Thursday, 30 March 2017

India and the South China Sea dispute

The South China Sea (SCS) is witnessing a dramatic rise in maritime tensions. Last week, China landed two fighter jets on Woody island – a subset of the Paracel group of islands – just days after the PLA placed surface-to-air missiles at the same location. With a range of about 200 kilometers, the new HQ-9 missiles can target aircraft approaching China’s claimed spaces in the South China Sea. To add to regional worries, the latest satellite images of several of the Spratly Islands showed probable radar infrastructure, suggesting that the PLA may already have established full radar coverage over the SCS.
Needless to say, there has been much speculation over China’s “strategic” intentions in the South China Sea. The act of placing missiles on disputed territory has been widely interpreted as a hardening of Beijing’s maritime posture – not just on account of the direct threat the missiles pose to foreign air-operations in the South China Sea, but also because the new armament complements the PLA’s existing air warfare capability on Woody Islands.
While India isn’t party to the South China Sea dispute, four aspects of the recent developments might interest New Delhi. First, irrespective of the claims and counter-claims by the United States and China, it is clear that Beijing operates from a position of strength in the South China Sea, wherein it has physical control over critical islands in the region. China has shown the U.S. and its allies that what matters in a maritime territorial dispute is the actual ‘possession’ of the islands, and as long as the PLA exercises military control over the features, it will exploit their location to support broader territorial claims. For New Delhi, which has been concerned about the security of its trade-flows and energy interests in the South China Sea, however, Beijing’s placement of missiles points to a sober reality. As the disputed islands are militarized, it could imperil freedom of navigation, making Beijing the main arbiter of the accepted range of ‘legitimate’ operations in the South China Sea.
Second, China’s exertion of authority over areas of maritime interest is mostly through indirect means. In the immediate aftermath of the new radar installations in the Spratly’s and deployment of missiles on Woody Island, it looks increasingly likely that Beijing would impose an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, ensuring the PLA’s dominance over the surrounding air-space and seas. At present, the likelihood of Chinese aggression occurring outside the disputed maritime spaces in Southeast Asia looks remote. Yet, there is no discounting Chinese maritime assertion in other areas where Beijing might have strategic interests – including critical spaces in the Indian Ocean. For Indian observers, it is useful to extrapolate known Chinese positions in the IOR, to assess Beijing’s likely strategic behavior after the PLA has established a foothold in critical Indian Ocean states. Could the PLA, for instance, play a role in assisting Sri Lanka, Pakistan or Maldives in securing vital sea and air pockets in the Indian Ocean? What could the implications of such a move be for India? As a key security provider in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi appreciates the need for greater stability in the region. Will India, however, accept an expanded Chinese role in securing important spaces in its primary area of interest?
Chinese Maritime Tactics
Here, Indian analysts must take note of Chinese maritime tactics in the South China Sea. Notwithstanding its military deployments on disputed islands, China’s real “implements” of aggression are the maritime militias in the South China Sea. Earlier this month, Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet,lamented China’s use of paramilitary agencies in territorial disputes, complicating U.S. attempts to avoid violence in disputed areas. According to U.S. naval sources, the presence of Chinese non-military vessels, including its coast guard and fisheries fleets, have jeopardized naval operations in the region, because such vessels are not governed by agreements like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
While China depicts its non-military bodies as “law-enforcement agencies,” these centrally controlled militias often work together to achieve strategic goals. Their regular employment in dominating maritime spaces is an instructive pointer for Indian watchers. With the expansion of Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, the presence of “non-grey” hulls in the Indian Ocean Region is likely to rise. Admittedly, this wouldn’t be to the same degree as witnessed in Southeast Asia. But even a relative increase in presence in the Indian Ocean could complicate the security situation in littoral South Asia. Already, China’s distant water fishing fleet is now the world’s largest and is heavily subsidized. Many, however, see China’s rise as a fishing power as indicative of its geopolitical aspirations. Indeed, just as the U.S. is now calling for a new Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to include state-aligned maritime assets, India might need a fresh set of rules of engagement to deal with increased Chinese non-military presence in the IOR.
Third, China’s maritime behavior is independent of multilateral attempts to lower temperatures in the region and aimed at establishing the image of a dominant power player in the Pacific. The timing of the missile placement at Woody Island coincided with U.S. President Barack Obama’s meeting with ASEAN leaders at California, where the participants sought to evolve a consensus for a peaceful solution to the disputes in the South China Sea, and the need for common norms and rules of behavior. Beijing’s actions, U.S. analysts point out, are in reality driven by the need to normalize the idea of Chinese military presence in contested territories.
For New Delhi, recent events underscore the contested nature of maritime politics in the Pacific. China and the U.S. play the ritual of cooperation and conflict at sea with a practiced ease that is hard to overlook. Just days after the passage of the Curtis Wilbur for the second FONOPS, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations consultedwith his Chinese counterpart about unplanned encounters at sea. Both naval chiefs appeared satisfied with the implementation of the code. Yet, only a few days later, China had placed missiles on the Woody, and Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, announced that the security situation had worsened to a point where the USN was contemplating intensifying the FONOPS.
Lastly, the recent developments emphasize the need for India to strike a balance between maritime security imperatives in the Indian Ocean, and its legal stance on freedoms enjoyed by user states in territorial waters. New Delhi’s real dilemma is that while it opposes Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, it also disagrees with Washington’s interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in littoral spaces. In particular, India does not concur with U.S. attempts at claiming a “right to uninterrupted passage” in coastal waters without the prior permission of the subject state – especially in areas that are deemed to be within a nation’s territorial waters. New Delhi’s view on the subject, in fact, broadly corresponds with Beijing’s – particularly on the need for prior notification by foreign warships before entering a coastal state’s territorial waters or EEZ claiming innocent passage.
Viewed through an Indian prism, unannounced forays through territorial waters and EEZs under the rubric of “innocent passage” or absolute “freedom of navigation” are a challenging proposition. Even though the UNCLOS permits continuous and expeditious passage – necessitated by the requirements of navigation – New Delhi does not concur with the practice of conducting maritime operations to score political points. New Delhi know it cannot support a U.S. maneuver, whose logic could be used to justify greater Chinese maritime activism near the Andaman Islands. For this reason alone, it is unlikely that U.S. and India will conduct joint patrols any time in the near future, even though New Delhi broadly supports the U.S. position on the territorial disputes.
This commentary originally appeared in The Diplomat.

