Saturday, 29 April 2017

Vulnerabilities of the Cauvery delta


Apr
29

Vulnerabilities of the Cauvery delta

The Cauvery water dispute has been a major interstate concern, involving the government and people of four states, particularly Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.
This event will examine the several issues to understand the Cauvery ecology, its people, as well as explore solutions.

Speaker

S. Janakarajan is Director of the Madras Institute of Development Studies (MIDS). He is a water management expert.

South Asia Weekly | Volume IX; Issue 13

Source: Maithripala Sirisena/Flickr

ANALYSIS

Sri Lanka: No accountability yet on ‘accountability’?

By N. Sathiya Moorthy
Repeating himself with consistent periodicity for the n+1 time after his UNGA assertion to the contrary, President Maithripala Sirisena has ruled out ‘foreign judges’ for UNHRC-mandates ‘accountability probe’, co-sponsored by Sri Lanka. While possibly targeting predecessor Mahinda Rajapaksa camp within the SLFP, of which he is the chairperson, he still asked local judges to be independent and impartial, yet his overall approach could seemingly upset his PM Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP apple-cart and/or their Government for National Unity (GNU).
Sirisena found a prompt echo in centre-right ‘Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist’ JHU alliance Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka, as always, while another unabashed backer in Cabinet spokesperson and Health Minister Rajitha Senaratne was/is away in Singapore for medical treatment. Ranwaka again said, ‘hands off war-heroes’, but has not clarified if his former presidential boss Mahinda Rajapaksa counted as one – and to what extent and end.
Another former and SLFP veteran, President Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga, CBK, as chairperson of the government’s Office of Unity and National Reconciliation (ONUR), has lauded the ‘eradication of terrorism’ (by the Rajapaksa regime), but has criticised the ‘politically-motivated’ derailment of post-war reconciliation – for which she has indicated ‘truth finding’ is a prerequisite of sorts.
On the UNP side, PM Wickremesinghe, not long ago, questioned the ‘independence’ and ‘credibility’ of the nation’s Judiciary, attributing it to ‘politicisation’, purportedly and near-exclusively under the Rajapaksa regime. In the US earlier this year, his UNP Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera sought to reassure the international community on ‘international probe’. But their new-found UNP MP and Minister, war-time army commander, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, seems to be singing different tunes at different times, but within a short span.
In a Parliament intervention as Regional Development Minister, Fonseka sort of blamed the controversial ‘white flag episode’, possibly among other alleged ‘war crimes’, on the Rajapaksas, and implied that he was ‘kept away’ from key decisions. At a news conference within days, Fonseka said the Rajapaksas were not involved in ‘battle-field decisions’. He was away in China and then President Mahinda Rajapaksa in Jordan during the crucial last days of the war, but Fonseka did not name acting defence minister Sirisena and/or then defence secretary, Gota R, as among those who possibly took decisions.
Yet, Fonseka also gave dates and timings to argue that he was still in the air back home, but Mahinda R was already back, when LTTE Prabhakaran was killed. He still disagreed with the Darusman Report for UN chief Ban Ki-moon, which fixed the number of Tamil war-victims at 40,000. He also discounted the theory that Pottu Amman did not die in the Nandikadal battle-field and was living in India, pointing out that the LTTE intelligence chief was wanted in the country for the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.

Credibility at stake

The confusing and contradicting signals and details, if they are any, emanating from different sections of the government, could put Sri Lanka’s credibility at stake, all over again. The Rajapaksa regime spoke in one voice, yet the international community felt that the government was shifting the self-fixed goal-posts often and without justifiable reason(s). The Maithri-Ranil government seems to be speaking in different voice(s), and the addition of Fonseka, that too, to the UNP fold, compounds the internal contradictions even more.
Two, the UNHRC resolutions since 2012 have derived from the Darusman Report and who knows, Pottu Amman’s fate too could be probed, whether by local or international judges. Fonseka, among others, could become a witness and more before a quasi-judicial or wholly judicial forum, domestic or international, if formed.
The Maithri-Ranil duo cannot be ignorant of the possibilities, and hence they could be seen as being non-serious about the UNHRC commitments and resolutions. Like the Rajapaksa leadership earlier, they cannot be seen as taking refuge in purported ‘Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist’ revivalism – and blame it this time on him. After his news conference, the Maithiri-Ranil duo seems to have rewarded Fonseka with additional departments under his ministerial care.

