Friday, 21 April 2017

Where does India stand on intellectual property rights in the digital economy

TPP, RCEP and TISA will entail some amount of IP norm-setting that shifts the balance established in the TRIPS towards rights-holders.
Courtesy: Sebastiaan ter Burg/CC BY 2.0
Several recent bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) appear to be exporting standards of IP protection that extend well beyond those prescribed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These FTAs include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
In this piece, I have scrutinised the TPP, TISA and RCEP that deal with IP and the digital economy vis-a-vis the current Indian legal standard for compliance with their provisions. For most of the IP section, I have assumed that the current Indian standard is TRIPS-compliant (e.g. with respect to data exclusivity), and therefore used the TRIPS standard interchangeably with the current Indian position. Below, I have discussed those provisions in these agreements that generate new international obligations for India. These include obligations that Indian legislators have already foreseen and complied with (such as the legal backing for TPMs), as well as obligations that would require a modification of the prevailing Indian standard.

Summary of findings

TPPTISARCEPTRIPS/Current Indian Standard

E-commerce

Zero customs duty on digital productsSimilar to TPP —TPP-compliant
Non-discrimination for foreign digital productsGovernment procurements exempt —None, as far as government procurement of software is concerned
Personal information protectionSimilar to TPP —TPP-compliant
Cross-border information flowSimilar to TPP, unless HK proposal is accepted by negotiators —Possibly non-compliant with TPP, depending on an interpretation of “legitimate public policy objective” in TPP Article 14.11.3 and TISA E-commerce Annex Draft Art. 2.4. Indian law requires the data recipient to comply with Indian data protection standards as a bare minimum.
Prohibition on server localisationSimilar to TPP, may be more expansive if “or investing in its territory” is accepted by negotiators —None

Intellectual property

 — —Commitment to accede to the WCT/WPPT/Beijing Treaty/UPOVN/A
Non-visual trade marks —Similar to TPP, with opposition for scent marksTPP-compliant in respect of sound marks, possibly non-compliant in respect of smell marks. RCEP-compliant if IN opposition is accepted by negotiators.
No rights for prior users of registered marks —Prior users protectedTPP non-compliant; RCEP-compliant.
Expansive definition of patentable subject matter —Similar to TPP,  but may have changed in a more recent draftTPP non-compliant — specifically with respect to evergreening and software patents.
Patent term adjustment for processing delays, and specific term adjustment for pharmaceutical marketing approval —Similar to TPPTPP/RCEP non-compliant
10 year data exclusivity for agrochemicals — —TPP non-compliant
Five year data exclusivity for drugs —Identical to TPPTPP non-compliant
Eight year data exclusivity for biologics — —TPP non-compliant
Patent linkage — —TPP non-compliant
Life plus 70 copyright term — —TPP non-compliant
Anti-circumvention measures—Similar to TPPPossibly TPP non-compliant — mens rea requirement
Presumption in favour of patent/trademark/copyright validity — —Possibly TPP non-compliant, especially with respect to patents
Criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation — —TPP non-compliant

“Who cares?”

This piece flags the most concerning elements of these treaties as they stand today, in terms of the IP obligations that India would import as a consequence of signing up.
But first — why must we concern ourselves with the implications of FTAs that we are (barring the RCEP) not even a party to?
There exists a three-fold answer: first, there is a growing perception that international standard-setting, at least in the IP space, is increasingly moving away from traditional multilateral regimes such as the TRIPS, and entering the turf of treaties styled as investment or free trade agreements. A passive approach to FTAs (especially those that bind significant portions of the world’s economic muscle) is today equivalent to a passive approach to international IP norm-setting. Line-drawing exercises in international law inherently entail distributive effects, and therefore are bound to benefit the interests of participants in these processes.
Second, accession to these FTAs is never out of the question. Nor is the possibility that parties to existing FTAs may require equivalent commitments in bilateral negotiations with non-parties such as India. It would be extremely convenient, for instance, for the US to ask India to accept a data exclusivity commitment in a hypothetical future India-US FTA, simply by pointing out that a similar provision exists in the TPP, which regulates trade between the US and many other Asian countries.
Third, the risk of being required to absorb TPP-equivalent standards as a pre-condition in bilateral negotiations is much higher for still poorer countries, who need the TRIPS flexibilities more than India.