Will Russia-China-Pakistan axis leave India out of Afghanistan

Baba Tangi peak on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
Source: steynard
There has been another dramatic twist in the seemingly never-ending Afghanistan saga. Last month, Russia hosted representatives of China and Pakistan to discuss developments in Afghanistan and the three agreed upon “a flexible approach to remove certain [Taliban] figures from [United Nations] sanctions lists as part of efforts to foster a peaceful dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban movement.” The three states underscored their concern “about the rising activity in the country [Afghanistan] of extremist groups, including the Afghan branch of IS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]” and underlined that the Taliban was a necessary bulwark in the global fight against the ISIS. The Taliban obviously welcomed the move. “It is joyous to see that the regional countries have also understood that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a political and military force,” a statement, issued on their behalf, said.
The proposal forwarded in the Moscow tripartite of delisting members of the Islamic Emirate is a positive step forward in bringing peace and security to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan seems to be becoming another front in Russia’s attempt to undermine the West and in particular American geopolitical interests. Buoyed by its seeming “success” in Syria, Russia now views itself as the vanguard of the global challenge to the West. Not surprisingly, the US military views this sudden endorsement of the Taliban by Russia as an attempt to undermine NATO military efforts in Afghanistan. The Afghan government too has reacted strongly against Russian attempts to bolster Taliban’s credibility.

