Friday, 21 April 2017

Jayadev Parida is a Research Assistant with ORF

Jayadev Parida

Research Assistant
 +91 011 43520020, 30220020
 +91 011 43520003, 23210773
Jayadev Parida is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Cyber Security and Internet Governance Initiative. He tracks and analyses developments in cyber security, cyber terrorism and cyber geopolitics. He is currently working on issues related to cyber warfare, data protection, cyber terrorism and Islamic State.
Jayadev is a Doctoral Fellow on Cyber Security in the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He holds an MPhil from the same Centre and his dissertation was "The European Union Policy on Cyber Security: 2003-2012."Prior to joining ORF, he worked as a Research Assistant at the Foundation for National Security Research, New Delhi. He is currently also an editorial contributor to the Cyber Security Review (London), a contributing writer to Indian Defence Review and has also written for World Focus. He has actively participated in various international conferences and workshops on India's cyber security issues and South Asian security issues.Jaydev's research interest covers cyber security and international security, non-traditional security threats, European Union and foreign policy, Indian foreign policy and South Asia.

Expertise

  • Cyber Security
  • Cyber Terrorism
  • Cyber Geopolitics
  • Indian Foreign and Security Policy
  • European Union's Foreign Policy

Current Position(s)

Research Assistant, Cyber Security and Internet Governance Initiative

Past Position(s)

  • Research Assistant, Foundation for National Security Research, New Delhi
  • Research Assistant, PRIMO Project

Education

  • MPhil, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Bedavyasa Mohanty is a Junior Fellow with ORF

Bedavyasa Mohanty

Junior Fellow
 +91 011 43520020, 30220020
 +91 011 43520003, 23210773
@darth_beda
Bedavyasa Mohanty is a Junior Fellow with ORF's Cyber Initiative. A lawyer by training, he is interested in the jurisprudence of privacy law and the constitutionality of the state surveillance. His current research focuses on global internet governance, cyber security and encryption. He has a keen interest in the philosophical justifications for war and the suspension of civil liberties.
Bedavyasa completed his BA LLB (Hons) from the National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata. Previously, he has worked with the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore and the Centre for Communication Governance, National Law University, Delhi, and the Central Information Commission, New Delhi.

Expertise

  • Privacy
  • Freedom of Speech and Expression
  • Cyber Security
  • Internet Governance
  • Net Neutrality

Current Position(s)

  • Junior Fellow, Cyber Security and Internet Governance Initiative

Past Position(s)

  • Intern, Centre for Internet and Society
  • Intern, Centre for Communication Governance
  • Intern, Central Information Commission
  • Intern, Trilegal
  • Intern, Karanjawala and Co.

Education

  • BA LLB (Hons), National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata

Samir Saran is Vice President of the Observer Research Foundation

Samir Saran

Vice President
 +91 011 43520020, 30220020
 +91 011 43520003, 23210773
@samirsaran
Samir Saran is Vice President of the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He spearheads ORF's outreach and business development activities. He curates Raisina Dialogue, India’s annual flagship platform on geopolitics and geo-economic, and chairs CyFy, India’s annual conference on cyber security and internet governance.
Samir is a frequent commentator on issues of global governance (climate change and energy policy, global development architecture, cyber security and internet governance) and on India's foreign policy. He is featured regularly in Indian and international print and broadcast media. His academic publications include India’s Climate Change Identity: Between Reality and Perception (Palgrave 2016); “New Norms for a Digital Society” (ORF Special Report, 2016); “India’s Contemporary Plurilateralism” in Oxford University Press Handbook on India’s Foreign Policy (2016); “Navigating the Digital Trilemma” in the latest CyFy Digital Debates, of which he is the editor; New Room to Manoeuvre: An Indian Approach to Climate Change (Global Policy–ORF Series, 2015); Attitudes to Water in South Asia (ORF–Chatham House report, 2014); and A Long Term Vision for BRICS, a comprehensive vision document submitted to the BRICS Think Tanks Council (2013). Samir's doctoral studies were on Indian attitudes towards climate change at the Global Sustainability Institute, UK. He has a Masters in media studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and completed his electrical and electronics engineering degree from Manipal Institute of Technology, India.
Samir is Commissioner, The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, and member of the South Asia advisory board of the World Economic Forum as well as part of its Global Future Council on Cybersecurity. He is Director of the Centre for Peace and Security at the Sardar Patel Police University, Jodhpur, India.
Samir previously worked in the Indian private sector (1994 to 2008). He joined Reliance Industries Limited as a young engineer and served in various business sectors, including fibre and petrochemicals, power, telecom, retail and media. He rose to a leadership role within the Chairman’s office, where he was tasked specifically with managing the regulatory and media affairs of the group companies.