Methodology

Of the treaties surveyed, the only one whose final text (pertaining to IP and e-commerce, the focus of this piece) is available in the public domain is the TPP. A draft leaked in October 2015 is the latest text available for the RCEP, while the latest TISA documents were leaked in May 2016. In addition, the RCEP does not propose to legislate on e-commerce, meaning that only its effects on IP norms can be measured, while the TISA’s IP chapter is yet to be leaked, meaning that only its effects on e-commerce can be examined. I will be examining the impact of the TPP, and (where feasible) the RCEP and the TISA on IP and the digital economy. I have only highlighted those instances where these agreements create significant new international obligations for India, if we were to accede to them.

E-commerce

While an important element of the TPP’s Digital Two Dozen (D2D) core principles is the removal of customs duties on all digital products (Article 14.3), this does not create any new international obligation for India. This is because India is a party to the 1996 WTO Information Technology Agreement, which appears to already mandate this. The TISA contains a provision (Draft Art. 10 of the E-commerce Annex) that mirrors the TPP standard.
The TPP also requires, in Article 14.4, that parties practice non-discriminatory treatment of digital products originating from any other party. Draft Article 1.6 of the TISA’s E-commerce Annex contains a non-discrimination provision, but the crucial difference between the two obligations is that the TISA appears to provide a flexibility for government procurement, while the TPP limits exceptions to Article 14.4 to subsidies, grants and other government-sponsored benefits. To the best of my knowledge, India has no explicit non-discrimination legislation, but such a law would be redundant, since India would be compliant with Article 14.4 merely by virtue of refraining from treating foreign digital products discriminatorily. In addition, government policies such as preferential adoption of the Bharat Operating System Solutions (BOSS) Linux distro may fall foul of the TPP standard, given that mere adoption would not amount to a grant or subsidy.
Article 14.8 of the TPP and Art. 4 of the TISA draft both mandate the protection of personal information online. While it can be argued that these legal standards can be independently imposed on India through instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these will represent the first time India accepts a concrete international obligation to actualise the right to privacy over the internet.
Article 14.11 of the TPP mandates the free flow of information across national borders. This provision may have huge implications for businesses that base their revenue generation on big data and targeted advertising, and the thrust of Article 14.11.2 is that parties must allow businesses to transfer information (including personal information) across borders through electronic means. However, Article 14.11 is subject to two significant carve-outs. First, Art. 14.11.2 is only applicable to covered persons, a term that has been defined to exclude financial service providers. Second, Article 14.11.3 permits derogation from the free flow obligation to achieve “legitimate public policy objectives”, provided that measures derogating from the obligation are non-discriminatory and least-restrictive in nature. The TISA draft, in Article 2.1, contains a similar provision to Article 14.11 of the TPP. However, it is unclear whether the TISA definition of “service supplier” mirrors the TPP definition of “covered person.” If it is, then financial service providers will be similarly excluded from the TISA obligation. Otherwise, the TISA obligation would be wider than the one in Article 14.11 of the TPP. In the latest TISA draft, Hong Kong has proposed a lengthy prefix to Article 2.1 of the E-commerce Annex which exempts all measures taken by parties to protect the privacy of individuals from the cross-border data flow obligation. Indian compliance with the TPP obligation is doubtful, and would turn on an interpretation of the words “legitimate public policy objective” in Article 14.11.3. This is because under Rule 7 of the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and sensitive personal data or information) Rules 2011, cross-border flow of personal information is permitted only in situations where the recipient of the information complies with Indian data protection standards as a bare minimum. Similarly, India would almost certainly be non-compliant with the TISA draft unless the Hong Kong proposal is incorporated into the final text of the agreement.

