Friday, 21 April 2017

Were the Scorpene files hacked

The Scorpene leak can be the first instance of information about India’s strategic assets being successfully extracted through digital networks.
Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar has suggested that sensitive details of the Scorpene submarine, slated to join the Indian Navy’s fleet next year, were “hacked” and consequently leaked to third parties. If he is right, this would be the first publicly recorded instance of information about India’s strategic assets being successfully extracted through digital networks. Parikkar is not the only high-level official to imply that the Scorpene files have been hacked. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull hinted that the leak is a “clear reminder” that cyber security is of paramount importance. Australia also plans to induct the Scorpene into its Navy.
An alternative theory, been offered by The Australian — the news outlet that broke news of the leak — is that the data was “removed from France” by a former French navy officer, then changing hands in Asia. The possibility that this was the action of a disgruntled officer or an employee selling commercial secrets cannot be ruled out. Simply “removing” data from the servers of DCNS — the French defence conglomerate that designed Scorpene — is however, easier said than done. Companies like DCNS go extraordinary lengths to protect the sensitive data they handle. There are usually three levels of protection that militaries and private defence agencies put in place to prevent data leaks or cyber espionage:
  • Employees are not allowed to bring in electronic devices of their own, including mobile phones, to office premises or data centres,
  • The files themselves are encrypted, requiring passwords or decryption keys that are held closely by a small group of individuals,
  • The computer terminals are programmed to alert a central monitoring system if external devices (such as USB drives) are plugged in.
It is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for any individual to bypass such restrictions and physically extract data from DCNS servers. From what we’ve seen of the leaked data, it essentially comprises scanned copies of printed documents, and PDF files. There is no doubt these documents have been electronically obtained. If the files themselves were circulated through a data disk, it is puzzling why a screenshot of the folder containing the documents would also appear in the trove of leaks.
It is conceivable that none of the safeguards listed here were in place five years ago, when the leak is alleged to have occurred. That said, Thales, the French private company that holds a minority stake in DCNS, is among the foremost providers of cyber security in the world. (As the joke goes, companies like Thales and Airbus became experts at cybersecurity because they learnt to fend off their own networks from espionage while doing business in China).
The jury is out for now, but it will become clear in the days ahead whether the Scorpene files have been hacked. Cyber-espionage usually leaves an indelible trail of electronic crumbs, and it is only a matter of time before investigators stumble upon them. If these files have indeed been hacked, the investigation may reveal:
  • The presence of sophisticated malware that falsifies digital certificates of operating systems or crucial applications; or
  • An executable file that was introduced by a user through an email or communication client; or
  • A software patch that was created by the group/individual to render systems vulnerable.
India’s armed forces and computer emergency response teams are prepared for these contingencies, which is why it would be surprising to learn that the leak has happened on the Indian side. Civilian entities, especially companies, on the other hand, do not have the luxury of “air-gapping” their networks (i.e., insulating them from the general internet). Whether or not the Scorpene files were leaked through an act of cyber espionage, the epsiode is a reminder to India’s defence agencies that their increased involvement with the private sector for the co-development of weapons systems will require additional layers of digital security to be the put in place.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Where does India stand on intellectual property rights in the digital economy

TPP, RCEP and TISA will entail some amount of IP norm-setting that shifts the balance established in the TRIPS towards rights-holders.
Courtesy: Sebastiaan ter Burg/CC BY 2.0
Several recent bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) appear to be exporting standards of IP protection that extend well beyond those prescribed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These FTAs include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
In this piece, I have scrutinised the TPP, TISA and RCEP that deal with IP and the digital economy vis-a-vis the current Indian legal standard for compliance with their provisions. For most of the IP section, I have assumed that the current Indian standard is TRIPS-compliant (e.g. with respect to data exclusivity), and therefore used the TRIPS standard interchangeably with the current Indian position. Below, I have discussed those provisions in these agreements that generate new international obligations for India. These include obligations that Indian legislators have already foreseen and complied with (such as the legal backing for TPMs), as well as obligations that would require a modification of the prevailing Indian standard.

