Saturday, 22 April 2017

China renaming places in Arunachal is an old ploy to delegitimise adversaries

Source: Wikipedia
True to form, the Chinese have pushed up their claim over Arunachal Pradesh to another level. The English daily Global Times said in a news item today that “China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced on 14 April that it had standardised in Chinese characters, Tibetan and Roman alphabet, the names of six places in ‘South Tibet’, which India calls ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ in accordance with the regulations of the central government.
So, Bum La, the pass that marks the Line of Actual Control (LAC) north of Tawang has become Bümo La and Namka Chu, through which the current LAC runs and where the fighting first began in October 1962, has become Namkapub Ri and Menchuka, a small town in West Siang district, has become Mainquka.
China has long mastered the art of “lawfare” or the system through which legal claims are put forward to delegitimise adversaries. Renaming places is not something new. So the Chinese call the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as the Xisha and Nansha islands or the Senkaku islands which they dispute with Japan as the Diaoyu islands. So Aksai Chin which India claims as being part of Jammu & Kashmir is occupied by China and is said to be the southwestern part of the Hotan Prefecture of Xinjiang.
According to the daily, the aim is to “reaffirm the country’s territorial sovereignty to the disputed region”. The paper cited a Chinese specialist Xiong Kunxin to say that the renaming and standardisation were part of “China’s growing understanding and recognition of geography in South Tibet.”
India’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh rests on the Simla Convention of 1914 which it arrived at with the Tibetan authorities which marked the border through what was known as the McMahon Line. The great monastery of Tawang thus became a part of India, though it was administered by Tibetan monks till 1951 when an Indian patrol team led by Major R. Khating sent them away. China says that its representative had not agreed to the Simla Convention, though the record says that he initialled it. Further in ensuring years, the Chinese authorities did not raise any issue with regard to the McMahon Line.
Even though China claimed a boundary on the foothills of the Assam plains from the outset, it did not press its claims. In 1962, following the defeat of the Indian Army, China occupied all of Arunachal Pradesh, but voluntarily withdrew thereafter.
Earlier in 1960, Premier Zhou Enlai offered to trade Chinese claims in Arunachal with India’s claims in Aksai Chin which China was occupying. This offer of a swap was repeated again by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. However, since the mid-1980s, the Chinese have been saying that India should concede Tawang to them. And now, following the most recent visit of the Dalai Lama, which China warned would spoil Sino-Indian relations, Beijing has taken this additional step.
However, in 2005, in signing the agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principle for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, China accepted under its Article VII that “In reaching the boundary settlement, the two sides will safeguard due interests of their settled populations in border areas.” Indians assumed that the Chinese were willing to again forgo their claim on Tawang, but a year later China disavowed this as well.
Last month, Dai Bingguo who was Beijing’s top negotiator on the border dispute with his Indian counterparts between 2003 and 2013, said in an interview with the China-Indian Dialogue magazine that “The disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is inalienable from China’s Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction.” Indeed, he had the chutzpah to suggest that India was blocking China’s “reasonable requests” in not offering Tawang up as part of a border settlement. Indian negotiators have repeatedly told the Chinese that bringing up Tawang is a deal breaker.
Now, it is not just Tawang, clearly the Chinese are hardening their claim on the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. And the prospects of a border settlement look remote. But this is not just something that affects India. Across their periphery, whether in the Senkaku/Diayou islands, or the South China Sea, China’s position on its borders has become more assertive and inflexible.
This commentary originally appeared in Hindustan Times.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Friday, 21 April 2017