Whither India

The Tamil-exclusive TNA, the officially-recognised Opposition in the present Parliament, had backed Fonseka (2010) and Sirisena (2015) presidential polls, against incumbent Mahinda R. Their demands and claims on ‘accountability probes’ could become politically burdensome after a point. Having opposed Rajapaksa’s PSC (parliamentary select committee) route to political solution, the TNA has now tamely accepted a much larger and more complex CA (constituent assembly) path.
Either, they too are keeping fingers crossed, or want to run with the hare and hunt with the hound – or, both, as on most occasions in the past.  This way, a political resolution could become as much complex as a domestically-implemented process on ‘accountability probe’. As always, the Sinhala-led government and the moderate Tamil leadership can once again blame each other, the wind weather and everything else other than the self, which alone might have to be blamed for most parts – and also convince the world, even if partly, partially and momentarily so.
Neighbouring India seems to be breathing relatively easy just now on this score, as Sri Lankans are engaged, dis-engaged or re-engaged among them, in various permutations and cancellation. The TNA could suddenly begin ‘discovering/re-discovering’ the selectively ignored guardianship of ‘mother India’. The international community too could begin to pressure India, possibly for the first time after the 2012 UNHRC resolution period. It could become more and immediate, should the TNA come under pressure from within.
Secondly, Sirisena even seemingly losing further hold on the SLFP in particular, whether on this count or others, could pressure India into arguing the Sri Lankan government’s case with the TNA and the international community – as it did for the Rajapaksa regime, up to a point. Jointly and severally, partners in the GNU would see the virtues of the Indian ‘relative’, but for differing domestic reasons and compulsions.
A third possibility is about a wilful Sri Lankan decision, where the probe and power-devolution are left hanging, as under Rajapaksa and/or others before him. That again could leave a huge question-mark before India, (from) among Sri Lanka’s neighbourhood friends.
It may be a coincidence, and even wide off the mark. Like other Sri Lankan critics of India on this count, the TNA seems ready for testing the waters after a gap (when they did not really want India, but only the ‘US and the international community’), by taking up the ‘environmental hazards’ of India-funded/executed Sampur coal-based power-plant in the Eastern Province with a substantial Tamil population.
The TNA’s reservations to the bilateral development project during the war years under the Rajapaksa regime was confined, first to the site-choice and later to the rehabilitation of evacuees. In political terms, the TNA opposition comes when the Ranil-led government seems keen on taking forward the project after the unexplained but well anticipated sluggishness through the Rajapaksa regime, which however had signed the agreement for the purpose.
On the ‘ethnic issue’ and attendant accountability concerns, India ended up voting for a ‘diluted’ UNHRC resolution in 2012, when the US-led West yielded as much for its support, if only to convince other fence-sitter voting-nations at the UNHRC. When they had the numbers otherwise, as in 2014, the US almost came to ignoring the Indian friend, partner, ally or whoever. In 2015 at UNHRC, none wanted anyone as the new Sri Lankan government went on board with the West and the rest. That may not be the case again – again, and again.

Rajapaksa bogey

It’s time that the Maithri-Ranil put their collective and independent houses in order. They cannot (continue to) sing different tunes, and to different constituencies, and conclude that other constituencies are neither hearing, nor listening. The government’s honeymoon with the voter having ended, and the TNA too remains clueless about the next step(s) of self and others, the Rajapaksa bogey can work only up to a point – for all of them, jointly and severally.
If the government leadership continues to think that fixing the Rajapaksas in non-war charges of corruption and nepotism would keep the voter-mood happy, from now on it might be confined to the traditional UNP constituency, which alone could not win last year’s twin polls against the Rajapaksa camp and/or charisma. They would have to stand together, yes, to fight off Rajapaksas.
It is still not enough that they stick together only viz the Rajapaksas, as if that’s the only issue before the Sri Lankan people, and their friends in the international community. After the Rajapaksa experience(s), loss of credibility by and for this government, particularly without a broad and purposeful Tamil endorsement, could mean loss of global credibility and standing of the Sri Lankan State. Parties and personalities would not count in context, either way, and after a point. Politics (alone) would count – and it comes in every denominator – internal, external and what not!
The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Chennai.

Pakistan: The Musharraf deal

By Kriti Shah
img-mushOn March 18, former Pakistan President Parvez Musharraf slipped out of the country to Dubai reportedly for “medical reasons”. This was a day after Musharraf’s name was removed from the country’s ‘exit control list’ (ECL) that had banned him from international travel since April 2013, after being  accused of a number of a crimes, including treason. While the news brought about a sense of alarm in the country as to how the most powerful can escape the law, it has brought about a familiar sense of discomfort with the realisation about the power and influence the military continues to exert on the civilian government and all aspects of decision-making in the country.
The former president and one-time army chief is facing charges of treason for ousting then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (now back in power) in a 1999 coup and for alleged involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Considering the severity of the cases against him, it is surprising that that the Supreme Court cleared him for international travel, instead of issuing fresh orders to continue the restriction.
Although the Nawaz Sharif administration had the constitutional power to re-impose the restriction, it did not do so, leading one to question the role army chief, Gen Raheel Sharif, may have had been in saving his former mentor.  His brother Shabbir Sharif (who died in the 1971 Bangladesh war) was said to be close to Musharraf, leading the latter to guide and mentor Raheel at every stage of his career, promoting him to the rank of major-general before resigning as president in 2008. While it is difficult to establish with any certainty, Gen Sharif’s sense of gratitude may have been behind his purportyedly getting the Nawaz Sharif government to shelve Musharraf’s treason trial of 2013, and facilitating his overseas travel now.