Indian think tank dialogue on rising powers

This dialogue will incorporate global governance issues that encompass unique challenges and opportunities. Through the prism of trade, development, security and sustainability, the dialogue shall deliberate upon rising significance of Internet for developing economies.
Two central global trends to be explored are: firstly, how policy think-tanks from emerging economies are transforming from rule-takers to rule-makers, and secondly, how the digital space is raising larger global governance questions.

Sessions

  • Emerging economies, geoeconomics, and global governance
  • The digital economy
  • Global security landscape
  • Financing sustainable development
  • Completing the 20th century projects: Energy, connectivity, and infrastructure in emerging economies


Find more details here.

BRICS Academic Forum 2016

Recommendations from the forum:

Click here to read the full document.

Background

The BRICS Academic Forum is a track 2 platform for academicians from the five countries to deliberate on issues of crucial importance to BRICS and come up with ideas and recommendations. This forum is held before the BRICS Summit every year.
The forum invites 10 to 12 scholars from each member nation to speak on themes of importance. In addition, a large number of scholars from all countries participate in the deliberations.
Find details of the forum here.

Digital payments: Inclusion, growth and opportunities

The Government of India has identified digital gateways to hold transformative potential for the country. The Digital India initiative, along with the JAM (Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile) ecosystem, is today the centrepiece of India’s development and inclusive growth efforts. These policy measures stem from an expectation that digital spaces can be accessible, inclusive and dynamic. Over a billion mobile connections, quarter of a billion bank accounts (Jan-Dhan) and a digital identity database (Aadhaar) of a billion strong are catalysing this strong policy push.
It is expected that India’s digital payment systems can ensure that millions of previously excluded citizens are brought within formal financial platforms. The digital economy and its potential is shaping the ambitions and directions of India’s growing young workforce, given that the future belongs to startups, SMEs, innovators and service sector businesses in the sector. The digital gateways can themselves redefine the delivery of services in the new economy, and India can seek to export this model to other emerging markets.
The objective of this event, jointly organised by Better Than Cash Alliance and Observer Research Foundation, is to bring together high-level decision makers, private sector players and civil society in India to debate and deliver solutions to accelerate digital inclusion, digital businesses and digital growth. They will discuss why digital payments are a key driver for financial inclusion and a digital economy, and showcase India’s exciting global leadership in this field. Crucially, participants will discuss the strategic considerations necessary to move from cash to digital payments.
Click here to read the agenda.
Know the speakers.
Please note that participation in this event is by invitation only. Follow @orfonline for live tweets during the sessions.

