Friday, 21 April 2017

Social Protection in the Age of Uber

Global debate on the loss of social protection benefits in a platform economy does not apply in the Indian context and need is for Uber to devise some plan
Street Scene
India is projected to dominate the digital platform economy by 2020. Conversations about the future of the platform economy in India are mostly framed through the prism of job creation, increased productivity and efficiency gains in an emerging economy. Enquiries into the quality and sustainability of jobs created and the broader societal effects of the platform economy are relegated to second-order concerns. But these two conversations need to be initiated in parallel. A conversation focused singularly on the numerical increase in jobs or net wealth creation will end up bypassing an important opportunity to steer the regulatory architecture of the digital economy towards inclusivity and social justice. Moreover, these conversations need to be localised to the Indian context and not readily borrow the terms of debate from the industrialised economies of North America and Western Europe, as is the tendency.
Uber is a good case in point. Two Uber drivers in the UK recently took the company to court, claiming that they should be entitled to minimum wage and paid holiday leave, just as they would from a traditional employer. Uber challenged this claim, arguing that it was a technology company that operates a platform for drivers to use; drivers are self-employed contractors, not Uber employees. The UK employment court was unconvinced by Uber’s argument: “The notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a common platform is to our minds faintly ridiculous…Drivers do not and cannot negotiate with passengers…They are offered and accept trips on Uber’s terms.” The court thus ruled that drivers are in fact Uber employees and Uber should shoulder responsibilities of a formal employer.
This could be a landmark judgment for the future of the platform economy. The crux of the debate on the platform economy is whether workers should be considered self-employed contractors or platform employees. The trend so far has been to categorise them as independent contractors, availing the benefits of the platform economy in terms of greater ownership and flexibility over their work. The trouble, however, is that workers can no longer avail of the social protection benefits that accompany formal employment, such as minimum pay or medical insurance. Moreover, risk is transferred to individual workers who invest both their capital and labour to engage through the platform, making them particularly vulnerable to external shocks such as regulatory changes or market fluctuations. Much of the conversation in North America and Western Europe is now increasingly about alternative mechanisms through which to deliver social protection. A basic income is one of the most talked about alternatives.

A global debate in the Indian context

What does this judgment mean in the Indian context, for the regulation of Uber and the platform economy more generally?
On one hand, the global conversation around Uber and the platform economy applies to the Indian context. Most of the Uber and Ola drivers interviewed for this piece said they work much longer hours now compared with their previous jobs and are penalised for refusing rides. The amount they earn per day is also dwindling as current taxi supply is outstripping demand. Earnings are dependent on rules decided by Uber and Ola, and the commission charged by the taxi platforms to drivers is increasing. Recently, Uber hiked commissions from 25% to 30% for some drivers. Lured by the initial monetary promise of Uber and Ola, drivers invested in a car but are now struggling to pay the requisite monthly installments; the pressure to meet monthly installment targets means that they are unable to switch to another more lucrative lines of work. Neither do drivers have access to grievance mechanisms; most of the drivers we spoke to said that Uber and Ola almost always privileges the customer in any dispute. While Uber and Ola have undoubtedly created new employment opportunities for some and alternative ones for others, it has not necessarily resulted in higher or more secure wages, nor protection against external markets fluctuations.
On the other hand, however, the global debate on the loss of social protection benefits in a platform economy does not apply to the Indian context. Eighty percent of the Indian workforce is already engaged in informal employment, as daily contractors with multiple jobs, with no standing in labour laws; they are reliant on their personal savings for healthcare, education and retirement, not benefits provided by employers. This means that in India the platform economy is reproducing informality. This a fundamentally different situation from that being discussed in Western capitals, where the platform economy represents a progressive shift from formal employment to self-entrepreneurial opportunities.
The vocabulary and discourse of the digital platform economy must therefore be adapted to the Indian context. While the digital economy is global, its effects and challenges will be experienced through its intermingling with local social realities. And in this adaptation, we must look for opportunities that enhance the protection of workers; the health of the economy will eventually depend on the health of its workers, not only the market value of technology platforms. The conversation about basic income is not applicable to India, where much of the population still does not have access to basic amenities and the overall tax base for the government to hand out social benefits is minimal. Private sector solutions alone will also be inadequate unless accompanied by structural government-backed interventions.
Alternatively, by insisting that platforms like Uber and Ola provide at least some of the social protections that accompany formal employment, the growth of the digital platform economy in India is an opportunity to facilitate a shift from the informal to the formal sector. It is much too costly to let Uber reproduce informality in a country with immense development challenges and where social security nets are urgently required. If not through the direct provision of social protection schemes, regulation could take the form of compelling platforms like Uber – which is valued at $69 billion – to conform to the same corporate social responsibilities as brick and mortar companies. A number of drivers we spoke to have already evolved their own systems to approximate this formality: rather than buying cars themselves, they are choosing to work for employers who have bought cars.
Doing so will undoubtedly come at a cost to Uber and its customers, as well as reduce the incentives for new technology platform entrants. But technology platforms will not deliver development on their own; innovation and technological progress needs to be steered through regulation in a manner that not only creates wealth but also distributes gain. This might seem contrary to the logic of competition, innovation and capitalism, but at a time when Indian policy makers are increasingly hedging India’s developmental bets on digital platforms and start-ups, the state has a responsibility to steer these digital transformations in a manner that is conducive to inclusive growth.
This article originally appeared in The Wire.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