Not accountable

Whether Raheel Sharif was behind the push to let Musharraf go, one cannot determine with surety. However, given the closeness between the two, and the military’s dominance in all aspects of the nation’s political life, one can deduce a possible connection. By allowing Musharraf to leave the country, Raheel Sharif has without a doubt added to his stature and popularity amongst the troops by demonstrating the power of a military chief above all, including the law. While bringing Musharraf to trial would definitely set a precedent that no one can escape the hands of the law, Raheel Sharif may have shattered that narrative by ensuring that the military, its officers and especially its chief, is not held accountable by civilian institutions.
The precarious balance of civil-military relations in Pakistan has once again found itself titling towards the later, with the military increasingly stepping into areas of governance, that are democratically set out for the elected civilian government. In an interview to DW, Kamran Murtaza, the former president of the Supreme Court Bar Association, said that “the court had ruled that the decision to impose or lift the ban would ultimately be decided by the central government. Therefore, it was (Nawaz) Sharif’s decision and responsibility”. Some reports state, that Nawaz Sharif, was unable to resist the military’s pressure in this matter. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the fear of the government of irking the military and its generals by detaining their former chief.

A help for the PM

The departure of Musharraf could also help Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N. By allowing the former army chief to leave the country, Sharif has demonstrated two important things. One, that he does not consider Musharraf to be a threat to him or his party in anyway. Two, that he is a leader who follows the military’s bidding. While this may lead him to be considered weak in the eyes of the international community, PM Sharif knows from experience, that within the country, it is vital to have good relations with the military.
Therefore by allowing Musharraf to leave under the pretence of Supreme Court orders, he has brought himself close to Raheel Sharif, with the public perceiving him to be a man who can deliver. It therefore not weaken Sharif amidst his political opponents, only strengthens his perception as a leader who works well with the military.
The civil-military matrix in Pakistan is a complex one, with each rising above each other on occasion. However, time and time again, the men in khaki demonstrate who holds the reins of the government. With the Prime Minster outsourcing matters of national security policy to the armed forces and Pakistan’s National Defence University, playing an increasing role in drafting security policy, Pakistan’s civilian institutions are continuously weakened.
In addition, the continued existence of the national reconciliation ordinance (NRO), the deal through which Musharraf left the country and political leaders from the Pakistan People’s Party and the Muttahida Quami Movement exit the country escaping accountability, needs to be changed so that political deals between accused civilians and the government cease.
While Musharraf will nonetheless, be thanking the Pakistan the military for its support and confidence in him, it remains to be seen what the future holds for him and its trial. While Nawaz Sharif had risked considerable political capital at the start of his term, declaring that he would bring Musharraf to justice, it cost him an expensive dharna that was backed by the military. Although he scraped through the crisis, it is unlikely that he will push for a trial anymore.
The military lurks like a hawk in both Islamabad and Rawalpindi, ready to defend its institution and poke holes in the tapestry of civilian ones. Nawaz Sharif, will find himself boxed into a tight corner once again, if he wakes the sleeping bear that is Raheel Sharif. In the meantime, Musharraf can rest easy, knowing his protégé is the army chief, and therefore has his back, come what may.
Kriti Shah is a Research Assistant at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

COUNTRY REPORTS

Afghanistan

US fights IS

The United States has intensified its air campaign in Afghanistan as the Islamic State widened its reach in the country, according to a report by the New York Times on 18 March. According to Air Force data, the United States conducted three times as many strikes in January and February this year as it did in the same period last year. The increase in strikes follows a decision by U.S. President Barack Obama to grant more leeway for strikes on the Islamic State in Afghanistan. The rate of strikes is the highest since 2013.
For more information, see: U.S. Steps Up Airstrikes Against ISIS After It Gains Territory in Afghanistan, The New York Times, March 18, 2016