As Afghanistan Struggles, Russia’s Got a Plan

The Afghan forces are fighting a tough battle against the Taliban with western help. After declaring that the US’ ‘combat mission’ in Afghanistan had ended, Barack Obama is having to revisit his decision based on ground realities. He has decided to send around 300 soldiers of the US Marine Corps back to Afghanistan as advisors, two years after leaving the country as combatants. There are still around 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan, a significantly higher number compared to the 5,000 Obama had envisioned on the campaign trail in an effort to scale back Washington’s ground forces. The security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. Earlier this week, more than 50 people were killed and 80 wounded in twin bombings near the Afghan parliament in Kabul, for which the Taliban claimed responsibility. Repeated bids to launch peace negotiations with the Taliban have failed and a fierce new fighting season is expected to kick off in the spring. With President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, at loggerheads, the Afghan government too is facing a serious political crisis.
Enter Russia with a plan. Amidst its deteriorating ties with the West, it has started warming up to the Taliban. It is now arguing that Afghanistan could become a safe haven for the ISIS, from where it would be able to pose a serious threat to Russian hinterland. China too remains worried about the impact of growing ISIS threat in its Xinjiang province. And both of them have found in Pakistan an important interlocutor who could perhaps manage the Taliban in a way that it would be a force against the ISIS.
Russia’s change of heart comes after helping the Afghan military by supplying helicopters and also agreeing to a supply route for coalition materials through Russia. But that cooperation is a thing of the past as contacts between Moscow and the Taliban have surged in recent years to an extent where the two have also shared intelligence about the ISIS. For Russia, the Taliban is a local nuisance and has given up the idea of global jihad, whereas the ISIS are the global jihadists. Zamir Kabulov, Vladimir Putin’s special representative for Afghanistan, has suggested that in so far as fighting the ISIS is concerned, “the Taliban interest objectively coincides with ours.”

 Russia Trying to Derail Afghan Stability

Russia’s warming up to Pakistan is part of this broader shift in Moscow’s foreign policy. The two held their first ever joint military exercise in September 2016 and their first-ever bilateral consultation on regional issues in December. After officially lifting an arms embargo against Pakistan in 2014, Pakistan’s military will be receiving four Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters in 2017. It is also likely that China-backed CPEC might be merged with Russia-backed Eurasian Economic Union. China has found a new ally in Russia which is keen to work with China, even as a junior partner, to scuttle western interests.
Russia has an interest in hyping the threat from the ISIS in Afghanistan and it is doing so rather effectively. The Taliban remain the most potent threat to the future of Afghanistan as everyday bombings in the country attest to. But given the uncertainty over President-elect Donald Trump’s Afghanistan policy, Russia feels this is the right moment to insert itself in the region and derail whatever little progress that has been made towards stabilising Afghanistan.

India May Find Itself Isolated

As Russia works with China and Pakistan to engage the Taliban, jettisoning its historic animosity to the group, India might find itself regionally isolated. The Afghan government is too weak to assert its primacy in the process. And given Trump’s soft corner for Russia, if he decides to buy into the Russian argument, then India’s Afghan policy will once again be at a crossroads.
There was once a time when the US wanted to reach out to the Taliban. Despite the threat of isolation, India stuck to its stand on the group. Eventually, New Delhi’s views prevailed as the Pakistani shenanigans made sure that the so-called peace process with the Taliban did not go anywhere. Today, India once again looks isolated. It would be hoping that Washington and Kabul will heed its advice on Afghanistan and stand up strongly against the China-Pakistan-Russia axis to manipulate regional strategic realities to serve their short-term ends. But hope is not a policy, and it is possible that New Delhi may have to revisit some of the fundamental assumptions of its Afghan policy soon.
The commentary was published in thequint.com