The next chapter in Internet governance

Once cradled by global ideals, the multistakeholder community that manages the global commons of cyberspace must now be nurtured by local realities.
Photo: Eric Bridiers/CC BY-ND 2.0
The inclusion of “civil society” — an umbrella group of activists, advocates, not-for-profit organisations, and even the academia — in Internet governance ranks among the most significant achievements of this decade in international relations. For a while, it appeared the “global, multistakeholder community” that drove normative processes like the 2014 NetMundial conference in Brazil, would stitch together rules for managing the global commons of cyberspace.

That assumption today stands on shaky ground. If multistakeholder models of Internet governance were itself a product of globalisation, its future appears uncertain in this current climate of “de-globalisation” and localism.

So, if states and strongmen have reclaimed political authority over national governance, why would they allow digital economies to function outside their remit? What’s more, these popular political leaders have discredited the private sector, which was expected to underwrite the global expansion of digital networks.
Today, companies have neither the appetite nor the legitimacy to incubate such governing platforms. Instruments of globalisation like the Trans-Pacific Partnership were supported by big technology corporations, but as the TPP’s demise shows, the mood across much of the world appears to favour protectionism over expanded trade. If the private sector recedes, multistakeholderism loses its most powerful advocate.
The inclusion of “non-state” actors in global governance itself emerged from a political context, which no longer exists. A world bruised by the global financial crisis mistrusted governments, and created a network of institutions that would not be managed by states alone.
The formation of the G20 (and its sister groupings for businesses and civil society like B20 and C20), short-lived government-bank partnerships, and the renewed focus on cross-border trade all, but ensured that the private sector and non-governmental organisations were seated at the high table of international politics.
Digital spaces benefited immensely from this geoeconomic moment. Whether to widen their consumer base, sustain their fledgling online presence, or ensure connectivity, businesses and governments realised they needed the Internet. Digital networks, therefore, became the conduit for globalisation.
Ironically, digital spaces also sowed the seeds of the current anti-globalisation mood. By shrinking geographies, social media platforms brought divergent, often conflicting voices in proximity to each other. Such online polarisation spilled over into the real world, pitting communities in a zero-sum game.
Majoritarian movements unleashed across the world threw up political strongmen, who in turn renewed the mandate of a strong nation-state. Governments today are more powerful than ever, enforcing protectionist policies, limiting migrants, micromanaging currency supplies, and engaging in widespread surveillance.

This moment in international politics should offer pause to the multistakeholder community, which finds itself in danger of being sidelined by governments — perhaps for good reason.