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOHZGHN28Lo

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOHZGHN28Lo

Obama’s Asia-Pacific challenge

Myanmar hosted US President Barack Obama this week in Nay Pyi Taw for the ASEAN and East Asia Summit. Obama, who visited the former 'paraiah State' for the second time in three years, said that the reforms in Myanmar were real but incomplete.
Analysis
Myanmar hosted US President Barack Obama this week in Nay Pyi Taw for the ASEAN and East Asia Summit. Obama, who visited the former ’paraiah State’ for the second time in three years, said that the reforms in Myanmar were real but incomplete. What could have otherwise been a shot-in-the-arm for President Obama, in the light of the US ending its ’isolationist policy’ towards Myanmar five years ago, is a mixed bag at best, as the reforms have come to be disputed. This has presented a challenge to the US and its allies in forging a formidable Asia-Pacific partnership.
President Obama landed in Nay Pyi Taw from Beijing, where he attended the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting and where Beijing also overtook Washington in playing a larger role in the APEC. From Myanmar, the US President headed for Brisbane in Australia, for the G-20 summit. Commentators blame it on the timing, saying President Obama would not have liked to visit Myanmar at a time when the nation’s civil strife had challenged the reforms underway in the former military-State.
Policy of engagement
Nearly after two decades of sanctions, the US has cautiously moved towards a policy of engagement with Burma (’Myanmar’ for much of the rest of the world) since March 2009, when the then US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton sent Stephen Blake to Myanmar. Since then, visits by top US State Department officials have been a regular feature.
The release of political prisoners and peace accord with armed ethnic groups in Myanmar were the bedrock of the economic and political reforms in the country. The US has come under criticism for going too far on its commitments towards the former dictatorial State.
Washington seems to have pursued Myanmar with a two-fold motive, becoming a leading investor in the country and rebalancing China’s influence. Intensified engagement with the US has affected relations of the junta-ruled government with China and that has cost Myanmar, but the US has failed to capitalise on the resultant void. The ensuing Muslim-centric humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State has caught world attention. The US failed to make any impact on the Thein Sein government for improving the communal situation in Myanmar. The army too has continued to attack bases of ethnic rebels even after ceasefire agreements had been signed.
President Obama’s reforms agenda seems to have been caught between strong winds. Myanmar is seen as as ab American ’Pivot to Asia’ but also seems to be fast slipping away from America’s broader design for the Asia- Pacific region. A weakened President Obama would have to take on China’s might in the region. To this end, he is also set to announce his policy towards Asia-Pacific while in Australia.
Political reforms and presidential polls
Myanmar would go in for presidential elections in 2015. The US would like to have Opposition leader and democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi at the helm of affairs in Myanmar. Her contesting elections will depend on Parliament amending Article 477 of the Constitution. Parliament is scheduled to take up the work later in the week, and there are slim chances of it getting passed. This could leave the US, hard-pressed for options.
Prior to Obama’s, a meeting was held at President Thein Sein’s residence on 31 October, to which all political party leaders were invited. The meeting is said to have reviewed the political reforms in the country before the US President’s visit. Aung San Suu Kyi has expressed disappointment at the outcome of the meeting, saying that the reforms were unsatisfactory.All this was after the President Obama had spoken to President Thein Sein and promised support for the reforms.
Assessing the reforms
The contentious nature of the reforms has not stopped the world from coming closer to Myanmar. As the chair of ASEAN for the first time and host of the East Asia Summit for the second time, Myanmar has been able to extract commitments from leaders across the globe.
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot committed to closer economic ties with Myanmar during his visit this week. Japan has also promised $250 billion loan for the country’s infrastructure development and the Dawei deep-sea port.
The US, which was to be a key to Myanmar’s opening to the world, has however been cautious and has taken positions on nature of reforms initiated by Myanmar. It has also been Myanmar’s most scathing critic on the latter’s treatment to the Muslims in Rakhine state.
The reforms and that too for a country emerging from the shadows of military rule need time. The US disillusionment with Myanmar is a result of its expectations from the nation, which might not have been realistic under the circumstances. However, it has come to accept that it will take time for democracy to come of age in Myanmar. Until then, the US can put pressure on the government to resolve the Rohingya-Muslim issue peacefully.
However, for now the situation in Myanmar has become a gamble for US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(The writer is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata)
Nepal: Continuing crisis in writing a new Constitution
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury
Nepal’s political trajectory since last decade is remarkable. The country has been passing through a series of transitional phases in her march towards democracy and rule of law. In this context, the latest phase of 2006-07 has become very crucial with the promulgation of the Interim Constitution and the start of the Peace Process.
The 12-Point Understanding of November 2005 between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the then rebel Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) was instrumental in leading the people’s movement of 2006, restoring the dissolved Parliament, eliminating direct royal rule and forming an interim government. Another landmark was the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) between the interim government of Nepal and CPN-M, which was concluded in November 2006.
The CPA formally ended the Maoist armed conflict by terminating military action and arms mobilisation by both Maoist and government. It kept combatants in cantonments and/or camps and called upon both parties ro commit themselves to upholding uphold human rights, international human rights laws, and civil liberties.
The CPA also had several other provisions for monitoring the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). This followed the all-party government with participation of CPN-M in cabinet which paved the road for Constituent Assembly elections. All these have made a new history for Nepal. However, the political leaders of Nepal have very little success in adopting country’s unanimously acceptable Constitution. Why has it been so? How much time will it take to adopt a constitution acceptable to all? Is political class in Nepal losing its credibility? Are fringe groups like Janajatis, Dalits, Madhesis and so on re-occupying the space?
Looking back
The first Constituent Assembly (CA) election was held on 10 April 2008 after two failed attempts. The election gave victory to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as the largest party in the CA. Comprising 601 members from 25 political parties, the CA officially started its journey on 28 May 2008 with the mandate of drafting a democratic and inclusive Constitution within the stipulated pwriod of two years.
However, the CA failed to produce the new Constitution within the stipulated time and it caused much controversy and chaos within Nepal. On 28 May 2010, the CA passed the 8th Amendment Bill to the Interim Constitution to extend tenure of the CA by one year with a two-thirds majority. The Bill amended the existing two-year term with three years for adopting an inclusive Constitution.
But the CA has failed to do so and was ultimately dissolved with a number of contentious issues like the forms of government, the electoral system, name, number and the boundaries of federal provinces, protection of preferential rights, the independence of the judiciary and arrangements for the transitional period after the promulgation of the new Constitution. However, to the experts in Nepal, federalism has become the most contentious issue since the formation of the first CA. How the central State will enter the federal arrangement is a crucial question.