Summary of findings

TPPTISARCEPTRIPS/Current Indian Standard

E-commerce

Zero customs duty on digital productsSimilar to TPP —TPP-compliant
Non-discrimination for foreign digital productsGovernment procurements exempt —None, as far as government procurement of software is concerned
Personal information protectionSimilar to TPP —TPP-compliant
Cross-border information flowSimilar to TPP, unless HK proposal is accepted by negotiators —Possibly non-compliant with TPP, depending on an interpretation of “legitimate public policy objective” in TPP Article 14.11.3 and TISA E-commerce Annex Draft Art. 2.4. Indian law requires the data recipient to comply with Indian data protection standards as a bare minimum.
Prohibition on server localisationSimilar to TPP, may be more expansive if “or investing in its territory” is accepted by negotiators —None

Intellectual property

 — —Commitment to accede to the WCT/WPPT/Beijing Treaty/UPOVN/A
Non-visual trade marks —Similar to TPP, with opposition for scent marksTPP-compliant in respect of sound marks, possibly non-compliant in respect of smell marks. RCEP-compliant if IN opposition is accepted by negotiators.
No rights for prior users of registered marks —Prior users protectedTPP non-compliant; RCEP-compliant.
Expansive definition of patentable subject matter —Similar to TPP,  but may have changed in a more recent draftTPP non-compliant — specifically with respect to evergreening and software patents.
Patent term adjustment for processing delays, and specific term adjustment for pharmaceutical marketing approval —Similar to TPPTPP/RCEP non-compliant
10 year data exclusivity for agrochemicals — —TPP non-compliant
Five year data exclusivity for drugs —Identical to TPPTPP non-compliant
Eight year data exclusivity for biologics — —TPP non-compliant
Patent linkage — —TPP non-compliant
Life plus 70 copyright term — —TPP non-compliant
Anti-circumvention measures—Similar to TPPPossibly TPP non-compliant — mens rea requirement
Presumption in favour of patent/trademark/copyright validity — —Possibly TPP non-compliant, especially with respect to patents
Criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation — —TPP non-compliant

“Who cares?”

This piece flags the most concerning elements of these treaties as they stand today, in terms of the IP obligations that India would import as a consequence of signing up.
But first — why must we concern ourselves with the implications of FTAs that we are (barring the RCEP) not even a party to?
There exists a three-fold answer: first, there is a growing perception that international standard-setting, at least in the IP space, is increasingly moving away from traditional multilateral regimes such as the TRIPS, and entering the turf of treaties styled as investment or free trade agreements. A passive approach to FTAs (especially those that bind significant portions of the world’s economic muscle) is today equivalent to a passive approach to international IP norm-setting. Line-drawing exercises in international law inherently entail distributive effects, and therefore are bound to benefit the interests of participants in these processes.
Second, accession to these FTAs is never out of the question. Nor is the possibility that parties to existing FTAs may require equivalent commitments in bilateral negotiations with non-parties such as India. It would be extremely convenient, for instance, for the US to ask India to accept a data exclusivity commitment in a hypothetical future India-US FTA, simply by pointing out that a similar provision exists in the TPP, which regulates trade between the US and many other Asian countries.
Third, the risk of being required to absorb TPP-equivalent standards as a pre-condition in bilateral negotiations is much higher for still poorer countries, who need the TRIPS flexibilities more than India.

Methodology

Of the treaties surveyed, the only one whose final text (pertaining to IP and e-commerce, the focus of this piece) is available in the public domain is the TPP. A draft leaked in October 2015 is the latest text available for the RCEP, while the latest TISA documents were leaked in May 2016. In addition, the RCEP does not propose to legislate on e-commerce, meaning that only its effects on IP norms can be measured, while the TISA’s IP chapter is yet to be leaked, meaning that only its effects on e-commerce can be examined. I will be examining the impact of the TPP, and (where feasible) the RCEP and the TISA on IP and the digital economy. I have only highlighted those instances where these agreements create significant new international obligations for India, if we were to accede to them.