“Multistakeholderism 1.0” reflects a sharp bias towards transnational corporations, and powerful, omnipresent civil society actors, while constituents from the global South have had their voices hijacked.
As the plethora of cyber policy conversations at the 2017 Munich Security Conference demonstrated, matters of the Internet are essentially a dialogue between white males shouting across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, the biggest technology giants have woefully under-invested in local talent, resources and needs.
This model is synonymous with the absence of government from governance, and relied mostly on the benevolence of markets. This is unsustainable, and will prompt state agencies to step into the governance vacuum created by continuing market failures.
What is the solution to this crisis of conscience and confidence for the multistakeholder community? First, the role of the state should be reviewed in multistakeholder processes. State-led institutions still hold political appeal, especially in democracies, and Internet governance must work with this real and popular mandate of governments.
The state in developing countries continues to guarantee the security of digital infrastructure and networks as a public good, a role that must be acknowledged in multistakeholder platforms. Second, domestic multistakeholder conversations on Internet governance need to be strengthened to ensure marginalised communities that do not have the wherewithal to participate in global dialogue are uniquely represented.
Finally, the thrust of multistakeholder Internet governance itself requires reformation. So far, such processes have sought to promote the openness and freedom of digital spaces and conversations, a laudable goal in which civil society plays an important role. But little energy has been spent on ensuring affordable digital access, and in conceptualising how the next billion will engage with digital platforms.
Will first-generation Internet users in the Asia-Pacific and Africa rely entirely on mobile devices, triggering new conversations on platform security? Are digital policies equipped to handle the proliferation of local language content across devices? Are emerging Internet of Things ecosystems interoperable? Will new Internet users be discouraged from digital spaces by subversive activity online? Will insurance hurdles and cyber-risk ratings retard the growth of digital economies in some regions? These are complex questions that should be confronted by “Multistakeholderism 2.0”.
Multistakeholderism 2.0 requires a democratisation of the process of Internet governance and pluralism in uncovering the universality of the so-called “core values” that influence policy conversations. Recent political developments in the US and Europe suggest the sanguine belief of the existence of a “global civil society” — rallying around common values or ethics — will be tested in the days to come. Therefore, the success of Multistakeholderism 2.0 will be contingent on bringing local communities, businesses and leadership to the forefront of Net politics. As commentators like Latha Reddy argue, countries like India will not only have the obligation to speak for the second largest constituency of Internet users, but also the largest population of unconnected citizens. To serve them, multistakeholderism, cradled by global ideals, must now be nurtured by local realities.
This commentary originally appeared in Live Mint.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Bridging the digital divide: Skills for the new age

Cultural Norms,Digital Divide,Digital Skilling

Bridging the digital divide: Skills for the new age

The digital divide is a manifestation of exclusion, poverty and inequality and continues to be exacerbated due to the effects of unemployment, poorly functioning digital skilling programmes and socio-cultural norms in some economies, depriving women equal access to digital services. Digital skills provide the poor a catalyst to break out of the cycle of poverty and empower themselves. A three-pronged digital skills strategy is required for developing countries: (1) Identify the skills required for employment (2) develop a holistic digital skills upliftment strategy, and (3) address the social and cultural norms through which these skills and systems are mediated.
 kaleidoscope, digital divide, skilling, digital learning, digital education
Photo: Amanda Dias/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Challenge

An inclusive digital economy can lead to more trade, better capital use, improved efficiency, and accelerated innovation. To facilitate such benefits becoming a reality, the G20 nations must address the factors enabling the digital divide. Statistics highlight that only 40% of the globe has digital access (UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 2002). Globally, poorer communities and rural women in the developing world reap the least benefits from the ICT revolution. In South Africa, it was revealed that 35% of household saw no relevance in accessing the internet due primarily to their socio-economic circumstances (Statistics South Africa, 2015). In addition, 16% fewer women than men use the internet in low and middle-income countries and are also 21% less likely to own a mobile phone. Unless a concerted effort is made to educate the population in terms of the benefits of digital technologies and how to operate such facilities, the digital economy will exacerbate existing political and social inequities, particularly in the developing world.
The digital divide is centered on two crucial problems. Firstly, poorer communities have limited access to digital technologies due to high costs and a general lack of infrastructure, ranging from intermittent supply of electricity to limited availability of ICT facilities. The second problem, and core focus of this study, is the limited access to training in digital technologies, the poor attainment of digital skilling and the limited access to the opportunities that can be derived from possessing these skills. Providing state of the art infrastructure in communities most affected by the digital divide, will not alone resolve the problem of poor digital skills or lead to an immediate adoption of such facilities. For example, it was found that in Brazil that despite providing more infrastructure, large parts of the population did not perceive a need for digital access (Marcus, Weinelt, & Goutrobe, 2015). Studies show that digital training is the vital ingredient in harnessing better use of ICT infrastructure investments made by both the public and private sectors (Bowles , 2013). Through greater training, the public will make better use of the tools available to them. The aim of this brief is to emphasise the skilling requirements in developing economies, particularly South Africa and India, as well as highlight opportunities for empowering women.
A digital skills upliftment strategy is urgently needed for the following reasons: (a) improved labor participation; (b) international competitivity (c) female empowerement and inclusive and equitable access to digital economy gains.