Collateral damage, sovereignty, and differentiated resentment

Civil wars are drawn-out conflicts, often lasting up to a decade or even longer before a political settlement is reached. Pakistan's military campaign against Pashtun militants, variously allied to the Afghan Taliban, the al-Qaeda, and often fighting for localised interests has stretched into its 12th year.
Analysis
Civil wars are drawn-out conflicts, often lasting up to a decade or even longer before a political settlement is reached. Pakistan’s military campaign against Pashtun militants, variously allied to the Afghan Taliban, the al-Qaeda, and often fighting for localised interests has stretched into its 12th year. Even though Government’s stated policy against the principal insurgent conglomeration — the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan — is based on the Three D’s, Development, Dialogue, and Deterrence, its decade-long counter-insurgency strategy hinges on the use of military force against rebel held territories.
So far, the Government has launched episodic operations in each of the seven units of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), besides three large scale offensives in Swat valley. While each military campaign has been shaped by both local and domestic, and not to speak of international, contexts, several generalisations can be drawn out. Pakistan’s latest anti-militancy efforts are in the form of the Zarb-e-Azb operation being carried out in North Waziristan region against foreign and local terrorists.
First, most operations have been preceded by large-scale, albeit localised, migration. In the case of Zarb-e-Azb, which was launched in June 2014, over 900,000 displaced civilians were registered by mid-July. Second, unlike other conflicts like Kashmir, Punjab, and Balochistan, where State intervention occurred during the incipient stages of the insurgency, Pakistan tends to engage militarily after the insurgent movement has built a strong organisation and also established a kind of ’sovereign control’ over its region of influence.
International interference
Third, much of counter-insurgency, especially its initial phase, resembles conventional war. Air strikes, area-weapons like artillery are generously used and large division-level operations conducted. These have produced significant civilian casualties even though the true extent of it remains disputed owing to the difficulties of independent verification. Fourth, insurgency in the tribal areas has also been the site of international interference, both by trans-national non-State terrorist organisations like the al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and also by the US.
Al-Qaeda has been responsible for unprecedented civilian deaths throughout Pakistan. The US, on the other hand, has carried out a hardly-covert program of drones, pilotless aircrafts that operate from bases in Afghanistan that constantly fly over insurgent controlled areas and fire missiles without Pakistan’s authorisation or knowledge, often killing civilians simply by virtue of their proximity to suspected insurgents.
Until 2013, 369 drone strikes were carried out by the US in Pakistan. It is hardly surprising that Pakistan’s state and society has been reluctant to take ownership of counterinsurgency; public support wanes in crucial periods, perception of the threat posed by the TTP continues to be disputed, and when the threat is realised, the contours of state response is hotly debated.
Civilian casualties
The sharp differences notwithstanding, public opinion seems to be constant over one particular aspect of counte-rinsurgency. Civilian casualties caused by US controlled drones are detested by the military, the civilian government, civil society, and the affected population alike, and understandably so.
Large-scale violence produced by the Pakistani military, paramilitaries, and police, on the other hand, is routinely pushed aside as ’collateral damage’, the inevitable damage that occurs as a result of the fog of war in civil conflicts. The strategy of turning against rebels allied to Afghan rebels routinely eulogised as resistance fighters is contested, but the manner in which such military operations are conducted hardly elicits public debate. Why?
Rhetoric and sentiments
Several factors account for this apparent anomaly in public perception of wartime civilian deaths. First, while public opinion is generally averse to civilian casualties, its salience is sharpened when it violates Pakistan’s sovereignty. In the process, several criticisms are congealed into a single narrative – that the war is imposed on the country, the Taliban are misguided youth whose terror is a reaction against State violence, Pakistan is fighting a war that it does not need and is hurting its economy, and that Pakistan’s foreign policy is no longer autonomous but is rather dictated by the US.
Drone-strikes accentuate such arguments and consolidate them into a singular discourse. In other words, criticism against civilian deaths caused by drones masks the entire gamut of issues plaguing US-Pakistan relations, and particularly the counter-terrorism cooperation.