E-commerce

While an important element of the TPP’s Digital Two Dozen (D2D) core principles is the removal of customs duties on all digital products (Article 14.3), this does not create any new international obligation for India. This is because India is a party to the 1996 WTO Information Technology Agreement, which appears to already mandate this. The TISA contains a provision (Draft Art. 10 of the E-commerce Annex) that mirrors the TPP standard.
The TPP also requires, in Article 14.4, that parties practice non-discriminatory treatment of digital products originating from any other party. Draft Article 1.6 of the TISA’s E-commerce Annex contains a non-discrimination provision, but the crucial difference between the two obligations is that the TISA appears to provide a flexibility for government procurement, while the TPP limits exceptions to Article 14.4 to subsidies, grants and other government-sponsored benefits. To the best of my knowledge, India has no explicit non-discrimination legislation, but such a law would be redundant, since India would be compliant with Article 14.4 merely by virtue of refraining from treating foreign digital products discriminatorily. In addition, government policies such as preferential adoption of the Bharat Operating System Solutions (BOSS) Linux distro may fall foul of the TPP standard, given that mere adoption would not amount to a grant or subsidy.
Article 14.8 of the TPP and Art. 4 of the TISA draft both mandate the protection of personal information online. While it can be argued that these legal standards can be independently imposed on India through instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these will represent the first time India accepts a concrete international obligation to actualise the right to privacy over the internet.
Article 14.11 of the TPP mandates the free flow of information across national borders. This provision may have huge implications for businesses that base their revenue generation on big data and targeted advertising, and the thrust of Article 14.11.2 is that parties must allow businesses to transfer information (including personal information) across borders through electronic means. However, Article 14.11 is subject to two significant carve-outs. First, Art. 14.11.2 is only applicable to covered persons, a term that has been defined to exclude financial service providers. Second, Article 14.11.3 permits derogation from the free flow obligation to achieve “legitimate public policy objectives”, provided that measures derogating from the obligation are non-discriminatory and least-restrictive in nature. The TISA draft, in Article 2.1, contains a similar provision to Article 14.11 of the TPP. However, it is unclear whether the TISA definition of “service supplier” mirrors the TPP definition of “covered person.” If it is, then financial service providers will be similarly excluded from the TISA obligation. Otherwise, the TISA obligation would be wider than the one in Article 14.11 of the TPP. In the latest TISA draft, Hong Kong has proposed a lengthy prefix to Article 2.1 of the E-commerce Annex which exempts all measures taken by parties to protect the privacy of individuals from the cross-border data flow obligation. Indian compliance with the TPP obligation is doubtful, and would turn on an interpretation of the words “legitimate public policy objective” in Article 14.11.3. This is because under Rule 7 of the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and sensitive personal data or information) Rules 2011, cross-border flow of personal information is permitted only in situations where the recipient of the information complies with Indian data protection standards as a bare minimum. Similarly, India would almost certainly be non-compliant with the TISA draft unless the Hong Kong proposal is incorporated into the final text of the agreement.
Article 14.13 of the TPP contains a prohibition on parties against conditioning the conduct of business in their territory on the localisation of computing facilities such as servers and storage devices. This requirement is conditioned by the same carve-outs as Article 14.11, with Article 14.13.3 being identical to Art. 14.11.3. In addition, Article 14.13 also applies only to “covered persons”, and excludes financial institutions from its protection. The corresponding TISA draft article, Article 8, contains a similar obligation. However, the TISA obligation may end up becoming significantly broader than the TPP provision, since only Colombia currently opposes a draft that expands the prohibition on server localisation to investment in the country’s territory by a covered business. Further, the difference between the TPP’s “covered person” and the TISA’s “service supplier” may mean that the TISA is nevertheless broader than the TPP. This researcher is unaware of Indian law that contravenes the prohibition on server localisation, although provisions of the Information Technology Act on surveillance may be interpreted as granting such powers to the government.