India and Russia sign cyber agreement, pushing the frontier for strategic cooperation

In the backdrop of seemingly flailing bilateral ties, India and Russia signed a far-reaching cyber security agreement on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Goa that began today. At the insistence of Moscow, the text of the agreement is unlikely to be made public. Officials familiar with the agreement suggest it is “open-ended”, paving the way for cooperation not just in tackling cyber crime, but also in matters of defence and national security. In addition to establishing a high-level dialogue on cyber issues, the agreement also allows governmental agencies to start working together on counter-terrorism.
Negotiations around the India-Russia cyber agreement began early this year, but its timing is extraordinary. Moscow is ascendant on the world stage, with its display of military power in the Crimea and Syria pitting it against the United States and its allies in contests for zones of influence. Bilateral relations have plummeted after the US formally accused Russia of attempting to hack the Democratic National Committee’s communications, in addition to manipulating online electoral rolls. In August, the “crown jewels” of the US National Security Agency — its tool-kit of penetrative and exploitative cyber weapons — were leaked by a group identifying itself as “Shadow Brokers”, which some have asserted is based in Russia. Reports have since emerged that the US is considering a proportionate, retaliatory response, which is likely to have lasting consequences for the stability of cyberspace. Analysts were initially reluctant to compare cyber arms control negotiations with antecedents from the nuclear weapons regime or other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). At this stage, however, it looks like history is set to repeat itself: following a brief, but highly disruptive phase of confrontation or posturing between both, Russia and the United States will likely come to the table to negotiate “rules of the road” for the use or threat of use of cyber weapons. These conversations may trigger formal negotiations on arms control, culminating in a treaty, or at the very least, the creation of an entity akin to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
The UN Group of Governmental Experts tasked with identifying cyber norms — itself originally a Russian initiative — has done commendable work in fleshing out a code of conduct for states, and in particular, highlighting their responsibility to prevent non-state actors from using their territory or digital infrastructure. The GGE reports, nevertheless, are not legally binding on UN member countries. It is also likely the term of this group will come to an end after the current round of meetings involving 25 countries (India included) finish in the summer of 2017. The GGE is a useful initiative, but its work would come to naught if its reports are not followed up by any meaningful effort to codify them as international law.
Thanks to its pro-active diplomacy, India is unlikely to be blindsided by a bilateral conversation between Russia and the United States on cyber arms control. Its agreement with Russia leaves New Delhi as the only major power to have concluded formal negotiations with both Moscow and Washington D.C. (diplomats assert the US-India deal is a “framework”, while the one with Russia an “agreement”). This opens up a unique opportunity for India, not only to prevent the rise of exclusionary non-proliferation regimes, but also emerge as a crucial interlocutor and indeed, the convenor of important conversations on the stability of digital spaces.
The cyber agreement also appears to be an indicator of the desire on both sides to take bilateral relations forward. The initial push to sign a “memorandum of understanding” on “information security” came from Moscow, but India moved slowly, especially as Russia had been aggressively pushing for greater inter-governmental involvement in internet governance issues at the 2015 BRICS summit in Ufa and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (which, technically, India is yet to join). The signing of the US-India cyber framework agreement, however, opened up room for negotiation, because the baseline norms in that document clearly indicated India’s appetite for multi-stakeholder engagement, while ensuring greater government role in matters of security. (As a result, the agreement with Russia has been ‘security-heavy’, although it purportedly removes references to “information” security, because India interprets the term in a strictly technical sense, without any political or economic connotation.)
Formal negotiations on the agreement were concluded by mid-September, with a view to sign it during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Goa for the BRICS summit. While there were delays in clearing the document, it is telling that the Prime Minister’s Office, led by the National Security Council Secretariat, made it clear this week to all concerned ministries this document had to be signed in Goa. Whether the India-Russia agreement will translate immediately into military-to-military cooperation on cyber defense is not certain, but it sets the ball rolling for sustained engagement and information sharing on both sides. For India, it is a chance to resuscitate what has been perceived as a weakening of strategic cooperation with one of the world’s most advanced cyber powers. For Russia, the deal is a coup: faced with strident criticism in Europe for its military actions, and adversarial signals from the United States, its agreement with New Delhi undermines any collective effort to isolate Moscow. Capitals in the West will be watching this development closely, especially the trajectory of India-Russia cooperation in the articulation of cyber norms.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Were the Scorpene files hacked