Within the rhetoric and sentiments of nationalism, micro-dynamics play a part too. Turning to the technology of war, the threat of violence posed by drones is markedly different from the conventional assaults launched by the Pakistan military from time to time. Military operations generally mark the beginning of state response and succeed in driving most of the insurgents away even if their stated objective is to kill them.
Subsequent phases of counterinsurgency involve continuous deployment of troops and occasional raids and arrests, but the bulk of the actual violence is concentrated in the initial phase of counterinsurgency. Indeed, this template is noticed in all counterinsurgencies conducted by armies steeped in training for conventional war. Drones on the other hand, fly continuous, around the clock, over regions of Taliban control.
The constant sight and sound of armed drones flying overhead have caused untold stress and mental anxiety among the tribes people, forcing an otherwise stoic community to seek psychological therapy to cope with the constant fear of death. In a telling testimony last year, fourteen year old Zubair Ur Rehman told the US Congress, "I no longer love blue skies. In fact, I like gray skies; the drones cannot fly when the skies are gray."
Collective cost
While drones are usually viewed as intelligence-gathering and precision-strike weapons, their utility in imposing a collective cost on villages who either harbour insurgents and do not rise against them out of legitimate security concerns has evaded the scrutiny of analysts so far. Under such harsh circumstances, stronger resentment against drones when compared to harsh but time-bound military operations conducted by the army is entirely understandable.
Writing on an entirely different conflict, Ashutosh Varshney had remarked evocatively, "Human beings both think and feel…an average citizen knows only one truth, the felt truth, the emotional truth". Whether seen from the national or the rational perspective, differentiated public response against wartime civilian deaths at both the local and the national levels does not posed a discrepancy after all.
(The writer is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)
Sri Lanka: Deep-sea fishing the only way-out to end TN row?
N Sathiya Moorthy
With Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa ordering freedom for five Tamil Nadu fishers, sentenced to death in a drug-smuggling case, it’s time that the concerned governments in India looked at ways — and the means — to avoid the recurrence of such unsavoury episodes. ’Deep-sea fishing’ for southern Tamil Nadu fishers affected by constant arrests at the hands of Sri Lanka Navy personnel in the latter’s waters (and acknowledged as such by the exclusively-competent Government at the Centre in India) seems to be the only way out.
Without having to go into the merits of the present case, the arrest, et al, it is time alternative sources of fishing for TN fishers in the impacted region(s) need to be pursued with greater vigour than already. That way, deep-sea fishing’ as the alternative has start-up advantages. One, since Budget-2011, the Tamil Nadu Government has acknowledged it as either an alternative, or additional source of fishing – without clarifying which and what. Since granting a 25 percent subsidy for conversion of existing bottom-trawlers to deep-sea vessels at the time, the State Government’s Budget-2014 has doubled the figure to 50 percent, since.
Then State Chief Minister Jayalalithaa, in her detailed memorandum to Prime Minister Narendra Modi at their first meeting, on the State’s various demands, sought Rs 2000-crore (approx) from the Centre, for ’vessel conversion’ and attendant on-shore facilitation. This, as also subsequent letters to PM Modi from Chief Ministers Jayalalithaa and succesor O Panneerselvam, have underscored the pending ’deep-sea’ demand of the State Government, at every turn.
Two, fishers along the southern Tamil Nadu coastline across the Palk Strait in particular acknowledge the absence of fish resources in the near-waters. It’s also a well understood fact that TN fishers crossing into waters acknowledged by the Government of India as belonging to Sri Lanka, do not stop with fishing in the ’shared’ Palk Strait.
Going after shallow-water shrimp for the export market, they could be seen fishing closer to the Sri Lankan coastline in the Tamil-exclusive Northern Province, with the naked eye. Their bottom-trawlers and other gears banned in Sri Lanka – and the ban enforced effectively for all fishers, too — has put paid to the revival of the post-war Tamil fishers in that country.
Mandated duty and more
Three, without harassment and wanton killing, if proved, the arrest of Tamil Nadu fishers in Sri Lankan waters also falls within their Navy’s mandated call of duty. The Centre, as the competent authority, having repeatedly acknowledged the IMBL, drawn up under the ’Katchchativu Accords’ of 1974 and 1976, both in Parliament and courts nearer home, there can be no justification under the international law for the TN fishers to continue with their habit of decades, possibly not centuries. In those centuries, more than Indian fishers in their small vessels, it might be coastal TN mariners working on the merchantman, who might have settled down on the Sri Lankan coast temporarily – or, permanently. If nothing else, there was no shortage of fish at the time in what has now been demarcated as ’Indian waters’ at the time, for Indian fishers to get closer to what was still Sri Lankan coast.