India and the South China Sea dispute

The South China Sea (SCS) is witnessing a dramatic rise in maritime tensions. Last week, China landed two fighter jets on Woody island – a subset of the Paracel group of islands – just days after the PLA placed surface-to-air missiles at the same location. With a range of about 200 kilometers, the new HQ-9 missiles can target aircraft approaching China’s claimed spaces in the South China Sea. To add to regional worries, the latest satellite images of several of the Spratly Islands showed probable radar infrastructure, suggesting that the PLA may already have established full radar coverage over the SCS.
Needless to say, there has been much speculation over China’s “strategic” intentions in the South China Sea. The act of placing missiles on disputed territory has been widely interpreted as a hardening of Beijing’s maritime posture – not just on account of the direct threat the missiles pose to foreign air-operations in the South China Sea, but also because the new armament complements the PLA’s existing air warfare capability on Woody Islands.
While India isn’t party to the South China Sea dispute, four aspects of the recent developments might interest New Delhi. First, irrespective of the claims and counter-claims by the United States and China, it is clear that Beijing operates from a position of strength in the South China Sea, wherein it has physical control over critical islands in the region. China has shown the U.S. and its allies that what matters in a maritime territorial dispute is the actual ‘possession’ of the islands, and as long as the PLA exercises military control over the features, it will exploit their location to support broader territorial claims. For New Delhi, which has been concerned about the security of its trade-flows and energy interests in the South China Sea, however, Beijing’s placement of missiles points to a sober reality. As the disputed islands are militarized, it could imperil freedom of navigation, making Beijing the main arbiter of the accepted range of ‘legitimate’ operations in the South China Sea.
Second, China’s exertion of authority over areas of maritime interest is mostly through indirect means. In the immediate aftermath of the new radar installations in the Spratly’s and deployment of missiles on Woody Island, it looks increasingly likely that Beijing would impose an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, ensuring the PLA’s dominance over the surrounding air-space and seas. At present, the likelihood of Chinese aggression occurring outside the disputed maritime spaces in Southeast Asia looks remote. Yet, there is no discounting Chinese maritime assertion in other areas where Beijing might have strategic interests – including critical spaces in the Indian Ocean. For Indian observers, it is useful to extrapolate known Chinese positions in the IOR, to assess Beijing’s likely strategic behavior after the PLA has established a foothold in critical Indian Ocean states. Could the PLA, for instance, play a role in assisting Sri Lanka, Pakistan or Maldives in securing vital sea and air pockets in the Indian Ocean? What could the implications of such a move be for India? As a key security provider in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi appreciates the need for greater stability in the region. Will India, however, accept an expanded Chinese role in securing important spaces in its primary area of interest?
Chinese Maritime Tactics
Here, Indian analysts must take note of Chinese maritime tactics in the South China Sea. Notwithstanding its military deployments on disputed islands, China’s real “implements” of aggression are the maritime militias in the South China Sea. Earlier this month, Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet,lamented China’s use of paramilitary agencies in territorial disputes, complicating U.S. attempts to avoid violence in disputed areas. According to U.S. naval sources, the presence of Chinese non-military vessels, including its coast guard and fisheries fleets, have jeopardized naval operations in the region, because such vessels are not governed by agreements like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
While China depicts its non-military bodies as “law-enforcement agencies,” these centrally controlled militias often work together to achieve strategic goals. Their regular employment in dominating maritime spaces is an instructive pointer for Indian watchers. With the expansion of Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean, the presence of “non-grey” hulls in the Indian Ocean Region is likely to rise. Admittedly, this wouldn’t be to the same degree as witnessed in Southeast Asia. But even a relative increase in presence in the Indian Ocean could complicate the security situation in littoral South Asia. Already, China’s distant water fishing fleet is now the world’s largest and is heavily subsidized. Many, however, see China’s rise as a fishing power as indicative of its geopolitical aspirations. Indeed, just as the U.S. is now calling for a new Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to include state-aligned maritime assets, India might need a fresh set of rules of engagement to deal with increased Chinese non-military presence in the IOR.
Third, China’s maritime behavior is independent of multilateral attempts to lower temperatures in the region and aimed at establishing the image of a dominant power player in the Pacific. The timing of the missile placement at Woody Island coincided with U.S. President Barack Obama’s meeting with ASEAN leaders at California, where the participants sought to evolve a consensus for a peaceful solution to the disputes in the South China Sea, and the need for common norms and rules of behavior. Beijing’s actions, U.S. analysts point out, are in reality driven by the need to normalize the idea of Chinese military presence in contested territories.
For New Delhi, recent events underscore the contested nature of maritime politics in the Pacific. China and the U.S. play the ritual of cooperation and conflict at sea with a practiced ease that is hard to overlook. Just days after the passage of the Curtis Wilbur for the second FONOPS, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations consultedwith his Chinese counterpart about unplanned encounters at sea. Both naval chiefs appeared satisfied with the implementation of the code. Yet, only a few days later, China had placed missiles on the Woody, and Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, announced that the security situation had worsened to a point where the USN was contemplating intensifying the FONOPS.
Lastly, the recent developments emphasize the need for India to strike a balance between maritime security imperatives in the Indian Ocean, and its legal stance on freedoms enjoyed by user states in territorial waters. New Delhi’s real dilemma is that while it opposes Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, it also disagrees with Washington’s interpretation of maritime law and the freedoms enjoyed by foreign warships in littoral spaces. In particular, India does not concur with U.S. attempts at claiming a “right to uninterrupted passage” in coastal waters without the prior permission of the subject state – especially in areas that are deemed to be within a nation’s territorial waters. New Delhi’s view on the subject, in fact, broadly corresponds with Beijing’s – particularly on the need for prior notification by foreign warships before entering a coastal state’s territorial waters or EEZ claiming innocent passage.
Viewed through an Indian prism, unannounced forays through territorial waters and EEZs under the rubric of “innocent passage” or absolute “freedom of navigation” are a challenging proposition. Even though the UNCLOS permits continuous and expeditious passage – necessitated by the requirements of navigation – New Delhi does not concur with the practice of conducting maritime operations to score political points. New Delhi know it cannot support a U.S. maneuver, whose logic could be used to justify greater Chinese maritime activism near the Andaman Islands. For this reason alone, it is unlikely that U.S. and India will conduct joint patrols any time in the near future, even though New Delhi broadly supports the U.S. position on the territorial disputes.
This commentary originally appeared in The Diplomat.

