditioning the conduct of business in their territory on the localisation of computing facilities such as servers and storage devices. This requirement is conditioned by the same carve-outs as Article 14.11, with Article 14.13.3 being identical to Art. 14.11.3. In addition, Article 14.13 also applies only to “covered persons”, and excludes financial institutions from its protection. The corresponding TISA draft article, Article 8, contains a similar obligation. However, the TISA obligation may end up becoming significantly broader than the TPP provision, since only Colombia currently opposes a draft that expands the prohibition on server localisation to investment in the country’s territory by a covered business. Further, the difference between the TPP’s “covered person” and the TISA’s “service supplier” may mean that the TISA is nevertheless broader than the TPP. This researcher is unaware of Indian law that contravenes the prohibition on server localisation, although provisions of the Information Technology Act on surveillance may be interpreted as granting such powers to the government.

Intellectual property

One of the more troubling features of the RCEP is Draft Article 1.7.6, which contains a commitment to accede or ratify a number of TRIPS+ agreements, such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.
With respect to trademark protection, the TPP’s Article 18.18 specifically provides for non-visual marks such as sounds and scents to be given protection by parties. Draft Article 3.1 of the RCEP contains a similar provision, but the portion dealing with scent marks has been met with significant opposition. India’s position on scent marks is unclear, but a reading of Section 2(1)(zb) of the Trade Marks Act 1999, alongside Rule 30 of the Trade Marks Rules 2002, seems to suggest that scent marks would not be permitted in India. Sound marks have been granted in the past by the Indian registry.

Kenya’s mobile money story and the runaway success of M-Pesa

M-Pesa in its current form was launched in Kenya in April 2007, and it revolutionised the financial services landscape.
Photo: Fiona Bradley/CC BY 2.0
Development finance and corporate banks alike have long wrestled with the issue of banking the unbanked in the developing world, which would encourage broad-based socio-economic development on the one hand, and on the other, greater product distribution for the private sector banking institutions.
However, bringing greater financial inclusion to the bottom of the pyramid no longer means universal branch bank account ownership. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, particularly in one of the continent’s emerging fintech hubs, Kenya.
M-Pesa, whose name derives from the Swahili word for money ‘pesa’ and ‘m’ for mobile, began as a concept piloted by British telecom giant Vodafone as a corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative in partnership with local service provider Safaricom. It was partly funded by DFID in Kenya in an attempt to facilitate financial access for micro-lenders and their clients. Pilot studies revealed that the application was in fact being used for general money transfers, and the application was redesigned. Essentially, Safaricom subscribers who also register with M-Pesa can transfer money between cell phone users, even if neither of them has a bank account. M-Pesa in its current form was launched in Kenya in April 2007, and it revolutionised the financial services landscape.
In 2006, before M-Pesa was launched, 25% of Kenyans had access to banking products. By 2014, this figure had jumped to 68%. Almost half of these users do not have a formal bank account, indeed, formal banking sector inclusion in Kenya remains as low at 23%. However, the M-Pesa platform performs the essential financial transactions: deposit and withdraw money, transfer money to other M-Pesa users and non-users, pay bills and purchase airtime. M-Pesa agents are as ubiquitous pavement airtime kiosks, whose owners have been duly trained and are incentivised by clipping a commission per M-Pesa transaction. This is the kind of distribution network that most ATM-driven banks can only dream about.
This context is not unique to Kenya. Small wonder that Sub-Saharan Africa is a global leader in the use of mobile money technology. On an average, 16% of the adult population actively use a mobile money product in the region; the global average is two percent. Of the 18 countries in the world that have more mobile money accounts than bank accounts, only one, Paraguay, is not in Africa. Here’s why.

On an average, 16% of the adult population in Sub-Saharan Africa actively use a mobile money product; the global average is two percent.

Visiting a physical bank branch can be time-consuming and expensive, in terms of transport costs to get there. Even with geographic access to a bank branch, the vast majority of the unbanked is not deemed to earn enough to warrant a bank account. However, in Kenya today, 43% of the population have a mobile phone — this figure jumps to 83% if one considers only Kenyans over 15 years of age. This immediately renders so-called mobile money products almost universally accessible. By way of example, Kenya today accounts for some 26.7 million M-Pesa accounts (and 33 million mobile phones), and has more active mobile money accounts than adults in its population.
There have been some surprisingly positive side effects in terms of financial empowerment of communities in rural areas, particularly women. According to one study, M-Pesa’s accessibility as a means of storing money greatly enabled women to save, as they would formerly have had to spend time and money to travel considerable distances to deposit money or access their savings. It kept funds safe from casual spending, either by themselves, or their husbands. This in turn increased community’s trust of and respect for them, as they were no longer forced to buy on credit. For many women, it created financial independence and privacy, as social conventions dictated that they had previously to rely on male relatives for access to funds.