Whether there was any demarcated IMBL at the time did/does not matter to the submisison. Nor were any cold-storage and other preservation methods known in those distant times, for now claiming rights over ’historic waters’ and ’traditional fishing’. Whether such claims would stand the test of international law needs to be ascertained in a full measure.
Equally important, even with a favourable order, if at all, could Indian fishers fish in safety in somebody else’s waters remains a question. Should they come in physical contact with their Sri Lankan Tamil counterparts (more than the SLN initially), then what should law-enforcement agencies in that country, do about it? Needless to recall that both during earlier rounds of ’Eelam Wars’ and also the early part of the famed but failed cease-fire period (2002-2006), the LTTE had ’arrested’ Tamil Nadu fishers for ’poaching’ in the waters under their control. The sentiments remain.
It was all a product of bottom-trawling introduced (only) in the Sixties with Norwegian assistance, for Government of India to increase export-earnings from every sector in a big way, without the purponents nearer home studying the long-term consequences. The Government of India that had funded bottom-trawling then would have to now finance deep-sea fishing too, and not just in the shared and troubled waters of the Palk Strait. It’s more so, considering that that the 12-crore strong fishing community (both inland and coastal), accounting for 10 percent of the nation’s population, has remained neglected and mostly un-suppported by successive governments and their political leaderships and partners alike, and at all levels.
Concurrent List
’Fisheries’ comes under the Concurrent List of the Constitution. Despite having a 7000-long coastline (the longest of them falling under PM Modi’s Gujarat State), his leadership belieed pre-poll hopes of his creating a separate Fisheries Ministry, to mend to the maritime interests of the nation, going beyond strategic and internal security concerns. Traditionally, ’Fisheries’ has remained an addended department of the Union Agriculture Ministry, with no Cabinet Minister holding the post ever expressing any views or concerns about the pllight of any section of fishers, inland or coastline, anywere in the country.
The Tamil Nadu Government’s proposition for encouraging deep-sea fishing in the troubled waters with Sri Lanka, and demand for Central funding throws up both an opportunity and challenge for the Centre. They also have to be construed as the State Government’s acknowledgement of an identified solution. They also imply that the State Government would work with the Centre in implementing/enforcing the decision on the ground, in consultation and cooperation with the fishers in the affected areas.
What is required then is for the Centre to study the State Government’s proposal, seek clarifications and come up with a detailed implementation process, if the former is found agreeable. The implementation paper will naturally have to include such elements as financing conversion/purchase of deep-sea vessels and the required gears, training in deep-sea fishing and knowledge of deep-sea fishes that have overseas marketability in particular, cold-storage facilities, marketing techniques, etc.
Needless to point out, various agencies of the Union Fisheries Department and also the Fisheries Ministry in the State(s) may have the required data and also the niche-area experts and resources to undertake further and specific studies, if and if only found required. What will then be required is the political will and persuasive skills of the Centre – which has been found lacking all along in the past decade and more – for taking the State Government along, convincingly and through constant and continuous engagement at all levels, if required at the highest levels, too.
Convinced of ’innocence’
Such a need arises out a visible lack of comprehensive knowledge of issues involved in the fishing row, all across Tamil Nadu and at various strata of polity and policy-making, policy-research, etc. Nowhere else was this ignorance more visible than the political discourse and media debates on the fate of the five condemned fishermen. Not only was there no appreciation of the continuing success of India’s quiet diplomacy ever since the fishers’ problem hit the roof years ago, there were even condemnation and insinuations against incumbent Government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi as was against the predecessor Manmohan Singh dispensation.
Indian diplomats, both in Delhi and Colombo, seemed to have clearly understood the gravity of the situation almost from the day the five fishers were arrested on drug-smuggling charge in 2011. They had also obviously studied the Sri Lankan law in the matter, the way forward and the way out. Throughout the period, until the freedom for five was granted by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa on his birthday on 19 November, India also seemed aware when to take up the matter, how and where. If they have waited until now, it has paid off. Even while freeing the five Indian fishers, officials in Colombo have clarified that the same facility would not be available to their three Sri Lankan Tamil counterparts, condemned to death along with them.