Breaking ranks with Asia: The case for encrypting India

Christiaan Colen
There is no Asian approach to encryption. The Internet transcends conventional borders and so does the encryption that travels with it. But there is a growing Asian security dialogue and an emerging debate on encryption in Asia. That debate has been overshadowed by the disjointed responses of individual countries to specific aspects of encryption. Bahrain, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, amongst others, formally disallow different forms of client-side encryption. A larger list of countries have decryption-on-demand laws. They are not very different from Western liberal democracies where calls for encryption bans and backdoors are commonplace.
In India, the surveillance and encryption debate is marked by contradictions. We are losing out, the claim goes, because the technologies and infrastructure of digital communications are located abroad. We must sacrifice our freedoms, another claim goes, because only high levels of surveillance can protect us. Unfortunately, these reductive arguments, designed to appeal to nationalism and insecurity, have captured the national discourse. They have helped to shape a statist, blunt and control-oriented approach to encryption. Taking their cue from China, several Asian countries including India want to impose their sovereignty on the Internet, strictly license encryption products, have unfettered access to Internet communications and more. This ‘Internet sovereignty’ approach to encryption will fail.
This essay explains the basics of how encryption works; provides a high-level account of the American crypto-wars and how they manifest in India; looks at how mass surveillance fears have fuelled a new phase of the crypto-wars; and demonstrates the futility of the Indian government’s nationalism-laced approach to encryption, particularly in relation to data localisation, Internet sovereignty and the withdrawn National Encryption Policy of 2015. Looking ahead, this essay argues that encryption cannot be stopped; cybersecurity depends on strong encryption; and India’s security and prosperity depend on the widespread adoption of encryption.
If it stopped pursuing the Internet sovereignty approach and supported strong encryption without backdoors instead, India would break ranks with many Asian countries. But since there is no multilateral cybersecurity cooperation regime in Asia that India participates in, that would not be a loss. On the other hand, India should drive the Asian cybersecurity debate towards unbreakable encryption in the interests of its emerging digital economy, democratic values and national security.
The Basics of Encryption
Encryption is the conversion of intelligible data (plaintext), such as files or messages, into an unintelligible form (ciphertext) and decryption is the reversion of ciphertext to plaintext. Encryption occurs through the application of a cipher, a cryptographic algorithm that links the plaintext and ciphertext. The algorithm contains at least one variable parameter (key) that changes each time data is encrypted. The key is determined by a random number generating algorithm. For encryption to work, the key must be secret. Encryption does not encompass data conversion using a fixed key with no variable parameter (scrambling).[1]
Until the 1970s, both the encrypter and decrypter had to have a pair of identical keys (symmetric-key encryption). The system has two main weaknesses. First, the key has to be shared before the message (key exchange). Second, secrecy is inversely proportional to the number of people in the know—intuitively, not mathematically. Moreover, the sender is not sure that the key reached the intended receiver, and the receiver is not sure that her key was authentic (authentication problem). That is because of the danger of the key exchange being intercepted by a third party who may access the messages as they flow or impersonate either the sender or receiver (man-in-the-middle).
Most key exchange problems were solved by the invention of public key cryptography in the 1970s. Two non-identical but mathematically linked keys are created, one to encrypt a message and the other to decrypt it (asymmetric-key encryption). A receiver makes one of her keys publicly available (public key) but keeps the other one secret (private key). A sender encrypts her message using the receiver’s public key which the latter decrypts with her private key. To solve the authentication problem, the sender, who has also made her public key available, signs her message with her private key which can only be decrypted with her public key to verify her signature (digital signature).
When designed and implemented well, public key cryptography is unbreakable. It obviates backdoors because no man-in-the-middle has the receiver’s private key. It can assure message integrity by algorithmically assigning the data a fixed value (hashing) which can be verified for consistency. However, public key cryptography is computationally intensive and slow to operate so it is rarely used for real-time communications which continue to be symmetrically encrypted.
The Crypto-Wars
The encryption debate is United States-centric because, for better or for worse, American laws have shaped the Internet’s architecture and the availability of encryption products. Public key cryptography did not begin to find mass application until the 1990s. The primary cryptosystem in regular use, the Data Encryption Standard (DES), developed by IBM in the 1970s, and approved by the NSA, used a symmetric-key algorithm with a weak key. As Internet use grew, businesses improved the security of their products to encourage consumer confidence.
For individuals who did not want to depend on off-the-shelf encryption, the asymmetric-key Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) cryptosystem, developed in 1991, offered client-side encryption for messages. PGP provides unbreakable encryption for messages even when passing through known backdoors. No one besides the sender and receiver can access the plaintext making strong PGP immune to man-in-the-middle attacks (end-to-end encryption).