According to one study, M-Pesa’s accessibility as a means of storing money greatly enabled women to save, as they would formerly have had to spend time and money to travel considerable distances to deposit money or access their savings.

It is no coincidence that M-Pesa’s wildly successful tagline was simply “Send Money Home.” Before the launch of M-Pesa, more than a quarter of Kenya’s population, usually rural women, were reliant on remittances for income, and 75% of the remittance providers would send cash informally, via travelling family members on public transport. By eliminating the time, cost and risk involved in this process, some estimates put the increase to household income that mobile money has facilitated at between five percent and 30%.
The average transaction size is around USD 33 and there is a cap of USD 500 on transactions in order to prevent the use of the platform for money laundering. Mobile money products are specifically designed to service cash transfers previously considered too small by banks to bother about. Half the transactions are for a value of less than USD 10. Indeed, M-Pesa accounts for just less than seven percent of national payments’ throughput value in Kenya, but more than two thirds of the transactions by volume.
M-Pesa, Kenya, ICT Africa, Mobile Money, Safaricom
Photo: Stefan Magdalinski/CC BY 2.0
The truly fascinating aspect to mobile money in Kenya, is that it has become a digital platform from which other financial products can reach previously ignored segments of the population. Financial regulations in Kenya prevent Safaricom, the local M-Pesa service provider, from earning or paying interest on the M-Pesa money flows, as it does not hold a banking license. However, an innovative partnership with Kenya Commercial Bank has given rise to a sister product M-Shwari, through which M-Pesa account holders can open an interest-earning savings account via their mobile phone. Excitingly, mobile network operators, which can track the transaction history linked to mobile money accounts, essentially have the information to enable the construction of a credit profile — historically one of the primary barriers to credit for low-income individuals — thus allowing M-Shwari to offer short-term loans to its customers. The fact that M-Shwari has a non-payment rate of two percent over 90 days, despite lending to a segment of the population considered highly risky by conventional banks, is testament to the product’s success.
However, M-Pesa is not a financial panacea that can be copy-pasted to all lower-income countries. Vodafone learned this to its detriment. Stupendous success in Kenya rendered the mobile service provider a self-declared expert on mobile money in Sub-Saharan Africa. The product was launched with gay abandon in several other countries such as Tanzania, DRC, Uganda and South Africa, as has been less successful, largely because the company has not taken the time to understand the structural nuances and social norms that inform the context of the formally unbanked in these countries. After being lured by South Africa’s conservatively estimated USD 20 billion informal market, embarrassingly, after struggling for six years, M-Pesa withdrew from South Africa in June 2016, having only a million registered users, well under one tenth of which were active.
In hindsight, the outcome was predictable.

M-Pesa’s success in Kenya was predicated on the fact that there was a real market need given the country’s low rate of financial inclusion, with a relatively permissible regulatory environment.

South Africa by contrast, has one of Africa’s most (formally) banked populations with 75% of South Africans owning a bank account and as a result has a highly regulated environment. Furthermore, there were already several alternative products promoting rural financial access, such as agent banking. Many of South Africa’s retailers have astonishing rural distribution, and through which more than a third of South Africans now access their accounts.
The significance of M-Pesa and the mobile money products alike is the potential it holds for retail financial access in the developing world and the money to be made in doing so. As the trailblazer in this innovation space, Safaricom now generates a reported 10% of its revenue through providing a transactional banking platform for that segment of the population conventional financial institutions did not consider worth it to bank.
Their loss.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Thursday, 30 March 2017