IMF reforms: India, China gets more voting rights, but not enough



Marking a significant development at the International Monetary Fund, developing countries, including India and China, will now have more voting rights with the implementation of long-pending quota reforms that was approved by the US Congress in 2015.
This pending resolution had been recommended by the IMF’s Board of Governors in December 2010 and was seen as a move to strengthen and repair the fund’s credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness, by increasing the role of emerging and developing countries.
As a part of far-reaching reforms, the Executive Board in 2010 had proposed the completion of the 14th general review of quotas with the doubling of quotas to approximately Special Drawing Rights 476.8 billion and major realignment of share among the members.
This reform package, which came into effect on January 26, has delivered a 100 per cent increase in quotas and a major realignment of quota shares, thereby improving the representation of the emerging and developing economies in the institution. A more representative, modern IMF will ensure that the institution is better able to meet the needs of its members in a rapidly changing global environment.
Quota subscriptions are central to the IMF’s financial resources and determines the country’s financial and organisational relationship with the IMF. Having faced criticism by the developing and the under-developed countries for a lack of representation and monopoly, which rich countries like the United States and Europe enjoy, present reforms have transferred more than six per cent of the quota share, including both the fund’s capital and its proportionate voting rights from the developed economies to the emerging economies.
As a result, the combined quotas of the IMF’s 188 members has increased from SDR 238.5 billion (about $329 billion) to SDR 477 billion ($659 billion). This will enhance the effectiveness of the members in responding better to the crisis by increasing IMF’s quota resources.
Second, the shift of more than six per cent of the quota share to the emerging countries will improve governance of the fund by making the countries and the members of the developing economies being better represented.
As a consequence, four emerging economies including Brazil, China, India and Russia, for the first time will be among the 10 largest members of the IMF.
Among others are the US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. With these reforms and realignment of shares, though the powerful position of the advanced economies won’t be affected much, but for the emerging economies, the shift in the share will push their respective ranking.
For instance, India’s share of quotas that would rise from 2.44 per cent to 2.7 per cent, will push India’s ranking from the 11th position to the eighth position. Similarly, increase in the share of Russia from 2.5 per cent to 2.71 per cent will move Russia’s ranking from the 10th position to the ninth position.
The biggest gainer, however, will be China with its share rising from four per cent to 6.39 per cent, pushing up its rankings from the sixth position to the third position after the United States and Japan. Major losers will be Saudi Arabia and Canada whose shrinkage in the share of quota will push them out of the first 10 lists.
The reforms also envisage shifting the voting shares of the developing economies, guaranteeing an increment of 2.6 per cent in voting rights to the emerging countries.
Third, the reform will enhance the effectiveness of IMF’s decision-making, including in its 24-member Executive Board. For the first time, the board will consist of entirely elected executive directors. This will bring an end to the category of appointed Executive Directors which is appointed by the five largest quota-holders.
In line with this, the advanced European countries have also committed to reduce their combined Board representation by two chairs by the next regular election of the Executive Directors. The new change that will usher is yet another attempt by the fund to reform the distribution of the quota or voting rights of the members.
The quota and the governance reforms ushered by IMF are truly historic. However, the reforms leaded by the IMF is not indicative of any major revamp as it was stipulated by the developing economies.
The 2.6 per cent points in voting rights gained by the emerging economies is a far from the 20 per cent points gain in the economic gains over the past decade.
This is partly because of the quota-share calculations which only gives 50 per cent weightage to the gross domestic product. Other factors included which calculating share includes the size of the currency reserves, volatility of cross-border investment flows and openness of the country’s financial system to the outside world.
Further, the power to amend any IMF Articles of Agreement lies with the US Congress and cannot be sanctioned unless the US authorises. Therefore, despite a historic move, emerging economies have not gained much.
This article originally appeared in The Pioneer.