Can the digital economy deliver on its promise

For digital economy to deliver on it's promise we need to avoid technological determinism and put people back at centre as the recipients of economic change
Prime Minister Modi waving during the launch of Digital India
Source: Scoopwhoop
The proposition that the digital economy is going to deliver development, prosperity and growth has become almost conventional wisdom among policy makers, economists, and innovators alike.
Unsurprisingly, the theme for the India Economic Forum underway this week in Delhi is the role of digital transformations, particularly a digital economy, in promoting inclusive growth. A recent Deloitte report suggests that if the Modi government’s ‘Digital India’ plan can increase broadband penetration across India by 50% and mobile penetration in rural India by 30% in the next two years, this could contribute towards a 9% increase in GDP; by 2025, the Digital India plan could boost GDP to $1 trillion. The World Bank similarly argues that a 10 % increase in mobile and broadband penetration can increase the per capita GDP by 1.38% in developing countries.
Can the digital economy deliver on its promise? Undoubtedly, a digital economy can lead to more trade, better capital use, and greater competition. It can promote efficiency and innovation as well as provide an inclusive platform for economic participation. Too often however, narratives on the role of the digital economy are characterised by technological determinism – a sense that technology is the natural and necessary solution to a number of complex social problems, a quasi-natural force, impervious to human choice and action, that will autonomously deliver social change.
At a conference last year, minister for communications and information technology, Ravi Shankar Prasad, stated that ‘India is developing on its own’ – the how and why of this was attributed to increased internet penetration. Silicon Valley entrepreneur Elon Musk’s promotional video for the SpaceX-Mars mission narrates how life has evolved from a single cell organism to complex multi-cellular beings, from amphibian to mammal and that the next necessary step in this evolutionary process is the technology enabled inhabitation of Mars – to stand in the way of man, technology, and Mars, would be to stand in the way of evolution. Technology is then seen as an almost magical force whose wide-spread application and use can automatically contribute to development and progress. But, this kind of deterministic narrative blinds us to the very real and tangible human interventions that must be made for the digital economy to promote inclusive growth.
The digital economy can accelerate development and growth, but it can equally exacerbate existing social and economic inequities. This is borne out by the numerous digital divides that exist today. Currently only 40% of the globe has digital access. A McKinsey report suggests that about 75% of the offline population is concentrated in 20 countries, and is disproportionately rural, low income, elderly, illiterate, and female.  A study by the World Economic Forum highlights that in India, only 15 of every 100 households have access to the internet and there are only 5.5 mobile broadband connections for every 100 people. Unless we can provide universal access to all, the digital economy will benefit only a few, exacerbating inequities between the digital haves and have-nots.
But the digital divide is not only about access. It is also about the degree and quality of participation among those who are already online. According to a Boston Consulting Group study, the percentage of women internet users in India is approximated at only 29%; the remainder 71% is men. A paper analysing Twitter feeds in India concluding that women were significantly underrepresented in political conversations. Almost 85% of the user generated content indexed by Google comes from the US, Canada and Europe. This mirrors the trends in academic journals; knowledge  production in the digital world is thus led by a select few, belonging to specific geographies. It should be clear then that the digital world is in fact mirroring the inequities of the physical world.

Digital empowerment

Addressing this divide requires providing universal and affordable access to all. The private sector has a necessary role to play as it invests in the backhaul infrastructure for digital connectivity. But the emphasis must be on promoting government backed structural solutions rather than private sector commercial ventures alone. This would include dismantling the monopoly control over international gateways, liberalising domestic markets for building and operating physical infrastructure  networks, and creating robust regulatory frameworks that check for policy capture by private sector monopolies. Commercial solutions such as Facebook’s Internet.Org can provide affordable access, but with a high cost to net neutrality; whether Google’s Project Loon that uses wi-fi balloons will impose the same kind of restrictions is yet to be seen. Access also must be balanced with concerns about data integrity, privacy, and security. While questions about data usage and privacy, the uses and misuses of big data, and the threat of cyber-crime are poorly understood even by the average internet user, the challenge for navigating the complex web of terms and conditions and availing of adequate privacy measures is likely to be even more pronounced for those with little basic education.