In the early 1990s, American telecom carriers were upgrading from analogue to packet-switched digital transmissions. The US government pushed carriers to install the ‘Clipper chip,’ a chipset that used a symmetric-key algorithm to encrypt voice data with a key developed by the NSA. The Clipper chip was to be installed in phones and a key copy surrendered to government to be held in escrow.
There are two fundamental problems with government key escrow. First, escrow of any sort only works when the third-party escrow agent is trusted by the other parties to handle the object of their transaction―in this case, keys. When a government wiretaps a private communication, it is not a third-party; so in a surveillance situation the government cannot by definition perform escrow functions. Second, the key is vulnerable to attack while stored in escrow. When the Clipper algorithms were declassified by the US government, they were swiftly shown to be vulnerable to high-speed, high-volume key guesses (brute-force attack).
At the same time, the US legislature enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA). It compelled telecom carriers to technologically enable government wiretaps. There were three significant limitations. First, the government was prevented from banning commercial encryption. Second, the law was restricted to the public switched telecom network (PSTN); it did not cover Internet services such as voice-over-Internet-protocol (VoIP) calls. Third, communications carriers were exempted from the duty to decrypt messages (decryption mandate) if they did not have the means to do so.
In 2005, CALEA was extended to cover VoIP and broadband Internet service providers (ISPs) even though they are not PSTN-based. But it still did not cover non-ISP-provided Internet email or over-the-top (OTT) instant messengers. Consequently, while Skype had to have CALEA-mandated backdoors, Gmail or WhatsApp were free from backdoors and the decryption mandate. That set the stage for the second phase of the crypto-wars.
In India, the Central Monitoring System (CMS) corresponds to CALEA in several ways.  Until recently, telecom carriers were restricted to 40-bit encryption which was even weaker than the 64-bit key found in the 1980s-vintage A5/1 cipher used in the 2G GSM standard.[2] Some carriers simply did not encrypt and voice calls could be lifted off-the-air. The CMS requires carriers to provide the government with a seamless interception interface irrespective of their network encryption. It covers VoIP and ISPs too. Unless an Indian user uses client-side public key encryption or commercial end-to-end encryption, their communications have permanent backdoors.
The CMS is more than an interception interface. It creates a centralised database which even Britain’s recent “snoopers’ charter” failed to do. Will Delhi misuse its technological capabilities? We do not know. But we do know that the government has a long history of illegal wiretaps. The issue has been consistently raised in Parliament and covered in the press.[3] Interceptions and decryptions are ordered by bureaucrats with little understanding of the law and no independent oversight mechanism. Private carriers have obeyed even procedurally-irregular interception orders instead of pushing back against irregular surveillance.[4] Nevertheless, the government asks us to trust it to use the CMS in accordance with law. It would not be an unfair assessment to say that businesses and individuals will be more interested in encrypting their communications from now on.
The Blackberry Episode
From 2008 the Indian government pressured Blackberry-maker Research in Motion (RIM) to decrypt messages on demand or hand over their key. RIM faced similar measures in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The campaign against RIM was more about enforcing Indian jurisdiction on a foreign company than it was about the national security risks of encryption. There are two kinds of Blackberry services. For companies, RIM installs a local Blackberry Enterprise Server (BES) and employees’ emails are routed through the BES with strong encryption. In most cases, RIM does not have the key and cannot decrypt BES messages. In any event, terrorists are not employees, they do not use BES services.
For individuals, RIM has an unencrypted Blackberry Internet Service (BIS) network. This is most likely how terrorists using Blackberrys communicate. BIS emails can be intercepted as plaintext provided the local carrier removes any transport layer encryption it added.[5] Instant messages via the Blackberry Messenger (BBM) app are transmitted on the basis of unique device-specific numbers (PIN). PIN to PIN messaging, another option for terrorists, are not encrypted, they are only scrambled using a single, global key.[6] They can be intercepted and routed to a third Blackberry quite easily, a textbook man-in-the-middle attack.[7]
Essentially, if the government wanted to intercept someone’s BIS communications, it was free to do so under Indian law. There would have to be an interception order under either section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) read with rule 3 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring, and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 (Interception Rules), or section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 read with rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. On the other hand, if, hypothetically, the BIS server was located in India, then access to data on it could be ordered under section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), a significantly lower threshold.