Why India is right about its South China Sea stand

Indian Naval Chief, Admiral Sunil Lanba (second from left) at the South Block in New Delhi, May 2016
File Photo
Winston Churchill once said that a lie goes halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on. The same is true for half-truths and innuendo which always seem to have an edge over tame facts.
In the aftermath of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s damning verdict against China on the South China Sea (SCS), there is criticism in some quarters that New Delhi’s official statement failed to account for key nuances while outlining its stand on the matter. Some Indian commentators suggested that South Block’s “hasty reaction” to the UN Tribunal’s ruling did deep disservice to New Delhi’s official stand on territorial disputes in its neighbourhood, creating a legal paradox that officials would find hard to defend in the future.
However, as this article explains, insinuations and half-truths only serve to distract attention from India’s larger interest in the Indo-Pacific region that New Delhi’s clear, though conservatively worded, statement on the PCA verdict did well to adequately highlight.
Some observers argue that India’s ‘stock’ response to the SCS verdict — emphasising freedom of navigation, over-flight and the rule of law — betrays a lack of understanding of its legal position on its border disputes. An article in The Wire said that not only did New Delhi’s statement on the South China Sea contradict its considered stand on Sir Creek — where India refuses international arbitration — it also failed to take advantage of inherent contradictions in Beijing’s legal position in the South China Sea policy and its stand on the border with India, where Chinese leaders reject the McMahon Line and a 1914 agreement between British and Tibetan representatives.
Though these arguments appear compelling outwardly, they fail the test of logical reasoning. A closer examination makes it clear that neither the maritime boundary delimitation issue with Pakistan nor India’s border-problems with China have any correlation with New Delhi’s position on the South China Sea.
On Sir Creek, the critics’ assessment that India’s insistence on mutual consultation and a solution in the spirit of the Shimla agreement is incompatible with New Delhi’s SCS statement is both legally and conceptually flawed. While Pakistan’s right to invoke international arbitration is recognised by the law, India cannot be denied a position which it believes leads to a just and equitable solution. What’s more important is Pakistan’s own reluctance to seek the legal remedy. Islamabad hesitates to act on its threat of international arbitration, because of an “opt-out” clause (Article 298) under Part XV of the UNCLOS, which entitles a state to refuse legal adjudication on a matter involving sea boundary delimitation. Needless to say, Pakistan knows that any attempt to elevate the Sir Creek issue to an international dispute will lead New Delhi to invoke the exclusion provision.
But there is also a cost consideration for Pakistan. In the absence of resources and stamina, Islamabad is ill placed to fight a long drawn battle in the court of arbitration. In the China vs. Philippines arbitration at The Hague, Manila spent a small fortune funding the legal process and even reportedly bore Beijing’s share of the arbitrator’s fees. Even if Pakistan takes India to the PCA on Sir Creek, it will find it hard to justify the expenses for a legal process that promises paltry gains. The process could deplete national willpower and state treasury well before the judges begin considering the merits of the case.
Pakistani officials privately acknowledge that the disputed patch of maritime territory in Sir Creek does not offer any immediate benefits — barring fishing rights — which Pakistani fishermen seem to already enjoy, even if at some risk from Indian law-enforcement agencies. The issue thus appears more symbolic than substantive for Pakistan, albeit one where Islamabad won’t cede an inch for political reasons, regardless of the utility of the maritime real estate in question.
Similarly, the argument that Indian support for the South China Sea ruling compromises New Delhi’s position on the McMahon Line appears too far-fetched to be taken seriously. Unlike the demarcating line between India and China that was defined in an agreement between the British and Tibetan representatives, the nine-dash-line was unilaterally declared by the ROC in 1947 as a basis for claiming nearly the entire South China Sea. Nothing about the South China Sea ruling bears remote resemblance to China’s territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh.
Unsurprisingly, critics of India’s South China Sea statement make much of the tripartite meeting between India, China and Russia on  April 18 this year, where New Delhi is said to have signed joint communiqué that supported China’s stand for a multilateral solution. The document released did not refer to the Philippines vs. China case pending before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, even though it did mention the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The recognition of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in the RIC communiqué, critics say, takes away the right of involved parties to legal recourse under the UNCLOS.