Looming threat of a post-Internet Kashmir

As Kashmir population becomes increasingly reliant on web, the Indian state ought to focus on addressing the deep-seated Kashmiri grievances.
Shikharas outside Dal Lake in Srinagar
At a recent conference held in New Delhi, Union information technology minister Ravi Shankar Prasad announced the Centre’s goal of using the Internet to deliver government services to rural parts of Jammu and Kashmir. The irony of the event was not lost on protesting conference participants: As the minister spoke, the Kashmir Valley witnessed the 108th day of Internet restrictions imposed following the 8 July killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani. This contradictory approach—of harnessing the Internet’s promise while simultaneously restricting its availability—is unsustainable and indicative of the Indian state’s unpreparedness to deal with a digitised Kashmir. The Valley is adopting a new normal in which Kashmiris are increasingly linked to the world of the Web. Unless New Delhi takes pre-emptive measures, this trend towards mass Internet penetration could radically transform the landscape in favour of global jihadist groups and ideologies.
When Burhan Wani joined the Hizbul Mujahideen in 2011, roughly 3% of Jammu and Kashmir’s population had ready access to the Internet. By the time he was killed five years later, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India classified more than 27% of the state’s residents as Internet users. Wani rode this initial wave of Internet penetration to make an impressive impact. Along with his associates in south Kashmir, he rebranded the Hizbul Mujahideen’s violent campaign to give it a deceptively indigenous appearance, and made militancy seem uncharacteristically democratic: You no longer had to be Syed Salahuddin or Hafiz Saeed to have your picture seen and message heard by millions of people.
More generally, Wani was able to demonstrate to disgruntled Kashmiris that the Internet as a medium welcomes their discontent. In the near term, Wani’s example will likely encourage tech-savvy militant entrepreneurs to follow in his footsteps and seek celebrity status by associating themselves with locally established militant outfits. In the longer term, however, Internet penetration could mature to promote violent religious ideologies over the militant nationalistic ones currently in vogue.
Since the early 1990s, a handful of leaders have monopolised the separatist space, relying on the vernacular press to dictate what people believe, when they close their shops, and how readily they jeopardise their educational prospects for a life of militancy or stone pelting. In a contained environment of top-down information flows, separatist leaders have more or less ensured that disaffection with New Delhi translates into one of their two endorsed outcomes: commitment to azadi, or support for Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan. All of this changes with Internet penetration. Once connectivity pervades Kashmiri households, the interests of men like Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Shabir Ahmad Shah and Yasin Malik will have to compete with an entire universe of alternative pull factors.
The Valley’s separatist leaders have already lost legitimacy among a section of Kashmiris, who argue that the Hurriyat men pretend to represent the Kashmiri people while serving only themselves. Indeed, most former militants interviewed by this author believe separatists are opportunistic “double agents”, lining their pockets in the cosy space between New Delhi and Islamabad’s corrupting tendencies. Though these former combatants acknowledge that separatist leaders currently retain the capacity to mobilize thousands of followers, they have no doubt that support for Hurriyat leaders is diminishing steadily. Continued Internet penetration will likely precipitate this breakdown of established power structures. As separatists lose their monopoly over the realm of discontent, the latter stands to become increasingly permeable to foreign ideologies—including those of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State—that have thus far struggled to gain currency in Kashmir.
The ability of heretofore unwelcome ideologies to find a receptive audience in the Valley will also depend on the persistence of what one may reasonably call omnidirectional disaffection. Over the years, Islamabad has lost favour with many Kashmiris for derailing what began as a struggle for azadi. Hurriyat leaders may await a similar fate as a growing mass of Kashmiris lose faith in their performance as “representatives”.
But the accounts of former militants suggest New Delhi should not expect to benefit from this growing dislike for its traditional foes. While these men initially befriended Pakistan because it was India’s enemy, their subsequent disillusionment with Islamabad has not translated into reduced animosity towards the Indian state. Instead, these individuals have come to exhibit omnidirectional disaffection, simultaneously opposing all involved parties: India, Pakistan, as well as the separatist camp. Because they perceive an absence of allies in their immediate environment, young men harbouring such disaffection could seek proximate shelter in religion, before anchoring themselves—via the Internet—to violent ideologies flourishing farther afield.
In times of crisis, a reactive New Delhi has sought to contain the Internet’s disruptive potential by blocking social media platforms and suspending Internet access altogether. As the Valley’s population becomes increasingly reliant on the Web, however, turning off the tap will not remain an option. Instead, the Indian state ought to focus on the more worthwhile task of addressing deep-seated Kashmiri grievances, for the latter alone can keep mass Internet penetration in the Valley from being a truly wonderful thing.
This commentary originally appeared in Live Mint.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).