Intellectual property

One of the more troubling features of the RCEP is Draft Article 1.7.6, which contains a commitment to accede or ratify a number of TRIPS+ agreements, such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.
With respect to trademark protection, the TPP’s Article 18.18 specifically provides for non-visual marks such as sounds and scents to be given protection by parties. Draft Article 3.1 of the RCEP contains a similar provision, but the portion dealing with scent marks has been met with significant opposition. India’s position on scent marks is unclear, but a reading of Section 2(1)(zb) of the Trade Marks Act 1999, alongside Rule 30 of the Trade Marks Rules 2002, seems to suggest that scent marks would not be permitted in India. Sound marks have been granted in the past by the Indian registry.

Kenya’s mobile money story and the runaway success of M-Pesa

M-Pesa in its current form was launched in Kenya in April 2007, and it revolutionised the financial services landscape.
Photo: Fiona Bradley/CC BY 2.0
Development finance and corporate banks alike have long wrestled with the issue of banking the unbanked in the developing world, which would encourage broad-based socio-economic development on the one hand, and on the other, greater product distribution for the private sector banking institutions.
However, bringing greater financial inclusion to the bottom of the pyramid no longer means universal branch bank account ownership. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, particularly in one of the continent’s emerging fintech hubs, Kenya.
M-Pesa, whose name derives from the Swahili word for money ‘pesa’ and ‘m’ for mobile, began as a concept piloted by British telecom giant Vodafone as a corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative in partnership with local service provider Safaricom. It was partly funded by DFID in Kenya in an attempt to facilitate financial access for micro-lenders and their clients. Pilot studies revealed that the application was in fact being used for general money transfers, and the application was redesigned. Essentially, Safaricom subscribers who also register with M-Pesa can transfer money between cell phone users, even if neither of them has a bank account. M-Pesa in its current form was launched in Kenya in April 2007, and it revolutionised the financial services landscape.
In 2006, before M-Pesa was launched, 25% of Kenyans had access to banking products. By 2014, this figure had jumped to 68%. Almost half of these users do not have a formal bank account, indeed, formal banking sector inclusion in Kenya remains as low at 23%. However, the M-Pesa platform performs the essential financial transactions: deposit and withdraw money, transfer money to other M-Pesa users and non-users, pay bills and purchase airtime. M-Pesa agents are as ubiquitous pavement airtime kiosks, whose owners have been duly trained and are incentivised by clipping a commission per M-Pesa transaction. This is the kind of distribution network that most ATM-driven banks can only dream about.
This context is not unique to Kenya. Small wonder that Sub-Saharan Africa is a global leader in the use of mobile money technology. On an average, 16% of the adult population actively use a mobile money product in the region; the global average is two percent. Of the 18 countries in the world that have more mobile money accounts than bank accounts, only one, Paraguay, is not in Africa. Here’s why.

On an average, 16% of the adult population in Sub-Saharan Africa actively use a mobile money product; the global average is two percent.

Visiting a physical bank branch can be time-consuming and expensive, in terms of transport costs to get there. Even with geographic access to a bank branch, the vast majority of the unbanked is not deemed to earn enough to warrant a bank account. However, in Kenya today, 43% of the population have a mobile phone — this figure jumps to 83% if one considers only Kenyans over 15 years of age. This immediately renders so-called mobile money products almost universally accessible. By way of example, Kenya today accounts for some 26.7 million M-Pesa accounts (and 33 million mobile phones), and has more active mobile money accounts than adults in its population.
There have been some surprisingly positive side effects in terms of financial empowerment of communities in rural areas, particularly women. According to one study, M-Pesa’s accessibility as a means of storing money greatly enabled women to save, as they would formerly have had to spend time and money to travel considerable distances to deposit money or access their savings. It kept funds safe from casual spending, either by themselves, or their husbands. This in turn increased community’s trust of and respect for them, as they were no longer forced to buy on credit. For many women, it created financial independence and privacy, as social conventions dictated that they had previously to rely on male relatives for access to funds.