Proposal

The G20 requires a holistic digital skills upliftment strategy which entails the following proposals: (1) identify the core digital skills required by employers, (2) establish a digital skills standard-setting body to balance the needs of institutions that demand and supply of digital skills, and (3) respond appropriately to socio-cultural norms which impede women’s access to digital skills training and the resultant opportunities.

Digital skills — A catalyst to break the poverty cycle

There are three tiers to digital skills, viz., literacy, fluency, and mastery. If one is digitally literate, they are able to conduct basic functions using a range of technical tools. The digitally fluent user is more digitally capable than the digitally literate user as the user is able to analyse and process multiple streams of information. One attains a level digital mastery, when one is able to fully utlise the various digital tools at one‘s disposal and is able to produce new digital content (Ridsdale et al., 2015). This three tiered structured approach empasised by the OECD, identifys ICT generic skills, ICT specialist skills and ICT complementary skills Integrating and comprehending sensory experiences. The key distinction is that complementary skills are needed to reposition existing work using ICT mediums. To become proficient , requires a degree of digital fluency and mastery.
Whilst it is crucial for emerging economies to ensure training for disadvantaged groups to reach a state of digital literacy, the training that adds the most value enables people to integrate such tools seamlessly into daily operational tasks. Thus, any digital skilling strategy must consider the longer-term requirements for mastery and the ability to apply such complementary skills in other fields as well. At a minimum, entry level jobs , needed in the modern economy require ICT generic skills to use technologies for professional purposes. These are generally routine and manual tasks related to information and computer skill-sets. Depending on the sophistication of the task, intermediate or expert jobs require ICT specialist skills inclusive of programming, developing applications and managing networks. Those that have mastered these tools possess ICT complementary skills as they integrate and apply their expertise in problem solving and communication.
Importantly, the core skills needed, particularly in developing countries are the generic entry level skills linked to the information and computer skill-sets. These skills are considered gateway skills, enabling the learner to better grasp entry level skills in other subject areas such as Media, Communication and Technology. The attainment of such digital skills, in addition to secondary schooling (Spaull, 2015) in South Africa, equips a learner to break out of poverty and access either semi-skill work opportunities, access to vocational training or universities. The absence of such skills denies the learner this vital initial foothold to gain access to formal employment.
Subject areaEntry level jobsIntermediate level jobsExpert level jobs
Skill LevelLiterateFluentMaster
Type of taskRoutine, manualNon-routine manualNon-routine, analytical, requires greater interaction amongst co- workers
InformationFinding, evaluating, organising, using content;Understanding the need for information; identifying what type of information is neededSynthesising, creating information
Computer
Competence in using hardware and software tools; understanding access controls;Ability to publish and communicate using available tools;
Using spreadsheets and word-processors
Using IT tools for research and scholarship,Ability to evaluate the benefits of new technologies
MediaAccess, navigating and edit text, sound, image and video media; Communicate via media platformsUnderstanding graphic design principles, the combination of visuals and text, the use of sound;The nature of web authorship;Critical analysis and evaluation of mass media; Production of multi-media content;Integrating and comprehending sensory experiences
CommunicationUsing and constructing hyperlinks between documents and/or images, sounds, movies, semiotic languages used in email, online chat space or in instant messagingProducing ‘non-linear’ texts, navigating three- dimensional worlds online and so onAbility to critically analyse and evaluate ‘non-linear’ texts and three- dimensional worlds online
TechnologyAbility to use technology within life situationsCommunicating and negotiating meaningful content through the medium of encoded texts within contexts of participationAbility to adopt, adapt, invent, and evaluate technology to positively affect his or her life, community, and environment
Table 1: The scaling of digital skills

Developing a holistic skills upliftment strategy

The challenge faced by all policy makers is determining how to ensure policy is agile to respond to the rapid pace of the changing needs of employers. The skill levels required in the digital economy keep moving forward, as such any minimum standards that are introduced for the purposes of digital education standards must informed by a dynamic and responsive standard-setting body.

Need for a digital skills standard-setting body

There is a need to introduce skills certification that is recognised by employers and higher education institutions. Such certification must be supported by an internationally recognised standard setting body that understands the fluid nature of digital skills and business related needs. It is vital to be aware that the digital skills can rapidly become obsolete due to changes in business approaches and the advances in technology. Training programmes and school curricula need to become more agile and responsive to this fluid state. In South Africa, it was found that there is a disconect between the entrance requirements of higher education programmes and the Computer Applicaitons Technology subject offered in secondary schools (Mdlongwa, 2012). Greater alignment is needed.