There is legal uncertainty regarding data access procedures because interception law is largely observed in the breach. Sections 69 and 69B of the IT Act, read with their respective rules, grant access to stored information and communications data, but in 2014 the Central Bureau of Investigation was using section 91 of the CrPC to access communications data. It is likely that other law enforcement agencies were doing the same and still are. There is no transparency and no accountability for legal abuse. In any event, the Interception Rules almost certainly suffer from excessive delegation and are ultra vires their parent statute.
So why did the government go after RIM? Perhaps it was anxious to demonstrate a tough line on security and singled out Blackberry because it was an iconic brand. That was how RIM’s chief executive officer viewed the incident in 2011.[8] It is most likely that the government wanted RIM to install mirror servers in India to fulfil its grievances regarding data localisation. But by singling out RIM, the government scored an own goal. As long as terrorists used the BIS service to communicate, intercepting their unencrypted communications was possible.[9]Now they have probably migrated to more secure services. Witless nationalism, which thoroughly pervades the government’s approach to encryption, damages India’s national security.
RIM has stressed that the “solution” it gave the Indian government does not involve its BES platform, only its unencrypted BIS network.[10] Is there a BIS proxy server in India? Probably not, the repercussions for RIM outweigh any Indian market gains. Does RIM reroute all Indian traffic from its foreign BIS server to India? Maybe, but that would be non-targeted mass surveillance, which is illegal. Did RIM simply guarantee that it would positively respond to every government request for targeted BIS data? This is most likely, but it is not a gain because the government had technological access to it anyway.[11]
The New Crypto-War
The race for stronger encryption in America is fuelled by fears of further CALEA extensions to cover Internet services and withdraw the guarantee against the decryption mandate. The push probably began with Edward Snowden’s disclosures of pervasive global Internet surveillance by Western intelligence agencies, which brought privacy to the forefront of public attention. Fears of NSA overreach are not misplaced. In 2013, a random number-generating algorithm that had been recommended for cryptographers had to be abandoned after claims that it contained an NSA-planted backdoor.
In that context, Internet companies began to adopt unbreakable encryption. For transmission, businesses are gradually implementing end-to-end encryption. KakaoTalk, South Korea’s most popular messaging app, introduced optional end-to-end encryption 2014. WhatsApp, the most popular messenger in India, rolled out its end-to-end encryption system in 2016. However, WhatsApp’s claim to not have the decryption keys has been challenged and, in any event, it does preserve metadata.[12] For storage, phones manufacturers are introducing strong device encryption paired with measures to thwart brute-force attacks including passcode authentication delays, challenge-response tests, and automatic data erasure (device locking).
In 2014, Apple introduced default device locking based on a key which it did not know, thereby voluntarily shutting itself out of the data access process. Soon after, FBI director James Comey delivered his famous ‘going dark’ speech: “[E]ncryption threatens to lead all of us to a very dark place.”[13] Apple refused to obey a court order to jailbreak the phone on the ground that the government could not compel it to write code. A central question in the Apple-FBI dispute is whether the government can enforce the decryption mandate against Internet companies. Apple is not in the telecommunications business, it is an information services company and is therefore exempt from CALEA.
In India, the decryption mandate is contained in section 69 of the IT Act read with rules 5 and 17 of the Interception Rules. However, the rules only apply in respect of a “decryption key holder” and in the case of end-to-end encryption, nobody but the sender and receiver holds the key. Will the Indian government enforce the decryption mandate against individuals and risk violating the fundamental right against self-incrimination under article 20(3) of the Constitution? This issue needs to be authoritatively decided by the constitutional courts. Several Asian countries have versions of the decryption mandate in their laws but, unlike India, many do not have independent judiciaries.
If the ‘going dark’ campaign reflects the American security establishment’s alarm at the modern encryption business, the Indian authorities are still primarily concerned about Internet sovereignty. Both views are misguided but, additionally, the Indian view is detached from reality. In 2014, national security advisor Ajit Doval said: “One of the problems we have is that technologically we have lost out in certain areas where the root servers are all under control of countries [in] the West, mainly the US. […] They are helpful to us in some areas, but not always helpful, particularly in the corporate world.”[14] For Doval, the issue is still about extending Delhi’s writ to Internet companies. If that happens, we are told, cybersecurity will bloom at the command of the Indian state.
The Internet sovereignty approach to encryption is stuck in a Cold War time warp. It continues to have currency in Asia because of China’s success at firewalling its Internet and strictly controlling encryption protocols. But even China was forced to drop a provision in its 2015 anti-terror law which required official vetting of commercial encryption. For India, such an approach is anathema to free markets and free speech. A state-controlled Internet with state-sanctioned encryption would be as counterproductive as a return to the centrally-planned command economy. Instead of trying to achieve an Internet license raj, India needs to promote cybersecurity by encouraging the creation of state-of-the-art encryption products and enabling domestic Internet companies to compete in the global marketplace.