A possible new phase in ties with the US

The first few weeks of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's tenure has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity. The steps taken by him in the foreign policy domain give a clear indication of the new government's priorities.
Analysis
The first few weeks of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s tenure has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity. The steps taken by him in the foreign policy domain give a clear indication of the new government’s priorities. Nowhere is this more evident than in the approach taken by him towards the US.
At the time of assuming office, President Ghani’s task was complicated by the legacy left behind by his predecessor, Hamid Karzai. Mr Karzai’s last few years in office had coincided with deterioration in Afghanistan’s relations with the US. Mr Karzai had taken to denouncing the American intervention at any opportunity and blaming them for the country’s present predicament. This is something that he has continued to indulge in, even after leaving office. Mr Karzai’s behaviour and aggressive rhetoric possibly created further difficulties for the US to continue its engagement with Afghanistan, which was becoming increasingly unpopular back home.
Task cut out
President Ghani naturally found his task cut out as far as managing relations with the US was concerned. It was critical for him to attempt to mend the relations as much as possible at the beginning itself. While it is still very early to judge how well he has fared in this task, and a number of obstacles remains, the start has been encouraging.
The biggest positive development in this area was the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US within days of President Ghani assuming office. The BSA allows the US to maintain a residual force within Afghanistan beyond 2014. Although the draft of the agreement was approved by a Loya Jirga, especially convened for this purpose, over a year ago, Mr Karzai had refused to sign it, passing the task on to his successor.
The delay in signing the BSA had raised concerns about the future of America’s military involvement in Afghanistan. The US, and even NATO, claimed that without the signing of the pact it would not be possible to maintain any foreign troops in the country. Both President Ghani and his Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, during their electoral campaign, had stressed the importance of the prolonged presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan post-2014, and gave assurances that the signing of the BSA would be a priority.
While the pact paves the way for foreign troops to remain behind in Afghanistan, it remains to be seen how effective they will be. Given that they were unable to make a lasting dent on the insurgency at the height of the US surge between 2009 and 2011, it would be a huge ask to expect the drastically reduced residual force to accomplish this task. The US is expected to maintain just 9800 troops and the other allied NATO nations will provide the remaining 2000 or so troops. This becomes especially difficult given that the bulk of the residual force would be expected to serve in an advisory and supporting role.
Move in the right direction
However, despite such limitations, this is definitely a move in the right direction. The signing of the pact is likely to stem the anxiety surrounding the military drawdown to an extent. The fact that the US has signed off on continuing to play a role in Afghanistan post-2014 may encourage the rest of the international community to continue their engagement with and assistance to Afghanistan. Other than the US, the fact that countries like Germany, Turkey, Italy, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and the United Kingdom will also provide troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 can be seen in this light.
More importantly, the swift nature of the decision taken by President Ghani could serve as a good precedent for what could be a new phase in Afghanistan-US relations. Already there are signs that the US may play a larger role in Afghanistan than as envisaged earlier.
For instance, US President Barack Obama has already agreed to expand the scope of the 1800-strong special operation forces by allowing them to target the Taliban insurgents as well. This enlargement of responsibility also includes the provision of providing air support to the Afghan National Security Forces. Similarly, the Afghan Government has given their sanction to the re-introduction of night raids, some of which could see the participation of the foreign forces in them. Night raids had been banned by the Karzai government despite the fact that the US forces saw them as an effective counter-insurgency mechanism. Finally, the fact that the US is contemplating increasing the number of troops itself – even if it is only by a few hundred – can be seen positively.
It is easy to dismiss all these developments as merely symbolic that will have very little impact on the ground situation. However, given the drastic changes taking place in Afghanistan presently and the disastrous consequences associated with them, even these symbolic developments can provide a platform to build upon.
(Aryaman Bhatnagar is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)
Bangladesh: Improved connectivity with India, important for economic growth
Joyeeta Bhattacharjee
The non-signing of the SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger and Cargo Vehicular Traffic among member-States, and the SAARC Regional Railways Agreement during the recently concluded SARRC summit has reinforced the need for dealing the issue of connectivity between India and Bangladesh at the bilateral level. The trade and economic relationship between India and Bangladesh is hampered due to poor connectivity. Improved connectivity will not only improve trade and economic relationship between the two countries but will also prepare ground for region integration.