According to one study, M-Pesa’s accessibility as a means of storing money greatly enabled women to save, as they would formerly have had to spend time and money to travel considerable distances to deposit money or access their savings.

It is no coincidence that M-Pesa’s wildly successful tagline was simply “Send Money Home.” Before the launch of M-Pesa, more than a quarter of Kenya’s population, usually rural women, were reliant on remittances for income, and 75% of the remittance providers would send cash informally, via travelling family members on public transport. By eliminating the time, cost and risk involved in this process, some estimates put the increase to household income that mobile money has facilitated at between five percent and 30%.
The average transaction size is around USD 33 and there is a cap of USD 500 on transactions in order to prevent the use of the platform for money laundering. Mobile money products are specifically designed to service cash transfers previously considered too small by banks to bother about. Half the transactions are for a value of less than USD 10. Indeed, M-Pesa accounts for just less than seven percent of national payments’ throughput value in Kenya, but more than two thirds of the transactions by volume.
M-Pesa, Kenya, ICT Africa, Mobile Money, Safaricom
Photo: Stefan Magdalinski/CC BY 2.0
The truly fascinating aspect to mobile money in Kenya, is that it has become a digital platform from which other financial products can reach previously ignored segments of the population. Financial regulations in Kenya prevent Safaricom, the local M-Pesa service provider, from earning or paying interest on the M-Pesa money flows, as it does not hold a banking license. However, an innovative partnership with Kenya Commercial Bank has given rise to a sister product M-Shwari, through which M-Pesa account holders can open an interest-earning savings account via their mobile phone. Excitingly, mobile network operators, which can track the transaction history linked to mobile money accounts, essentially have the information to enable the construction of a credit profile — historically one of the primary barriers to credit for low-income individuals — thus allowing M-Shwari to offer short-term loans to its customers. The fact that M-Shwari has a non-payment rate of two percent over 90 days, despite lending to a segment of the population considered highly risky by conventional banks, is testament to the product’s success.
However, M-Pesa is not a financial panacea that can be copy-pasted to all lower-income countries. Vodafone learned this to its detriment. Stupendous success in Kenya rendered the mobile service provider a self-declared expert on mobile money in Sub-Saharan Africa. The product was launched with gay abandon in several other countries such as Tanzania, DRC, Uganda and South Africa, as has been less successful, largely because the company has not taken the time to understand the structural nuances and social norms that inform the context of the formally unbanked in these countries. After being lured by South Africa’s conservatively estimated USD 20 billion informal market, embarrassingly, after struggling for six years, M-Pesa withdrew from South Africa in June 2016, having only a million registered users, well under one tenth of which were active.
In hindsight, the outcome was predictable.

M-Pesa’s success in Kenya was predicated on the fact that there was a real market need given the country’s low rate of financial inclusion, with a relatively permissible regulatory environment.

South Africa by contrast, has one of Africa’s most (formally) banked populations with 75% of South Africans owning a bank account and as a result has a highly regulated environment. Furthermore, there were already several alternative products promoting rural financial access, such as agent banking. Many of South Africa’s retailers have astonishing rural distribution, and through which more than a third of South Africans now access their accounts.
The significance of M-Pesa and the mobile money products alike is the potential it holds for retail financial access in the developing world and the money to be made in doing so. As the trailblazer in this innovation space, Safaricom now generates a reported 10% of its revenue through providing a transactional banking platform for that segment of the population conventional financial institutions did not consider worth it to bank.
Their loss.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).