Future of digital ecosystem in India

India’s digital ecosystem is at a critical juncture. The telecom industry, which provides the physical backbone on which data rides, is currently consolidating after a decade and a half of intense competition. Data revenues per user in India remain among the lowest in the world, and at the same time, data consumption is growing at an unprecedented pace. In December 2016, there were nearly 236 million broadband subscribers in India, with mobile subscriptions accounting for over 90 percent of the total subscriber base. India is a largely a ‘mobile-first’ data market, with millions of consumers joining every month to consume creative media and entertainment content, harness the efficiencies of e-commerce and communications services, and transact digitally.
The panel will discuss and debate how this unique market, which shares similarities with both advanced and developing jurisdictions, will evolve over the next decade; and which business imperatives, consumer behaviour, and regulatory developments will play a prominent role in defining its uncharted future. Some of the driving questions that the panellists will address include:
  • Will India’s growing demand for data trigger the further development of telecom infrastructure? What are the necessary/enabling conditions for this?
  • How can regulations for the digital economy best reflect consumer needs?
  • What relevant global best practices and experiences can inform the development of India’s dynamic data-hungry economy?
  • Will global headwinds of protectionism change India’s approach to regulating the digital economy?

Speakers

Arun Mohan Sukumar, Head, Cyber Initiative, ORF
Chris Libertelli, Head, Global Public Policy, Netflix
Peter Lovelock, Director, TRPC, Singapore
Rajat Kathuria, Director and Chief Executive, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)
Swati Rangachari, Chief of Corporate Affairs and Marketing, Sterlite Technologies, India
Read the programme here.
The timing of the event is from 10:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

New Norms for a Digital Society

New Norms for a Digital Society

While the state continues to exercise its regulatory capacity over digital spaces — a task it will likely keep in the coming years — the internet has magnified the rights and responsibilities of the private sector and end users across the world.
The interaction between states, non-state actors and transnational corporations necessitates the creation of a regime complex that clearly outlines their respective roles. This paper is a first step in that direction, articulating norms that may serve as the baseline for legal and political agreements on cyberspace. Inter-governmental gatherings like the UN Group of Government Experts have largely focused their efforts on the security of networks and ICTs. Multistakeholder organisations and platforms like the Internet Governance Forum, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and the Internet Engineering Task Force, have begun to re-orient their mandate, with a view to make their governance more inclusive and accountable.
The set of seven norms and their corollaries identified in this paper may inform the functioning of both intergovernmental and multistakeholder processes. This document also attempts to chart the role of the private sector in digital governance. The end user today is valuable to internet companies, since the data collected from consumers directly contributes to the creation of revenues. If user data is the basis of wealth generation, internet giants have a responsibility to invest in the user by offering local content and innovative technologies that are contextual.  This is particularly true in the case of emerging economies and developing countries, where internet businesses should tailor to the unique needs of the next billion users.
This paper argues that effective internet governance requires shifting the locus of digital debates from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific and bringing in new voices and views of a new constituency of stakeholders. Similarly, all stakeholders must work towards building the capacity of growing digital economies and first-generation internet users. Efforts to fragment digital spaces by creating alternative “internets” must be avoided. Just as regimes that curtail the freedoms of internet users are undesirable, actions that raise the cost of local innovation and increase barriers to the unrestricted flow of technology, and thereby quality of access, should also be discouraged. These norms are a work in progress, and the author reserves the right to refine them through continued consultations with stakeholders across the spectrum.