The Scorpene leak can be the first instance of information about India’s strategic assets being successfully extracted through digital networks.
Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar has suggested that sensitive details of the Scorpene submarine, slated to join the Indian Navy’s fleet next year, were “hacked” and consequently leaked to third parties. If he is right, this would be the first publicly recorded instance of information about India’s strategic assets being successfully extracted through digital networks. Parikkar is not the only high-level official to imply that the Scorpene files have been hacked. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull hinted that the leak is a “clear reminder” that cyber security is of paramount importance. Australia also plans to induct the Scorpene into its Navy.
An alternative theory, been offered by The Australian — the news outlet that broke news of the leak — is that the data was “removed from France” by a former French navy officer, then changing hands in Asia. The possibility that this was the action of a disgruntled officer or an employee selling commercial secrets cannot be ruled out. Simply “removing” data from the servers of DCNS — the French defence conglomerate that designed Scorpene — is however, easier said than done. Companies like DCNS go extraordinary lengths to protect the sensitive data they handle. There are usually three levels of protection that militaries and private defence agencies put in place to prevent data leaks or cyber espionage:
  • Employees are not allowed to bring in electronic devices of their own, including mobile phones, to office premises or data centres,
  • The files themselves are encrypted, requiring passwords or decryption keys that are held closely by a small group of individuals,
  • The computer terminals are programmed to alert a central monitoring system if external devices (such as USB drives) are plugged in.
It is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for any individual to bypass such restrictions and physically extract data from DCNS servers. From what we’ve seen of the leaked data, it essentially comprises scanned copies of printed documents, and PDF files. There is no doubt these documents have been electronically obtained. If the files themselves were circulated through a data disk, it is puzzling why a screenshot of the folder containing the documents would also appear in the trove of leaks.
It is conceivable that none of the safeguards listed here were in place five years ago, when the leak is alleged to have occurred. That said, Thales, the French private company that holds a minority stake in DCNS, is among the foremost providers of cyber security in the world. (As the joke goes, companies like Thales and Airbus became experts at cybersecurity because they learnt to fend off their own networks from espionage while doing business in China).
The jury is out for now, but it will become clear in the days ahead whether the Scorpene files have been hacked. Cyber-espionage usually leaves an indelible trail of electronic crumbs, and it is only a matter of time before investigators stumble upon them. If these files have indeed been hacked, the investigation may reveal:
  • The presence of sophisticated malware that falsifies digital certificates of operating systems or crucial applications; or
  • An executable file that was introduced by a user through an email or communication client; or
  • A software patch that was created by the group/individual to render systems vulnerable.
India’s armed forces and computer emergency response teams are prepared for these contingencies, which is why it would be surprising to learn that the leak has happened on the Indian side. Civilian entities, especially companies, on the other hand, do not have the luxury of “air-gapping” their networks (i.e., insulating them from the general internet). Whether or not the Scorpene files were leaked through an act of cyber espionage, the epsiode is a reminder to India’s defence agencies that their increased involvement with the private sector for the co-development of weapons systems will require additional layers of digital security to be the put in place.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).