India’s role as US-China positions harden

Is the world dangerously moving closer towards war?
The South China Morning Post quotes an official from China’s Central Military Commission writing, “A war ‘within the president’s term ‘ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practicality reality” (The Statesman 29 January 2017). Quite obviously, it is in reaction to the recent statements coming out of the new administration in the United States.
This view is shared by Dan De Luce who in a recent post in the Foreign Policy Magazine (26 January 2017) has accused Trump of leading the world to the brink. He quotes Evan Medeiros who served as the top advisor on Asia in Barack Obama’s White House, labeling the US under Trump as both ‘confrontational and disoriented’ on the South China Sea.  He argues that the new administration’s statements about US policy towards China and South China Sea are not only antagonizing and provoking China but also confusing allies and aggravating tensions.
Rex Tillerson, Trump’s choice for secretary of state, stunned lawmakers and foreign governments at his January 11 Senate confirmation hearing when he said that the United States would be ready to block China’s access to artificial islands it is building in the South China Sea. If it is a serious statement of policy that the US would be ready to act upon, it would require a blockade ‘which is an act of war’.
Like on many other issues, Trump believes, and he has very much given everyone to so understand from his campaign days, that it is time for the US to replace its weak dealing with China by a strong hand, assuming that getting tougher with China will lead Beijing to back down. So he is ready to break with the US stance on China of the past several decades.
The statements emanating from the new US administration seem to suggest it is “willing to court conflict with China without being terribly well-informed on this issue,” De Luce quotes Mira Rapp-Hooper of the Center for a New American Security as saying.
The idea behind Trump’s approach seems to be that the United States has been weak in its dealings with Beijing, and that a strong hand is needed. Experts say the Trump administration is testing the hypothesis that if Washington simply gets tougher with China, Beijing will back down. But US encounters with China during Clinton or Bush administrations were by no means easy to handle. China has only grown more powerful today with a massive economy and an increasingly capable military ‘equipped with ship-killing missiles that threaten the U.S. Navy’s dominance’. And its leaders confidently believe that their country’s moment has arrived.
Whether on Taiwan or South China Sea, China has made clear that it is not going to back down under pressure. Foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said: “We urge the United States to respect the facts, [and] speak and act cautiously to avoid harming the peace and stability of the South China Sea.”
The Trump administration’s policies, as they are taking shape through statements and actions so far, appear to be directionless but provocative on all fronts (think of the newly declared immigration policy). Talking about the Indo-Pacific alone, it is baffling, to say the least, why the US should abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed 12-nation trade pact with strong support among Asian allies and partners which was a signature step of the Obama administration.
Ash Carter, Defence Secretary in the preceding Obama administration, recently in a piece titled, “The Rebalance and the Asia-Pacific Security” (Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2016) has shown the important role the US has played in this region since World War II: “During Democratic and Republican administrations, in times of surplus and deficit, and in war and peace, the United States has played a part in the region’s economic, diplomatic, and security affairs… The results have been extraordinary: the Asia-Pacific has long been a region where every nation has the opportunity to thrive.” According to him, the Trans-Pacific Partnership aimed to bind together the United States more closely with 11 other economies in the region “is an opportunity that the United States…should not miss.”
Now the Trump administration’s pull out of the TPP has given a severe blow to its credibility in the region, from Vietnam to Japan, and China will likely fill in the void. While threatening the use of force to restrict China in the South China Sea, Trump has given it a free hand in the Indo-Pacific.
What should India do if the war talk between the US and China becomes more intense with the possibility of the impossible looming large?
On a number of issues like terrorism and India’s attempt to become a NSG member, India and China are not on the same page. The Modi-Xi bonhomie of 2014-15 has paled of late. India has neither warmed up to the ‘One-Belt-one-Road’ idea floated by China nor hesitated to express serious reservations on the China-Pakistan Economic Co-operation (CPEC) which runs through Pak-occupied Kashmir. On the other hand, India has positioned herself closer to the United States.
Under Modi government India has signed, significantly departing from its policy of not entering into a military agreement with any major power, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States which will allow their militaries to work closely and use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies. Although under the agreement, as reported, comprehensive logistics support will be decided on a case-by-case basis by the parties, the agreement does include “reciprocal logistics support…during authorised port visits, joint exercises, joint training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts” (Indian Express 31 August 2016). Thus, there is enough room for India under LEMOA getting entrapped in a US-China conflict.
There is, indeed, no reason for India to welcome a war at its doorstep now or in the foreseeable future, not to speak of getting engaged in such a war. If that be so, the best policy for India would be to help reduce such a possibility. Despite some amount of coolness in India-China relations of late, it is a fact that both China and India have maintained a decent relationship during the last few decades. Trump also is communicating with Modi. Therefore, India still has some leverage with both. It  should take this opportunity and urge upon them the need for approaching and settling the issues not in terms of a zero-sum game but pragmatically within the framework of benevolent self-interest and consensus among regional countries.  In today’s world no country has the privilege of dragging the whole world into a nuclear holocaust. In such an effort for world peace Modi will certainly find collaborators among leaders from May to Merkel and beyond.
This commentary originally appeared in Indian Defence Research Wing.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).