1. Online = Offline + more

The protection of rights over the internet requires mechanisms that are unique, contextual and transformative. Rights on the internet should not be limited to those offline, and must build on the edifice of free speech and expression that already exists. Similarly, current regulatory frameworks must evolve in response to the digital medium. Just as traditional broadcasting regulations have become inadequate to regulate online speech, outmoded censorship laws often constrain free expression and impose a chilling effect. Contemporary conversations on privacy must reflect the need to protect sensitive data, while acknowledging its importance for technological innovations that benefit local communities.
NORM: Realising the transformative potential of the internet requires progressive online freedoms that move beyond rights granted offline.
COROLLARY: Real-world regulations must not constrain the advancement of technology; rather, they must evolve in response.

2. Let data flow

Affordable, universal and high-quality access to the internet is among the top policy prerogatives of governments today. Access will require substantial investments in the form of local data centres, internet exchanges and last-mile connectivity. As net exporters of data, developing countries represent a robust market for internet companies. For their digital economies to expand — thereby increasing the share of the global pie — the free flow of trans-boundary data must be coupled with the unrestricted flow of technology. Custodians of data should orient their research and development towards local solutions, and foster domestic entrepreneurship. Data flows, however, should respect the sovereign imperative of law enforcement and security.
NORM: The global free flow of information must necessarily lead to universal access to the internet in emerging economies that is affordable and qualitatively rich.
COROLLARY: Free flow of data must be complemented by free flow of technology that is tailored for local innovative solutions.
Saran_Corollary_2

3. Living in an encrypted world

Governments around the world are locked in debate with industry bodies and civil society for the right to access encrypted communications. Backdoors and forced localisation of data, however, can decrease the overall standard of security in the market, curtail free speech, and violate the integrity of data. Governments should welcome technological developments that incorporate security by design, with a view to preserve the integrity and stability of digital networks.
NORM: Encryption must be the norm.
COROLLARY: Decryption of data must be subject to rigorous standards of judicial review.
Saran_Corollary_3

4. The responsibility to inspect?

States are faced with increasingly dangerous and sophisticated threats from state and non-state actors in cyberspace. The technological and legal capacity for dealing with these threats is often disparate, caused in part by lack of access to proper forensic, investigative and prosecutorial tools. It is the sovereign function of a state to protect its own citizens and infrastructure from such threats, without undue interference or intervention in its affairs. The interconnected nature of the internet demands that governments and businesses across geographies cooperate towards norms of cooperation that mitigate the risk of conflict.
NORM: The responsibility of states to protect cyberspace is a sovereign function, commensurate to their capacity.
COROLLARY: The collective responsibility for protecting cyberspace requires global investments for building capacity in developing countries.

5. Strengthening the base

The ubiquity of low-end smartphones, the growth of affordable data networks in emerging economies, and the relative lack of awareness of cyber vulnerabilities among users leave networks and individuals vulnerable to exploitative practices. Enhancing cyber hygiene among internet users in emerging economies can help substantially decrease the vulnerability of the global digital space as a whole.
NORM: Cyber security must account for, and address technology limitations of the end user at the bottom of the pyramid.
COROLLARY: Local communities must be at the forefront of articulating policy solutions for cyber security.